Infinity Journal Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019

Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019 Infinity Journal Page 4 Introduction: The Mystery of Strategy I will argue in this essay that strategy differs from other components of national and international security in a way that commonly is hardly recognized. Whereas all politics/ policy, operations, and tactics can have a contemporary empirical reality that can be verified, strategy alone is an actuality of the future which will be verifiable only through understanding the consequences of thought and behavior. Strategy can be what is intended today, but its reality can exist strictly only in the future. It must always potentially be a guide or warning for tomorrow. Only a few commentators and historians have come close to recognizing why the concept of strategy has proved so elusive, even almost evasive.This author has been a student of strategy for more than fifty years, but I must confess that in all that time I failed to seek out with sufficient rigor the core of the challenge that, at long last, I accept in this essay. What I find rather puzzling is the nature of this enquiry. I admit that sufficient light appeared and illuminated what previously had eluded me only fully when it was all but thrust in my face by my need to think more deeply than usual about strategy’s meaning. I needed to draft my book, Theory of Strategy .[i] I have complained, often probably pedantically, about popular, and much supposedly expert, misuse of the ‘strategic’ adjective. Through frequent abuse the noun, strategy, and inevitably the adjective, strategic, have lost much conceptual integrity.Since Infinity Jour nal is committed uncompromisingly to the better understanding of strategy, it must be assumed to welcome some fundamental reflection on the subject. An unavoidable problem exists in the minds of those who sincerely do not find the current conceptual vagueness of the subject troubling.Before proceeding further I need to register firmly that in my opinion misunderstanding of strategy, often in the past as also commonly in the present, has been exceedingly painful and expensive.It is improbable that the conceptual habits of generations can or would be turned around, but one can always try. Theory Military students may strive to resist the idea, but the function of military, even strategic, theory simply is to explain the meaning of thoughts and events. Empirical reality can appear a morass of happenings and possibilities that seems designed to promote confusion. Theory, particularly strategic theory, has been conceived, even elaborated, to help enable us to think clearly,which usually means relatively economically and simply. Probably the most valuable contribution that theory can make to understanding lies in its terse identification of conceptual structure. This task may seem too elementary to detain us for long, but in historical practice many a fine army has failed because it could not function as required by a High Command unduly enamored of its own brilliance. The beginning of wisdom about military affairs needs to be through holistic appreciation of the actuality of defense preparation and warfare itself. All too understandably, a holistic grasp of events is not to be expected, or required, of the performance of the soldier junior in rank. However, war and its warfare as a whole phenomenon, is apt to call for the full commitment of participants of every rank. Reference to ‘Strategic Corporals’ and the like of recent years has recognized a deep truth about the phenomenon of war. The focus on strategy and strategic in this essay obliges full recognition that should be so obvious almost as seeming too obvious to be worthy of particular notice. Basic to all contextually specific theories of strategy is the eternal and universal authority recognized as residing in a familiar conceptual mantra. Strategy is expressed with praiseworthy economy to require a careful, if often complex, balance among policy ends, strategic ways, and most probably military means – with the entire exercise seasoned by heavy or light application of pertinent assumptions.When considering the wisdom or otherwise of ventures in statecraft Colin S. Gray United Kingdom Professor Colin Gray is a retired independent scholar. He has a D.Phil from Oxford (Lincoln College) and has published many books, including Modern Strategy (OUP, 1999) and The Strategy Bridge : Theory for Practice, (OUP, 2010). His most recent book is Theory of Strategy , (OUP 2018). To cite this Article: Gray, Colin S.,“Why is Strategy Different,” Infinity Journal ,Volume 6, Issue 4, Summer 2019, pages 4-8. Why Strategy is Different ID 35318276 © Andrei Moldovan | Dreamstime.com