Volume 2, Issue 2, Spring 2012
Infinity Journal
Page 25
Introduction
The Fall 2011 issue of
Infinity Journal
included an article
called “Future Threats and Strategic Thinking,” which argued
that the construct of “hybrid threats” is particularly useful for
how the United States military prepares to fight in the future.
We find it all-too-typical that an article about “Future Threats
and Strategic Thinking” be associated with a concept like
hybrid threats, because contemporary discussions of future
warfare and strategy are littered with unclear, incomplete, or
just plain bad ideas.The concept of hybrid threats (or hybrid
warfare),as defined by its main proponents,is indeed unclear,
incomplete, and often unhelpful. The concept is not unique
in this regard, so while this article critiques the concept of
hybrid threat, we see this specific idea as a telling individual
case of a larger problem of muddled thinking about future
warfare and strategic thinking.
To be clear, however, the proponents of hybrid threats make
an important point. As American forces in the Middle East
draw down, the budget wars within the beltway are heating
up.The United States military does indeed need to think very
hard about prioritizing resources for future contingencies,
an essential task of strategic thinking. Funding priorities are
determined in part on the basis of anticipated future threats,
and so it is important that we get the threat right. That said,
trendy concepts like hybrid threats might sound promising,
but their conceptual weaknesses serve as an impediment
to clear and productive strategy making.What we propose is
that the hybrid warfare concept really comes down to a focus
on tactics and techniques which is not a useful construct to
guide policy and strategy makers.
Why Hybrid Warfare Does Not Make Sense
Frank G. Hoffman has been the most vocal proponent of
the hybrid threats concept, introduced in his oft-cited 2007
monograph, and followed up by a series of writings of which
the
Infinity Journal
essay is only the latest.[i] Hoffman has
Dan G. Cox
U.S.Army School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas Bruscino
U.S.Army School of Advanced Military Studies
Alex Ryan
Booz Allen Hamilton, United States of America
Dan G. Cox is an associate professor of political science
at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies.
His published books include
Terrorism, Instability, and
Democracy in Asia and Africa
and
Population-Centric
Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?
He has also published
articles in the Journal of Peace Research, Congress and
the Presidency, Parameters, and Joint Force Quarterly.
Thomas Bruscino is an associate professor of military
history at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military
Studies. He is the author of
A Nation Forged in War: How
World War II Taught Americans to Get Along
.
Dr.Alex Ryan is an Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton and
a recipient of the firm’s highest honor,the
Values In Practice
award. Dr. Ryan has taught operational and strategic
design at the School of Advanced Military Studies and to
commands including U.S. Special Operations Command
and U.S. Strategic Command. Dr. Ryan also has nine
years of experience as a defense scientist with Australia’s
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).
His dissertation in applied mathematics advanced a
multidisciplinary approach to complex systems design.
To cite this Article:
Cox, Dan G., Bruscino,Thomas & Ryan,Alex,“Why Hybrid Warfare is Tactics Not Strategy: A Rejoinder to ‘Future
Threats and Strategic Thinking’”,
Infinity Journal
,Volume 2, Issue No. 2, Spring 2012, pages 25-29.
Why HybridWarfare is Tactics Not Strategy: A Rejoinder to
“Future Threats and Strategic Thinking”
The concept of hybrid threats (or
hybrid warfare), as defined by its
main proponents, is indeed unclear,
incomplete, and often unhelpful.
trendy concepts like hybrid threats
might sound promising, but their
conceptual weaknesses serve as an
impediment to clear and productive
strategy making
