Military Strategy Magazine - Volume 7, Issue 4

Volume 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022 35 Conclusions What can be learned from this war on the topic of drones? First a qualification – an issue not discussed here is the tactical effect of drone-swarms as opposed to single drones, since none were employed. Second – it is clear that the hype was exaggerated. The Azeri drones were essential for their victory, but did not win the war alone, severe ground fighting was necessary. Some of the lessons are not new – when one side has an advantage in the air, he gains a considerable advantage on the ground too. To quote Erwin Rommel, who faced manned-aircraft – not drones: "Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with same chances of success."[xx] The Azeris did not command the air, but the ability of their drones to exploit a specific gap in the Armenian air defence, gave them freedom to use the air and gradually, as they destroyed more and more Armenian air defence assets, provided operational freedom to use manned-aircraft too. However, this gap was created by Armenian mistakes, not by the essential nature of drone warfare. Furthermore, the gap can probably only be reduced, not fully closed, because of even smaller drones used by the Islamic State and other organizations. The converse is that the smaller the drones needed to exploit what remains of that gap, the smaller the size of the munitions they can carry and therefore the smaller their tactical effect. In fact, most of the drones today can carry munitions equivalent only to attack-helicopters. Whenever a bigger bomb is needed manned aircraft are still needed to carry them. This will probably change in the future, but is correct for several years at least. The effect of drones on the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh was a replication of events in Syria and Libya. Though again, one should be wary of statements over-hyping the effects there too. "Turkey used its fleet of drones to lay waste to Syrian Arab Army (SAA) tanks, vehicles, and air defenses, while Azerbaijan was able to do much the same against Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh."[xxi] This misrepresents events in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Syria. Syrian regime forces were initially surprised and shocked as they had no air defence assets facing a Rebel force devoid of aircraft. However, after suffering many fewer casualties than claimed in press releases by the Turks, the Syrian recovered within 24 to 48 hours, halted the Rebel ground attack the Turkish drone-offensive was supporting and counter-attacked to retake all ground lost to the Rebels and more. In Syria and Libya, the drones attacked in a permissive environment regarding anti-drone defences. However, it should be remembered that manned aircraft have been operating like this for many years, even when the enemy ostensibly has some air defence capability – see the Israeli air force's almost complete freedom of action since 1982. However, exaggerated though the hype may be, the obvious lesson from all these events is that ground forces need to invest significantly in developing and procuring effective anti-small-drone equipment. Once the technological issue is solved, as it should be fairly easily, the tactical issue must be addressed – training units to deploy and maneuver together with the new equipment so as not to accidentally move outside the protective dome they provide and learning to operate one's own drones through that dome. Drones do provide some new tactical capabilities: longer loitering times compared to manned-aircraft; the ability of the pilot, sitting in an office, to calmly survey the ground and focus on detection and targeting and when he tries – to exchange seats with someone fresh; the quality of the pilot's surveillance equipment. But they do not, in as of themselves, radically change the ability or utility of airpower on the battlefield. The results achieved in Nagorno-Karabakh were not better than those achieved by drone-less properly handled air forces in previous wars. Had the Azeris employed an air force with capabilities similar to those of the USA, Israel or similar armies, the result would have been at least the same, and some would argue even better – given the more powerful bombs carried by manned aircraft. A tactical revolution is not in the offing, however a strategic revolution is. It comes not from the tactical capabilities of the drones, but from their cheapness, simplicity and availability compared to manned aircraft. States and organizations who cannot afford a full-capability air force of manned-aircraft can now acquire a capability that may not be as comprehensive or as powerful as manned aircraft. Thus this is a huge leap from nothing, or almost nothing, to capabilities they could only dream of. For states like the USA, Western Europe, Turkey and Israel, with large, advanced air forces of manned-aircraft, the drones are an incremental, albeit useful, improvement. For states like Azerbaijan, unable to fund and maintain an air force, though it had a smaller weaker air force, this was a radical enhancement in military capability. For an organization like Hezbollah, which cannot even establish and maintain an air force like Azerbaijan's and which only began to use armeddrones during its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, this is an enormous leap up. For decades the Israeli army has been used to fighting without looking up to see whose aircraft was rumbling overhead, knowing with virtually 100% certainty it was Israeli. It can no longer be certain of that and must prepare to operate under unfriendly skies. Achieving air-superiority in one fell swoop as in 1967 is no longer an option. That is undoubtedly true also in other Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data Eado Hecht

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