Volume 9, Issue 4

What makes a problem, operation, capability, or specific organization “strategic”? As the U.S. deterrence mission has broadened since the end of the Cold War, the meaning of “strategic” has become increasingly uncertain. In this article, we suggest a new way to categorize the contemporary use of the term strategic, while highlighting how current circumstances call for serious consideration of the question, “What is Strategic”?

The theory of maneuver warfare, in the course of its development, was several times influenced by "Sun Tzu". Liddell Hart and John Boyd referred extensively to core concepts and theories claimed to come from Sun Tzu. However, these references to Sun Tzu are more of a misinterpretation or invention. This article is not a critique or endorsement of Sun Tzu, but a critique of such a phenomenon: ignoring historical context and using cases arbitrarily to serve themselves.

The study and application of peacekeeping are often divorced from Strategic Theory. However, this lack of utilisation has led to a misunderstanding of warfare and conflict, which results in modest success or, more often than not, failed peacekeeping operations. This research examines the importance of incorporating Strategic Theory in peacekeeping through the case study of Rwanda’s experience and current deployment in African peacekeeping missions.

Understanding of the reasons for bad strategy is still rudimentary. Reflecting upon how the conditions that lead to poor outcomes may be mitigated lies in the cultivation of a sense of strategic humility. This endeavour rejects the idea of strategic mastery in favour of open conversation that recognises the capacity of each of us to be a strategic learner.

Western counterinsurgency theory has repeatedly failed to achieve victory. However, non-Western approaches to counterinsurgency offer a promising path forward.

This article provides tools for staff officers to describe the key issues for complex challenges in strategic and operational environments to enable senior leader decisions. It argues that staff officers can visualize and describe complex problems effectively by focusing on what a problem does, versus what it is, while ignoring unhelpful details.