Infinity Journal Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019

Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019 Infinity Journal Page 10 The literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency is voluminous and this is certainly not the place to discuss it, and wars in which insurgency is the dominant factor are invariably described as “limited.” What we must point out is that much of the writing on these topics is tactical and thus not directly related to our discussion. The literature suffers from an endemic lack of self-awareness on this point and does not deal with the reality that tactical fixes often cannot address the larger strategic challenges. This failing can lead to simplistic recommendations for addressing one of the most complicated military problems. Unfortunately, space requires us to risk making the same error. The Foundation for Analysis: The Political Objective As with all wars,we must begin the analysis by understanding the political objectives sought. Insurrections are invariably classified as limitedwars because the insurgents—tactically— fight using traditional guerrilla warfare methods with forces that are usually (but certainly not always) small, weak, and poorly armed—at least initially. It is the political objective that provides the clearest basis for analysis, not the size of the force or the means and methods of warfare. Insurrections can pursue limited or unlimited political objectives, which will depend upon the situation at hand. Do the insurgents want the overthrow of the regime (an unlimited political objective) or do they want something less, say, for example, 13 colonies in an imperial backwater.[i] Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists sought an unlimited political objective—the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist regime. The insurgents may also have different objectives against different opponents. The North Vietnamese sought the destruction of the South Vietnamese regime, but also the ousting of the US from South Vietnam. In either case, the primacy of politics reigns supreme. This is also true even if the political objective is clothed in religious rhetoric. As always, the value of the political objective or aim is key.[ii] If the insurgents want the overthrow of the regime this implies a high value on the object for the insurgents as well as the leaders and supporters of the regime that is now protecting itself. It is the counterinsurgent who is fighting the war for a limited political objective. Indeed, the counterinsurgent—or counter-insurrectionist (a term taken from historian Jeremy Black)—is always seeking a limited political objective because they wish to preserve the regime and its control. Understandably, some will see this as counterintuitive. The political objective of maintaining control should not be confused with the fact that the government might be forced to destroy the enemy to achieve its limited aim. Do not confuse the aim with the means and methods used. If the objective of the insurgents is not regime change but the redress of some grievances, the regime is wise to try and settle this via negotiations, which is historically one of the ways of ending an insurrection or insurgency and should not be balked at except under very unusual circumstances. Sometimes the counterinsurgent surrenders to impatience here when they should not, denies the legitimacy of any grievances, and fights when talking might be the answer.The counterinsurgent also sometimes wants to fight with the tools and methods they possess without having to incur much in the way of political or social costs while failing to realize when they need to adjust to the situation at hand.[iii] The classic 1940 US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual offers excellent advice here: “The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the conditions of unrest may be economic, political, or social.”[iv] Negotiations can be even more useful if this can lead to quick achievement of the political objective desired, though one should be cautious about ceasing to apply military pressure during negotiations as this can be interpreted as weakness. To cite this Article: Stoker, Donald,“A Typology of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Infinity Journal ,Volume 6, Issue 4, summer 2019, pages 10-17. A Typology of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Donald Stoker Atlas Organization,Washington D.C. Donald Stoker taught strategy for the U.S. Naval War College's Program in Monterey, California, for 18 years. He is currently a Senior Fellow with Atlas Organization in Washington, DC. His eleventh book, from which this article is drawn, is Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and U.S Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2019). By Staff Sergeant Aaron Allmon - This Image was released by the United States Air Force with the ID 060203-F-7823A-008, Public Domain.