Infinity Journal Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019

Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019 Infinity Journal Page 34 The title of this article might seem, to those conversant in the subject at hand, to be inverted. That is, strategies make use of force and so their conception and formation must occur before it is decided how force is to be used to accomplish them. This view fits nicely into the traditional ends/ways/ means syllogism that has been the foundation of strategy courses for generations; the possibility of a chicken-or-egg problem being potentially disruptive in any number of ways. However, the author, having had to formulate war plans (if only notional and local) meant to produce political effects, has found that in practice there is a rather chaotic search process that occurs at the outset of strategy generation, one that can, and frequently has, over the course of history, produced counterproductive strategies when effective ones were possible, judging by the ends desired and means at hand. How to reduce the chaos? On the one hand, Clausewitz asserts that it is the innate aptitude (genius) of the decision maker that sees the glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and…the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”[i] This view is generally supported by Colin Gray, who concludes that the complexity of the environment in which strategy is made makes any attempt to teach it futile.[ii] With due respect to both writers, it is only responsible to try and find some way to assist those who must produce strategic plans. If we grant that yes, strategy is beset by “intellectual complications and extreme diversity of factors and relationships”[iii], we still must try and find a way to increase the odds that someone will detect the glimmerings and be able to follow them. In an epistemological sense, one way to get a grip on some complex problem is to find its practical boundaries, and within those boundaries define the range of alternative ways of dealing with it. In military planning terms the ideal, when doing a commander’s estimate of the situation, is to develop mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive lists of both enemy and friendly options. What this means is that each and every possible course of action has been identified. As a practical matter this is of course virtually impossible, but the closer one can come to the ideal, within the constraints of available time and effort, the more confidence one can have in the decision emanating from the estimate. Of course, the military estimate process is normally employed by commanders at the tactical and operational levels, the complications at the strategic level obviating its routine use there.That being said, it appears to this author that the basic logic of the estimate can be used to ease the intellectual complexity and disorder encountered when making strategy. Let’s start with Infinity Journal’s own definition of strategy: “Military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.”[iv] The key words are“the use of force and the threat of force.” Can one delimit the number of ways force can be used? If so, there would at least be some kind of menu a strategist could employ to organize his or her thinking. In the view of this author there is such a delimitation possible. The possible ways force can be used devolves into four categories: definitive, coercive, catalytic and expressive. This taxonomy is a modification of that coined by James Cable in his book Gunboat Diplomacy.[v] Cable is focused on the limited use of naval force short of war, but the author found that Cable’s logic could be extended throughout the spectrum of conflict, and was of direct utility in being able to see the forest for the trees in a war planning problem with which he was confronted. Let’s first establish the taxonomy and then see where it led the author. Definitive Force A tactical commander who is ordered to take a hill occupied by enemy forces, and does so by assault, is using force in a definitive manner. It would be nice if, after the preparatory artillery bombardment, white flags appeared, but the orders contemplated the need for a ground assault that either drove the enemy out or killed and captured the defenders.The end Robert Rubel Naval War College (Retired) Captain Robert Rubel was a light attack and strike fighter naval aviator and a faculty member at the Naval War College where he instructed in planning and decision making, directed the Wargaming Department and served for eight years as the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He has published over thirty journal articles and book chapters. To cite this Article: Rubel, Robert, “Antecedents to Strategy: The Use of Force”, Infinity Journal , Volume 6, Issue 4, summer 2019, pages 34-38. Antecedents to Strategy: The Use of Force ID 35318946 © Andrei Moldovan | Dreamstime.com