Military Strategy Magazine - Volume 7, Issue 4

Volume 7, Issue 4, Winter 2022 42 in Bosnia without consulting or informing the NAC.[xxvi] Inpractice, these functions and their interactionswere often quite successful. From Gruenther’s political engagement with allies, Norstad’s hand in shaping political directives, and Secretary General Stikker’s close monitoring of forces and targeting, all led to a high degree of strategic coherence that led to many NATO successes, including the integration of West Germany, delicate manoeuvring around nuclear issues, and a consistently shared view between senior political and military leaders on the proper direction of policy and planning. What happens, however, when this harmony does not come about? What can happen within NATO if fusionism is eschewed for a stricter political-military division by leaders? Czechoslovakia and Strategic Civil-Military Incoherency In the late 1960s, SACEUR General Lyman Lemnitzer (19631969) took a more “Huntingtonian” view with a strictly military definition of his role, and deliberately limited SHAPE input into policy matters. Lemnitzer being more confrontational than diplomatic, this had a strong effect on the military’s relationship with both the NAC and then Secretary General Manlio Brosio (1964-1971).[xxvii] In May 1967, then, a new guidance to the military authorities was issued, with comparatively less input from SACEUR and the military authorities in general. It emphasised that military planning should distinguish between political intentions and military capabilities, and that increases in warning levels should focus on political indicators such as a shift in Soviet policy. The Defence Planning Committee explicitly admitted that “reliance on [the probability of political warning time prior to military action] would involve considerable risk,” it was nonetheless approved as Alliance policy at the May 1967 Defence Ministers meeting. [xxviii] In other years, this may have been rather routine. But beginning in January 1968, significant political tensions grew in Central Europe. The Prague Spring[xxix], a period of political liberalisation under Alexander Dubček in Czechoslovakia (ČSSR), shook the inner workings of the Warsaw Pact and the broader Soviet sphere. Tensions rose over the course of 1968, as leaders in Prague continued to break from the Moscow orthodoxy. In Brussels, reports from SACEUR raised concerns about the capability and risk of the Warsaw Pact to quickly intervene in Czechoslovakia.[xxx] Any Soviet invasion could threaten the border with West Germany or cause a destabilising conflict. In the Political Committee however, the risk of such an intervention was dismissed, given the focus on intentions rather than capabilities.[xxxi] Warsaw Pact manoeuvres, though foreboding, stood alongside the Bratislava Declaration between Warsaw Pact leaders, including Dubček, reaffirming fidelity to MarxismLeninism and a withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed inside the ČSSR to its border. Soviet intentions, it seemed, remained committed to peaceful resolution. Some military leaders were in agreement with the Committee, particularly the local commander of the Central Army Group (CENTAG), General James Polk. Put clearly by Polk after the invasion, “we…were dealing very largely in Soviet intentions and not hard capabilities: we simply did not think itwould happen.”[xxxii] Reflective of both Feaver’s concept of divided principals and agents, the military did not have a single view on the capability vs. intention matter. Nor did the political principal. Secretary General Brosio agreed with Lemnitzer’s assessment that Warsaw Pact troops were “pressuring” Czechoslovak authorities, and that there was a latent form of military risk to the situation. Optimism, either in Prague or Brussels, was misplaced as history bore out. On the night of 20-21 August 1968 Warsaw Pact troops invaded. “NATO had no tactical warning whatsoever,” a Military Committee report described later[xxxiii], while Alliance officials and military forces relied mainly on press reports. The intention-based approach to warning had not led to heightened intelligence gathering. NATO radar had even missed Soviet aircraft entering Czechoslovakia. As put succinctly by Timothy Andrews Sayle, “NATO had proved unable to recognise Warsaw Pact military actions in the heart of Europe.”[xxxiv] After the invasion, Lemnitzer was unable to argue of the importance of this event for the Alliance, with diplomats continuing to trust Soviet assurances. [xxxv] This case is important for a number of reasons. One, it provides more nuance to the historical record of NATO in the détente period of the late 1960s. Though a period of generally reduced tensions, there was clearly misplaced optimism and undue trust in assurances from Moscow. Secondly, it reinforces the important historical civilmilitary lesson (and warning) of the dangers of incoherence at the strategic level. Taking a more strictly military role in his approach to policy-making, Lemnitzer neglected the political-militarymanager’s role in being an active player in international security affairs. More generally, it highlights the importance of civil-military relations throughout NATO’s history, in that the strategic incoherence towards the Czechoslovak crisis was uniquely “NATO” and a result of its structures. A Screenwriter’s Guide Writing about NATO civil-military relations is a bit like writing a movie about the topic. It would require a broad cast of characters, from across military and political Re-Thinking the Strategic Approach to Asymmetrical Warfare Daniel Riggs

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