Volume 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022 41 with a major responsibility being the management of alliances.[xv] Beyond ascribing a specific “political-military officer”, Janowitz further argues that, “Every ranking field commander stationed abroad is, by virtue of his very position, a political agent…” Janowitz’s ideal officer, the political-military manager, is a reflection not only that war is an extension of politics, but that military affairs are inherently and inseparably political. Competing theories, however, from researchers such as Rebecca Schiff[xvi] and Douglas Bland[xvii], abound. British historian Hew Strachan has noted howHuntington’s theories in particular are important only for understanding American politics in 1950s but remain limited in other contexts.[xviii] Gordon Craig has warned more broadly that “it is difficult to frame a theoretical definition of appropriate roles that is not so broad as to be meaningless,”[xix] while the author David Betz has argued convincingly that in cases where little in the academic literature can provide a guidebook, “it pays to be wary of theory.”[xx] Avoiding then categorical formulations of civil-military relations (particularly those based solelyon the US case), the literature can provide only a loose framework, as well as some useful concepts like Janowitz’s “political-military manager” and Huntington’s “fusionism”. AWindow into NATO Civil-Military Relations NATO officials may loosely fit the “fusionist” and “politicalmilitary manager” concepts. Neither political or military policy, strategy, or even operations is developed or conducted in total isolation from the other. Military officers have often performed political roles, while political leaders have been deeply involved in military affairs. Take for instance the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and the staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE). Eisenhower, as the first SACEUR, served the almost exclusively political function of building support for the new organisation in allied governments and populations. General Alfred Gruenther, the third to hold the international post (1953-1956), had the task of convincing German political leaders that continued conscription was compatible with the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine.[xxi] Even more tellingly, General Lauris Norstad (1956-1963) and the SHAPE staff were intimately involved in the drafting of political directives, beyond what might be considered the normal scope of ‘military advice’. A declassified internal SHAPE history details the development of the 1957 Political Directive, which updated assessments of trends in Soviet policy that would form the basis of force reviews. Described in the internal history, “SACEUR and his staff took every opportunity to observe informally the development of this document within the framework of the civilian structure.” SHAPE staff concluded after several interventions in drafting that sought to avoid “political decision which could limit severely the military commander’s authority,” that “the Political Directive is generally acceptable to Allied Command Europe as guidance for the development of forward planning.’”[xxii] This role played by SACEUR, as well as many subordinate commanders in Europe, was, and is today, the precise stereotype of the political-military manager. NATO military officials have often found themselves in the position of not only developing military plans for the defence of Europe, but also being a key player in securing a less tangible part of the Alliance: its solidarity. Ensuring Alliance cohesion and solidarity is and has always been the ultimate political task in NATO. And it hardly falls to SACEUR alone. Both political and military authorities play an important task in this, again balanced with the equal task of ensuring effective deterrence and defence. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the subordinate Military Committee (MC), the two committees made up of all allies, are the ultimate symbols of cohesion and sources of authority in NATO, with only the NAC having the Washington Treaty as the source of its authority. It is challenging enough to explore the relationship between the set of one nation’s institutions, but what of a ‘international political-military organization’, that blends both the national and the international, military and political? Feaver’s work on principal-agent models in civilmilitary relations provides useful concepts. In the context of civil-military relations, political leaders represent the ‘principal’ while the military is the ‘agent’, contracted to carry out political orders. [xxiii] In his brief reflections on NATO, Feaver describes the Alliance principal as ‘divided’, in that rather than having a single individual or authority, such as a prime minister or president, the power of the principal is spread between the NATO allies, making the ‘game’ between principal and agent only more complex. [xxiv] For example the military authorities are divided in a host of ways, be it through the multinational MC or ‘dualhatted’ commanders with equal loyalties to the NAC and American authorities. Further complicating matters is the role of the SecretaryGeneral. Though not facing the dual hat challenge of NATO commanders, the Secretary-General experiences unique issues. As head of the International Staff (IS), the role is intended to chair NAC meetings and seek consensus, often through complex multi-player compromises in developing and agreeing NATO policies. However, neither the Secretary-General nor the IS have decision-making authority, only NAC does, and their role as principal or agent remains murky. Many have become closely involved in military affairs, such as Secretary General Dirk Stikker’s (1961-1964) close monitoring of high-readiness forces and nuclear targeting[xxv] or even Willy Claes (1994-1995) taking the extreme measure of initiating the NATO air campaign Re-Thinking the Strategic Approach to Asymmetrical Warfare Daniel Riggs
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