Volume 8, Issue 1, Summer 2022 33 References [i] Henry Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 2 ( January 1969): 214. [ii] All statistics in this essay are derived from the Belligerents in Battle dataset. The dataset includes information on belligerent identities and characteristics, numbers of troops fielded and casualties sustained, and locations of fighting for 984 sides in 492 battles in 62 interstate wars waged between 1900 and 2003. A full description of the data, methodology for assessing patterns and trends, and preliminary findings are reported in Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer, “A Century of Coalitions in Battle: Incidence, Composition, and Performance, 1900-2003,” Journal of Strategic Studies 45, no. 2 (February 23, 2022): 186–210. [iii] To determine whether battlefield coalition partners had prior experience fighting together, we examined the historical record as represented in Belligerents in Battle to determine whether at least two members of the group in question had fought together in either a) a major battle during an interstate war in the past 25 years, b) one major battle in the current interstate war, or c) at least three major battles during the current war. To calculate these statistics, we used a simple binary measure of whether battlefield coalition partners met any of these conditions or not and then tested their winning percentages. The reported win rates, and the difference between them, is statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level. [iv] Brett Ashely Leeds et al., “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” International Interactions 28, no. 3 (2002): 238. [v] Daniel S. Morey, “Military Coalitions and the Outcome of Interstate Wars,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 4 (October 2016): 535. [vi] This is the logic of what scholars of collective action call “privileged groups.” See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). [vii] See, for example, Ajin Choi, “Democratic Synergy and Victory in War, 1816–1992,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (September 2004): 663–82; Ulrich Pilster, “Are Democracies the Better Allies? The Impact of Regime Type on Military Coalition Operations,” International Interactions 37, no. 1 (March 2011): 55–85; Benjamin A. T. Graham, Erik Gartzke, and Christopher J. Fariss, “The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory,” Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 4 (October 2017): 613–39. [viii] By democracies, we mean those states scoring +6 or higher on the Polity IV scale conventionally used by political scientists and others to quantify regime type. The component indicators account for factors like the openness of executive recruitment and selection as well as the number and strength of constraints imposed on the executive by, for example, legislatures and judiciaries. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Annual Time Series 1800-2011, version p4v2012 (College Park, MD: Center for Systemic Peace, 2012), http://systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. [ix] Treaty data is drawn from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project. Leeds et al., “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” [x] Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12–17; Roy A. Prete, Strategy and Command: The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1914 (Montréal Québec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 3–25. [xi] John French, “1914,” n.d., Chapter 1. [xii] French, Chapter 1. [xiii] William J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914–18 (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 18–19; Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 26–28. [xiv] French, “1914,” Chapters 4-6; Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 85–91; Prete, Strategy and Command, 101–17. See also Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer, “Organizing for Performance: Coalition Effectiveness on the Battlefield,” European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 4 (December 2020): Appendix I. Practice Makes Perfect for Battlefield Coalitions Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Ryan Grauer
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