Volume 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022 40 Distinctly lacking from Dr. Strangelove as well as answers to the question above is one organization in particular, NATO. For a film on the high politics of nuclear deterrence between the United States and the USSR, particularly one with a British character, it is a distinctly glaring omission. Major Cold War crises almost always included consultation between NATO allies, from the Korean War to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is the case across books, films, and TV as well. Occasionally a film might begin with the collapse of NATO, like Red Dawn[ii], or the Alliance is merely a side mention to the drama of the story, like in the Bond film Thunderball[iii] or the more recent German-language TV show Deutschland 83.[iv] In the Tom Clancy novel Red Storm Rising[v], NATO is peripheral, merely occupying the same space as US forces. This supporting character role for NATO in film, TV, and literature has its parallel in a particular niche corner of the academic world. In civil-military relations, that field which General Ripper alluded to earlier by invoking Clemenceau, NATOhas been at best an extrawith a speaking part, atworst mere scenery. Indeed, there has never been a dedicated and sufficiently broad study of civil-military relations with NATO in the spotlight. To begin filling this academic gap this article returns to Ripper’s question, for whom in NATO is war more important? The simple answer is both the generals and the politicians. A more involved answer is that it depends on specific circumstance, the players involved, the nature of the war and its costs. Non-discretionary wars involve a greater commitment from both while wars of choice, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, will probably be of greater interest to politicians. However, what we will see here is that to divide between the military and political is to detach two groups that share unique responsibilities in matters of war and peace, particularly in an alliance like NATO. Why NATO civil-military relations? The internal dynamics between civil andmilitaryauthorities in NATO have been, on the whole, and especially on the surface, harmonious. This however does not eliminate NATO as an interesting case. As Mara Karlin, an academic recently turned Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, has written about the generally bland civil-military relations in the Pentagon, “Infrequent or utterly ineffective dialogue may be an anomaly in practice, but the magnitude of the consequences of [a] lack of communication caution against being overly optimistic.”[vi] Just because generally effective cooperation has been the norm, does not mean this norm has never been deviated from. Contentious politics and internal conflict within NATO structures may be rare, but its consequences are often strongly felt. Meeting this standard does not take the study of NATO civil-military relations out of the woods yet. Both Samuel Huntington, the patriarch of civil-military relations theory, and the scholar Peter Feaver have been reticent to explore the alliance’s institutions. NATO’s internal dynamics are described as a “tangled mess” that “defies easy modelling,” by Feaver[vii] while Huntington’s normative ideals of the proper civil-military relationship dismisses many of NATO’s institutions as either “impractical” or unideal.[viii] Some historians have been less reticent in their approach, however. Diego Ruiz Palmer[ix] and Lawrence Kaplan[x] have led efforts to overcome the tendency to look at the political and institutional historyof theAlliance as separated from its military history. Despite this, in the introduction to a recent volume on NATO historiography, NATO historian Linda Risso has succinctly argued that the political and military institutions are “strongly interdependent, and they mutually influence each other to a point that has yet to be examined in a satisfactory account.” Revisiting NATO through Civil-Military Relations Scholars in general make little mention of NATO civilmilitary relations, though specific mention should be made of Robert Jordan’s Cold War-era companion analyses of NATO leadership[xi], as well as Ryan Hendrickson’s work on the post-ColdWar office of the Secretary General. These, however, hardly scratch the surface given the breadth of NATO institutions. It is important then to re-examine the major theories in the field, and to critically assess if they can adequately equip researchers with the tools to approach civil-military relations in the case of NATO. Samuel Huntington proposed a model of civil-military relations termed ‘objective civilian control’. Objective control, to Huntington, was the clear delineation of political and military spheres, and the total subordination of the latter to the former, while political officials are equally expected to stay out of military affairs. As put succinctly in The Soldier and the State, “A minister of war need not have a detailed knowledge of military affairs, and soldiers often make poor ministers.”[xii] The Soldier and the State also critiqued the post-Second World War trend of ‘fusionism’, that military leaders should consider non-military (economic, diplomatic, etc.) factors into account in their military judgement, and commented negatively on ‘soldier-statesmen’ in uniform who acted in largely diplomatic roles and advocated for political agendas. [xiii] Contrasted to Huntington, sociologist Morris Janowitz proposes the opposite ideal. Rather than strict military ‘professionals’, Janowitz argued that armed forces need political-military managers[xiv], who can effectively operate within the international security environment, The Screenwriter’s Guide to NATO Civil-Military Relations Davis Ellison
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