Volume 4, Issue 1, Summer 2014
Infinity Journal
Page 7
to overcome. And if the threat of force fails to deter, by
increasing the capabilities of partner naval and air forces,
the U.S. creates the space needed for the land forces of
the U.S. to mobilize and deploy. U.S. and partner land forces
provide the operational foundation for joint forces to operate
freely behind interior lines of operation to posture, organize,
prepare, and conduct offensive operations to coerce or
compel a change in behavior.
Coerce – Framework for Air-Sea Battle (ASB) and Naval
Blockade
The most controversial concepts for the Asia-Pacific Region
are Air-Sea Battle and Naval Blockade. While its detractors
have argued that ASB is not a strategy, its chief architects
have correctly identified it as a part of the strategy
development process and as an operational concept
needed to overcome enemy A2/D2 capabilities in order to
allow the U.S. to conduct offensive operations.[xxvoi] Properly
integrated with the concept of “Offshore Control” to degrade
enemy forces, the deterrence value of ASB increases due
to the psychological stress placed upon the enemy who
has to take into account the threatened force inherent in,
as Army Chief of Staff General Odierno said, “kicking the
door open” for land forces to seize the initiative, should the
U.S. be required to compel China to modify its behavior
through violence. Naval Blockade would provide the glue
between Offshore Control and ASB, but its effects on China’s
economy and will to fight would take longer to measure.
The key element to avoid escalation is removing the threat
to the regime’s survival or loss of mainland Chinese territory.
When discussing the application of ASB and Naval Blockade,
it must be limited to the threat and use of violence to deter
Chinese aggression beyond their territorial boundaries.
Risk
The greatest risk inherent to conflict between the U.S. and
China is the threat of nuclear escalation. To mitigate such
a threat, the U.S. must reaffirm the nuclear umbrella in the
region and maintain ambiguity regarding the posture of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal and that of regional nuclear powers.
While nuclear war is the least preferred option to resolve a
conflict, the Chinese must believe there is not parity in the
nuclear arsenals. Additionally, China must be made aware
that any threat of nuclear escalation on its part would result
in the U.S., India, or Russia acting beyond proportionality,
resulting in national suicide by China.
Conclusion
the U.S. needs a strategy that
restrains China’s ambitions in
partnership with regional powers in
the Asia-Pacific
As the preponderance of global power (political, economic,
and military) shifts to the Asia-Pacific, both the U.S. national
security interests and need to protect those interests will grow.
Unlike the U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition, the U.S. cannot
afford to outspend China, whose economy is expected to
become the largest in the world by the end of the year,
on military expenditures. Additionally, it cannot contain
China due to the integrated nature of the global economy.
As a result, the U.S. needs a strategy that restrains China’s
ambitions in partnership with regional powers in the Asia-
Pacific. The Balanced-Deterrence strategy offers such a
solution in support of the Asia-Pacific Pivot to be effective by
matching rhetoric with visible actions. The U.S. will need to
evaluate its global interests and begin to prioritize resources
accordingly.[xxvii] A balanced deterrence strategy
integrating the various military concepts to restrain China’s
militarism will serve all nations in the region in the long run,
but only if forces opposing Chinese aggression are credible
in their capabilities to use force for U.S. and partner nations’
interests.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s alone
and do not reflect those of the US Army, Department of
Defense, or any other organization of the US Government.
Balanced Deterrence for the Asia-Pacific Region
Chad M. Pillai
