Volume 8, Issue 1, Summer 2022 18 [iii] Snider and Matthews, Future of the Army Profession, 13; ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession (2019). [iv] Army Doctrine Publication ADP 1 The Army (2019); ADP Publication 1-01, Army Doctrine Primer (2019); ADP 3-0 Operations (2017); ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession (2019); FM 3-0 Operations (2017); FM 3-07 Stability (2014); FM 3-24 Insurgencies & Countering Insurgencies (2014); FM 3-24.2 Counterinsurgency Tactics (2009); SD 01 CSA Paper 01 Army MultiDomain Transformation (2021); SD 02 CSA Paper 02 Army in Military Competition (2021); Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (2021). These publications can be accessed at: Army Publishing Directorate Website (https://armypubs.army.mil/). [v] FM 3-0 Operations (2017), chap. 1, p. 39. [vi] David H. Ucko, The NewCounterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for ModernWars (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2009); Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2014). [vii] See: SD 01, CSA Paper 01, Army Multi-Domain Transformation (2021); SD 02, CSA Paper 02, Army in Military Competition (2021); Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (2021). [viii] Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter, Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). [ix] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959). [x] ADP 1-01 (2019), chap. 1, pp. 1-2. [xi] Raimo Väyrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (London: Routledge, 2006), 1-30. [xii] ADP 6-22, Change 1 (2019), chap. 1, p. 1. [xiii] ADP 3-0 (2017), 2. [xiv] For a concise history, see Milan Vego, “Science vs the Art of War,” Joint Force Quarterly 66, 3 (2012): 62-70. [xv] ADP 6-22.York: Basic Books, 2000), 32-45. [xvi] Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” 7, 17. [xvii] Everett C. Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age (New York: Routledge, 2005), 5-17. [xviii] David G. Chandler, “Napoleon, Operational Art, and the Jena Campaign” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips. (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2005), 27-39. [xix] Brett A. Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression?” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, no. 3 ( July, 2003), 427-439. [xx] Charles R. Bowery, Jr., The Civil War in the Western Theater, 1862 (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2014), 30-33, 61-62, 70-71. [xxi] Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 239-251. [xxii] US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 6 December 2018), v-xii. [xxiii] US War Department, Logistics in World War II: Final Report to the Army Service Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 244-252. The Persistence of America’s Way of Battle Antulio J. Echevarria II
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