Volume 8, Issue 1, Summer 2022 25 References [i] Also see Michael Clarke, “Back to the Future: Is ‘Integrated Deterrence’ the New ‘Flexible Response’?, The National Interest, October 23, 2021; Michael O’Hanlon, [ii] Secretary of Defense Remarks at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies Fullerton Lecture (As Prepared), July 27, 2021, Singapore. [iii] Jim Garamone, “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says,” DOD News, December 8, 2021. [iv] “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the INDOPACOM Change of Command,” Department of Defense, April 30, 2021, https:// www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarks-for-the-us-indopacom-changeof-command/. [v] Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Remarks.” [vi] Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Remarks.” [vii] Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Remarks.” [viii] Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 1. [ix] As chronicled in Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1959). [x] George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. [xi] Ibid. [xii] Summaries drawn from Michael Mazar, “Understanding Deterrence,” Perspective Series (Rand Corp: Santa Monica, CA: 2018). Also see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, NJ, Center of International Studies, January 1959) [xiii] John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Also see James J. Wirtz, “How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 58–75, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60757. [xiv] See literature review in Tim Sweijs and Samuel Zilinzik, “The Essence of Cross Domain Deterrence,” in Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs, eds., Deterrence in the 21st Century Insights from Theory and Practice (The Hague and Berlin, Springer and Asser, 2020) [xv] Herman Kahn, The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence, P-1888-RC, 2nd printing (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1960), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P1888.pdf; Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, P-1472 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1958), https://doi.org/10.7249/P1472. [xvi] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Declassified: U.S. Nuclear Weapons at Sea During the Cold War,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 72, no. 1 (2016): 58–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124664. [xvii] History drawn from J. Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, R2964FF (Santi Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983); GregoryW. Pedlow, ed., NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969 (Brussels: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1997), https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf. [xviii] As covered in George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994). [xix] As emphasized by Michael O’Hanlon, “The Best Defense? An Alternative to All-Out War or Nothing,” Brookings Blog, Order from Chaos, May 21, 2021, published online at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/21/the-bestdefense-an-alternative-to-all-out-war-or-nothing/ [xx] Andrew Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense Flexible Response and Integrated Deterrence at Sea in the 21st Century: Implications for the U.S. Navy James A. Russell
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