Volume 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022 34 This should not be inferred from the Second NagornoKarabakh War. A careful study of Armenia's air defence shows that it was not "formidable", certainly not where drones are concerned. Exact amounts of the various missile systems are not available, but they included a combination of Strela-10 (SA-13), Osa (SA-8), Kub (SA-6), Krug (SA-4), S-300 and Tor. Except the Tor, all were older less capable versions. Only the Tor was a threat to the Bayraktar TB-2 and Israelimade suicide-drones.[xiv] The effective range of the Strella-10s and Osas against the TB-2 drone sized targets was shorter than the range of the missiles these carried; whereas the longer-ranged Kubs, Krugs and S-300s were optimized against targets bigger and faster than the drones, so to them the drones were invisible.[xv] Apparently there were only 6 Tors. Given the overall size of NagornoKarabakh and its mountainous terrain, 6 Tors were a drop in the bucket compared to the number needed to create a robust defence with overlapping fields-of-fire to provide cover for each other. One Tor was destroyed towards the end of the war. The Azeris observed it with a drone from a safe distance till it folded its antenna and drove into a garage for maintenance or rest. As soon as it was unable to defend itself, it was bombarded with a number of suicide drones. Not only were the Armenians lacking in numbers of relevant systems, but neither did they use those they had properly – sending them alone rather than providing each other cover. So basing computations of the future capability of drones against air defences on the Nagorno-Karabakh war is misleading. It cannot be assumed in advance that future enemies will be as weak as the Armenians were. An important question is why did the Armenians not acquire better systems – this war was not the first time they had faced drone strikes launched by the Azeris. The Azeris had used Israel-made suicide drones in a number of previous skirmishes since 2016. However, apparently the Armenians believed they were protected. After a four-day skirmish in July 2020, an Armenian Major-General stated that during that skirmish: "… the Armenian army destroyed more than a dozen Israeli strike drones that were in the Azerbaijani arsenal within a matter of days. These drones were made of the best technology and they were considered indestructible."[xvi] The only change made by the Azeris from the July skirmish to the war, was to add a new drone to their arsenal – the missile-firing Bayraktar TB2 drone, enabling them to strike targets up to 8 kilometers away. The vast majority of the strike videos released by the Azeri Ministry of Defence were filmed by the TB2s, but these include videos of suicide-drone strikes, so it is not quite clear how many of these videos show actual TB2 strikes or the TB2 is merely the spotter for the suicide-drone attack. If the new missile-firing drone is the reason for the change in level of success, it would suggest that the Armenian air defences had been perhaps sufficiently effective in shooting-down of suicide-drones, which need to approach the target and therefore operate deep in the defensive envelope of the defensive systems, including ordinary antiaircraft guns. An alternative explanation is that the Azeris had used their suicide-drones sparingly, so the Armenians were lulled into complacency by their presumed success in defeating this weapon. One weakness of the remotely piloted drone is the threat that the enemy might override the controls and force it to crash by jamming or spoofing the signals sent by its pilot. One report claimed that 9 Azeri drones had been brought down in this manner when they flew too near a Russian army base in Armenia.[xvii] After the war, an Armenian general stated that the Armenians had successfully used a Russian electronic warfare system for several days. He did not specify whether the system brought down the drones or just forced them to maintain pilot control.[xviii] The lesson is clear – armies must develop and procure large numbers of anti-drone capable systems. Systems optimized to confront manned-aircraft are usually not sufficient to confront the smaller drones – though against larger drones they can be effective.[xix] Some analysts have suggested the issue was the lack of Armenian combat-field-craft – they were parked or drove in the open with insufficient use of camouflage or terrain concealment and often were too tightly bunched into a convenient target to be detected and attacked. However, better combat-field-craft would not have solved the Armenians' problem. The terrain over most of the theater is devoid of tall vegetation or other options of concealment. Furthermore, some strike videos clearly show failed attempts to conceal equipment in small woods or under camouflage nets. The ability of the drones to conduct long sweeps of an area with multi-spectral cameras enabled them to find these targets too. Furthermore, concealment prevents movement – how would the Armenians have brought up reinforcements or conducted counter-attacks while hiding? Also, the concept of spreading out against small guided steep trajectory munitions is almost irrelevant – unlike statistical or flat-trajectory munitions, the miss, if it occurs will be very close to the target, and the warheads are fairly small. The only solution is to provide active interception of the drones and the munitions – an 'interception dome' of mobile weapons that can cover an area large enough for a ground forces company or battalion to maneuver in and can move with that unit to maintain that dome wherever it goes. Electronic warfare is useful but might accidentally bring down friendly drones, whereas interception weapons can be equipped to discern friendly from hostile drones. Another issue is that whether using physical interceptors or electronic warfare, the defending unit continuously signals its own location and that of the unit it is defending to the enemy's signals intelligence. Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data Eado Hecht
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