Volume 11, Issue 1

This article investigates the theories of offense and defense in the writings of classical strategic thinkers Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, and Thucydides. By applying these theories, it aims to shed light on the reasons why commanders chose and changed offensive or defensive directions for their strategies.

This article provides a new reasoning framework for practitioners to ensure military assistance is deliberate, purposeful, and serving national interests. We provide an approach that helps Western militaries improve their security assistance methods so that military advisors are able to be more effective in the development of partner security forces.

Western military doctrine has long relied on Clausewitz’s much-debated “center of gravity” as a model for depicting an enemy’s primary source of strength. This article brings a fresh perspective to the question of whether the model remains relevant by comparing it to the character of war and the operational environment across three ages of warfare: the Professionalized Age, the Industrialized Age, and the Digital Age.

The history of naval warfare from Trafalgar to Jutland reveals a recurring problem: dominance can narrow how institutions think about war. This article argues that success reshapes risk calculus and doctrinal assumptions, often leaving dominant forces vulnerable to adversaries who refuse to fight on their terms. The implications for modern airpower are immediate.

Through thoughtful and careful design, postwar Japanese security policy has cleverly protected the utility of nuclear deterrence, reserving Japan’s right ultimately to possess nuclear weapons, while maintaining respect to its postwar Constitution that forever renounces war as a sovereign right. Japan’s strategy is perceived by the Japanese people as inevitable and just, given the increasing nuclear belligerence of the PRC and DPRK, both of which have decided unambiguously to become global nuclear powers.

This article examines the enduring relevance of 18th-century military leadership through a case study of the New York–New Jersey Campaign of 1776. As the character of war evolves, the character of leadership, consisting of leadership style and skills, must also be deliberately developed and changed in response. This article aims to not only replay a meaningful and interesting segment of Anglo-American history but also enlighten military leaders, strategists, and policymakers by applying historical insights to today’s renewed era of major-power rivalry and propose a leadership framework suited to modern complexity.