Volume 4, Issue 1, Summer 2014
Infinity Journal
Page 8
References
[i] “U.S. Economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean
region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities.Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally,
we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region.” Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense, 2012,
page 2.
[ii] The Chinese Defense White Paper published on 16 April 2013 observed that the U.S. Military pivot was making the regional situation in Asia tense.The Annaul
Report of World Affairs: Strategic Survey 2013, Chapter 9 (Asia-Pacific),The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group), 2013, page 319.
[iii] Editors: Craig Cohen, Kathleen Hicks and Josiane Gabel,“Part Three: Sustaining the Rebalance: Should We Change Our Security Approach in Asia?”, 2014
Global Forecast: U.S. Security Policy at a Crossroads, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2013, pages 38-50.
[iv] Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (United States of America: Princeton University Press), 1976, page 75.
[v] Ibid, page 76.
[vi] Caitlin Campbell, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, China’s ‘Core Interests’ and the East China Sea, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Washington, D.C. , 2013.
[vii] The Four Enduring interests are:“The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an
open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and An international
order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,security,and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”The National Security
Strategy,The White House, 2010.
[viii] “Mao was determined to prevent encirclement by any power or combination of powers, regardless of ideology, that he perceived as securing too many wei
qi “stones” surrounding China, by disrupting their calculations.” Kissinger, Henry, On China, (United States: Penguin Books), 2012, pages 103-104.
[ix] “The stabilization of China’s land borders may be one of the most important geopolitical changes in Asia of the past few decades…there is no longer a Soviet
Army bearing down on Manchuria like during the Cold War, a time when under Mao Zedong China concentrated its defense budget on its army, and pointedly
neglected the seas.The significance cannot be overstated.Since antiquity China has been preoccupied with land invasions of one sort or another.”Kaplan,Robert
D.,The Revenge of Geography,(New York:The Random House Trade), 2013, pages 212-213.
[x] Caitlin Campbell, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, China’s ‘Core Interests’ and the East China Sea, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Washington, D.C. , 2013.
[xi] Referencing Mao’s quest to restore honor by stating “even though when he refrained from military measures, Mao would put forward claims to lost territories
given up in the“unequal treaties”of the nineteenth century–for example,claims to territory lost in the Russian Far East in the settlements of 1860 and 1895.”Kissinger,
Henry, On China, (United States: Penguin Books), 2012, page 100.
[xii] Mark Leonard states “competition has more to do with status than ideology.As a result, differences between great powers frequently lead to complementarity
and cooperation,whereas convergence is often the root of conflict.As they rebalance their economies and recalibrate their foreign policy,Beijing and Washington
are increasingly fighting over shared interests.” Leonard, Mark,“Why Convergence breeds conflict: Growing More Similiar will push China and the United States
Apart,” Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2013), pages 125-135.
[xiii] “Indeed, China’s rise has led to fears that the country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day supplant the United States as a global hegemon.”
Nathan,Andrew J. and Andrew Scobell,“How China Sees America:The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,”Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2012), pages 32-47.
[xiv] Three broad areas for U.S.Army in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater: (1) Bolstering defense of allies and deterring aggression; (2) promoting regional security and
stability through security cooperation; and (3) ameliorating the growing U.S.-China security dilemma. Deni, John R.,“Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,”
Parameters (Autumn 2013), pages 77-86.
[xv] Zakaria, Fareed,The Post-American World, (New York and London: W.W. Norton), 2008, page 236.
[xvi] Betts,Richard K.,“The Lost Logic of Deterrence:What the Strategy that Won the Cold War Can -- and Can’t -- Do Now,”Foreign Affairs (March/April 2013),pages
87-99.
[xvii] Friedberg,Aaron L.,“Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S China Policy.” Foreign Policy (September/October 2012), pages 48-58.
[xviii] Kissinger, Henry, Chapter 28: Foreign Policy as Geopolitics: Nixon’s Triangular Diplomacy, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 1994, pages 703-732.
[xix] Nathan, Andrew J. and Andrew Scobell,“Globalization as a Security Strategy: Power and Vulnerability in the China Model,” Political Science Quaterly: The
Journal of Public and International Affairs (Fall 2013), pages 427-453.
[xx] Office of the United States Trade Representative.Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
[xxi] Chapter 13: “Europe Refashioned.” Berhman, Greg, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Saved Europe, (New
York: Free Press), 2007.
[xxii] Elkus, Adam, “The Policy-Strategy Distinction: Clausewitz and the Chimera of Modern Strategic Thought.” Infinity Journal Special Edition, Clausewitz and
Contemporary Conflict, February 2012.
[xxiii] Crowther, Alex, The Army Should Embrace A2/AD
-
A2AD/2013/07/12
[xxiv] Hammes,T.X.,A Military Strategy to Deter China,
[xxv] Deni, John R.,“Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” Parameters (Autumn 2013), pages 77-86.
[xxvi] Finney, Nathan,“Air-Sea Battle as a Military Contribution to Strategy Development,” Infinity Journal, 31 October 2012. Also see (Greenert and Welsh 2013)
Breaking the Kill Chain How to keep America in the game when our enemies are trying to shut us out,Admiral Jonathan Greenert and General Mark Welsh,http://
.
[xxvii] Kay, Sean, Getting the Asia Pivot Right,
/.
Balanced Deterrence for the Asia-Pacific Region
Chad M. Pillai
