Attacking Russia’s Center of Gravity: A Clausewitzian Answer

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has prompted wide-ranging speculations about Russia’s center of gravity and how Ukraine might attack it.[1] Some analysts rightly consider Putin himself to be Russia’s center of gravity.[2] Others argue Putin’s power comes from his control over the Russian armed forces and his tacit social pact to protect the Russian people in return for tolerating his rule; therefore, they claim these are Russia’s true centers of gravity.[3] Still others have asserted Russia’s centers of gravity are its major wartime objectives, namely, (a) capturing Ukraine’s major cities, thereby forcing its population to evacuate or become subservient, or (b) seizing the coastline along the Black Sea, which would boost Moscow’s maritime strength in its strategic competition with the West.[4] The range of these answers—encompassing individual, material, sociocultural, and geographic perspectives—underscores just how difficult it can be to discern a party’s center of gravity. This article returns to the original concept as developed by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and argues Russia’s center of gravity is, indeed, Putin.[5] The best way to attack him, moreover, is by means of a multi-faceted strategy of denial aimed at preventing him from taking Ukraine while also increasing the risks to his political survival as long as the war continues.

To be sure, one can defeat a foe without first identifying and attacking its center of gravity. Traditionally, militaries focused on destroying an adversary’s armed might and eroding its willingness to fight. This approach remains effective, but it can prove long and risky, especially for a small party menaced by a larger one. What the center of gravity offers that the traditional solution does not is a way of looking at the problem that goes beyond merely targeting an enemy’s physical and psychological capacities to discern what is holding everything together and then developing ways to neutralize it.

I. The Original Concept

Clausewitz’s On War remains the most authoritative source for understanding what a center of gravity is and does because he was the first to apply the concept to military art. But the book presents two competing definitions that might cause confusion for some readers. The first definition appears in Book VI, Chapter 27 “Defense of a Theater of Operations.” As its title indicates, this chapter concerns operations rather than strategy, and Clausewitz’s description of Schwerpunkt follows suit. “The center of gravity (Schwerpunkt),” he asserts, “is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely, and . . . the blow struck against the center of gravity of an object is the most effective.”[6] However, here he has apparently conflated the terms center of gravity and center of mass, an error the scientists of his day sometimes made as well. For instance, a German textbook on hydrostatics published in 1777, equated the two, calling an object’s point of equilibrium its “center of mass (Mittelpunkt der Schwere) or center of gravity (Schwerpunkt).”[7] A center of mass can occupy the same point as a center of gravity. But the latter refers to the point where the gravitational forces acting on an object come together, thus creating a focal point of balance or equilibrium, though that point is not necessarily on the object itself. A center of gravity thus refers to equilibrium or balance, while a center of mass refers to density, which in turn makes it metaphorically similar to an operational main effort.

Clausewitz’s second definition appears in Book VIII, Chapter 4 “A More Precise Definition of the Military Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy.” As its title suggests, this chapter deals with strategic matters, such as the overall military defeat of an adversary. Here Clausewitz suggests, if one keeps the “dominant characteristics of the belligerent parties” in mind, a “certain center of gravity (Schwerpunkt)—a hub (Zentrum) of power and movement,” will emerge upon which everything depends; “it is against the enemy’s center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) that the combined might of all [one’s] forces must be directed.”[8] Admittedly, the phrase “dominant characteristics” is vague; however, it most likely points to a strategic comparison or net assessment of each party’s political, military, and economic strengths and weaknesses in relation to its competitors’.[9] Furthermore, he offered several strategic examples for clarity: (a) popular uprisings have two centers of gravity, the leaders of the uprising and public opinion; for alliances and coalitions, the center of gravity is their common interests; for states with disputing political factions, it is the capital; nineteenth-century France (after Napoleon’s abdication) also had two centers of gravity, Paris and the French army.[10] While more than one center of gravity can exist in some strategic situations, Clausewitz duly reminded his readers to reduce all centers of gravity to as few as possible, ideally to one.[11] His examples, though dated, align well with modern military doctrine and with recent history.[12]

A brief detour to the battle of Waterloo in 1815 illustrates how Clausewitz’s notion of a center of gravity differs from that of a center of mass. In 1815, Napoleon was unquestionably France’s center of gravity, which he aptly demonstrated by rallying some 200,000 troops to his cause within weeks upon his return from exile in Elba.[13] He was not the operational center of mass, which concerned the disposition of French troops for military operations, as at Waterloo.[14] Perhaps the most memorable example of a center of mass in action is the concentration of the French Old Guard for its critical but ill-fated assault against the British lines late in the battle. When that attack faltered and the Old Guard retreated, Napoleon stayed briefly with one of its battalions while attempting to rescue the situation. His efforts ultimately failed, and he ordered the Old Guard’s remaining battalions to cover his retreat to Paris where he hoped to restore order before his regime collapsed entirely.[15] The French center of gravity thus left the French center of mass behind on the field of battle, though for a time they were co-located.

II. The Russian and Ukrainian Centers of Gravity

Assessing the Dominant Characteristics of the Belligerent Parties. In terms of population, Russia has almost four times more people than Ukraine (143.5 million compared to 38 million). Economically, current estimates vary widely, but Russia’s remains roughly where it was in 2022, that is, ranked number 11 in the world (GDP: $2.8 trillion); whereas Ukraine’s economy (GDP: $200 billion) is approximately 14 times smaller, though it is expected to grow as its industrial base expands.[16] Of note, Moscow’s trade relationship with Beijing has increased significantly, reaching almost $445 billion by the end of 2024, and enabling Russians to offset the impact of Western sanctions more or less.[17] Militarily, Putin’s armed forces outnumbered Zelensky’s by almost 12:1 in February 2022, in the critical categories of aircraft, tanks, and artillery.[18] That ratio has obviously changed after more than three years of fighting. Russia still holds a superiority in numbers, but the ratio remains unclear since neither side publishes its true casualty figures.[19] From the standpoint of military strategy, Russia also holds a crucial advantage in its willingness and ability to tolerate high costs both in terms of blood and treasure to obtain what it wants. As Russia expert Dara Massicot noted: “casualties are not something that moves the needle for the Kremlin.”[20] Kyiv cannot match Moscow’s cost-ceilings. Nor in all likelihood could any Western democracy. Ukraine must, therefore, avoid engaging in a strategy of attrition or exhaustion with Russia. While Moscow cannot sustain such a strategy indefinitely, it can probably do so long enough to coerce Kyiv into concessions—unless the West’s economic, military, and political support continues. That support balances the situation for Ukraine, and so it must do whatever it can to keep Western assistance flowing.

Russia’s Center of Gravity

The Russian center of gravity is undoubtedly the state’s leader, Vladimir Putin. As a former KGB officer, he has had extensive experience in arrogating power to himself and in consolidating it. Little happens in Russia that Putin does not control or at least influence. As numerous experts attest, however, he rarely gets everything he wants because his bureaucracy, his industrial base, and his military machine are known to be inefficient and corrupt.[21] (Ukraine has similar problems.) Had Putin’s political and military apparatus been more efficient, Ukraine might have fallen to Russian aggression in the opening days of the conflict, as high-ranking Western officials openly predicted.[22] Instead, Russia has yet to overwhelm its much smaller adversary, suffering grievous losses in the process. Obviously, the Russians have learned, adapted, and improved their operational performance since 2022, but so too have the Ukrainians, creating a situation of rough parity where neither side has broken and progress on the ground is painfully slow.[23] Nonetheless, it is Putin’s war: he initiated the hybrid operations in 2014 and escalated the conflict to a full-scale invasion in 2022. He also retains the political power and authority to halt the conflict with negotiations, should he so choose. To be sure, he does not have a completely free hand in how he conducts the war, as he must continue to garner the support of the Russian populace.

The argument that Putin himself has two centers of gravity—the Russian military and the support of the Russian populace—is superficially true; however, it overlooks the fact that he has no obvious rivals for control over the Russian military, and that he controls the country’s most powerful media outlets in addition to the strategic narratives that are fed to the Russian public. At the risk of sounding glib, Russia’s center of gravity is actually the space between Putin’s ears, that is, his perceptions and his thinking. Ergo, this is the target Ukraine (and the West) must attack or try to sway.

Ukraine’s Center of Gravity

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky was Ukraine’s center of gravity because his courage and leadership galvanized Ukrainian resistance and helped stimulate Western support. Had he fled Kyiv, surrendered to the Russians, or been killed, Ukraine’s willingness to fight would have suffered a heavy, perhaps even a fatal blow. Fortunately, Moscow’s planners underestimated Ukrainian resistance and failed to increase the strength and density of their main effort, the dual assault on Hostomel Airport and Kyiv. This overconfidence likely saved the city and Zelensky from falling into Russian hands.

Ukraine’s center of gravity changed after the opening months of the conflict as political and military support (in the form of intelligence sharing, training, and hardware) began to flow from Europe and the United States.[24] Ukraine’s center of gravity is now that support. As is well known, willingness to fight is a critical factor in war, but it is intertwined with the wherewithal to fight. Without the latter, Kyiv would face tough choices ranging from conceding to Moscow’s demands or transitioning to a strategy of insurgency.[25] Unfortunately, though Russian counterinsurgency tactics have much in common with their Western counterparts, they do not adhere to the same ethical constraints as Western militaries, making insurgency a risky choice for Ukraine.[26]

To be sure, Zelensky still contributes significantly to bolstering Ukraine’s willingness to fight and still encourages the West to continue providing security assistance; however, Ukrainian morale has revolved less around him and more around that support, rising or falling as the West’s willingness to back Ukraine ebbs and flows.[27] Were Zelensky to be killed or incapacitated, another Ukrainian leader would simply take his place. Indeed, other “hubs of power and movement,” such as General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Ukrainian army’s former chief of staff, have emerged at various points in the conflict to compete with Zelensky.[28] Ukrainian hopes, in other words, remain pinned to the West’s continued support.[29]

III. Attacking Russia’s Center of Gravity

Understanding an adversary’s center of gravity is, obviously, only half the battle. Finding ways to attack or influence it is the essential other half. Ukraine’s challenge is how to get at the center of gravity—the thinking of an autocratic head of state—who is located a significant distance from the frontlines, commands a large military force, controls the strategic narratives fed to the state’s public, and is protected by an extensive security apparatus.

A strategy of decapitation (schwacking Putin) will not necessarily solve the problem because his successor could merely continue where the former KGB agent ended, requiring the process of coercion to be re-started. Regime change is something of a gamble in any case because new leaders can prove harder to deal with and less predictable than their predecessors. Moreover, decapitation may be more difficult than it appears in this case. Both sides have attempted multiple times to eliminate each other’s heads of state, but neither has succeeded.[30]

A better approach would be to increase the pressure on Putin in the only way he seems to respect—making the war militarily unwinnable for him, which will also raise the risks for his political survival. At root, this approach is a strategy of denial. It is usually associated with deterrence strategies; however, there is no reason it cannot apply to defensive strategies as well. The aim of this denial strategy would be to preclude Putin’s operational and strategic goals from being accomplished, thereby undermining his credibility as a leader. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which clearly did not go as planned, created an existential problem for his regime; if it continues to fail, he will be seen as weak. Autocracies are sensitive to perceptions of weakness and to internal threats, because they often give rise to some form of leader reshuffling.[31] All the more reason, then, to strengthen the strategy of denial against Putin by presenting his regime with additional security dilemmas to contend with, such as playing Russia’s major institutions against one another, bribing or coopting some of his officials or his disgruntled oligarchs, supporting revolutionary groups or resistance movements that openly agitate for regime change. Such actions would add fuel to the feelings of suspicion and distrust that already exist within the regime.

To be sure, Putin controls Russia’s media outlets and the main narratives fed to Russian society. But recent polls show his control is not absolute: many of those who voted for him in the 2024 elections, for instance, did so “not from genuine loyalty or agreement with his policies but from political apathy, the lack of viable alternatives, and his symbolic role as a figure of state power beyond criticism.”[32] Furthermore, while Russians continue to support the actions of their armed forces in Ukraine, approximately two-thirds of them believe “peace negotiations should be initiated.”[33] Overall, Russians still believe the high costs of the special military operation have been worth the “global respect” the Motherland has gained.[34] But taken together, these polls also suggest Russian opinion is shifting; the majority now feels the special operation has accomplished its mission, and it is time to reconnect with Western economies and to return to normalcy. In other words, Putin could well increase the risks to his regime by overplaying his hand at this point.

Ukraine has attempted to exploit Putin’s existential dilemma by highlighting the ineffectiveness of Russia’s defensive measures. That was the strategic point of the Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Spiderweb, the assassinations of Russian generals and other officials, as well as the sundry deep strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure. But Kyiv will require the West’s assistance to continue fighting. The Atlantic Alliance and the European Union should feel confident in providing that assistance even without the United States, since Europe’s collective economic power exceeds that of Russia by a ratio of 8:1, even with the economic lifeline Beijing provides to Moscow.[35] The reality is Ukraine has become the West’s de facto proxy, and the West should view this reality as an opportunity to “wage war without going to war,” and to do so not merely for Ukraine’s sake but for its own interests.[36] These interests are best served by standing firm against an aggressive and revanchist neighbor.

Conclusion

Russia’s top political leader, Vladimir Putin, is the country’s center of gravity in the war against Ukraine. To be sure, Russia’s military arsenal and Russian society provide him significant power, and he must weigh how his political decisions will affect his control over them. They certainly limit his actions on some matters, such as mobilization, which the very same polls above show Russian public does not support. But he is still Russia’s hub of all power and movement. Nor can Russia’s center of gravity be any of Putin’s military or political objectives, such as the Black Sea or its coastal cities, or even the rest of the Donbas. Seizing these would surely give Putin some advantages in his strategic competition with the West. They are, however, not the power driving the war. That is Putin himself.

Although Clausewitz’s concept of center of gravity can be difficult to grasp, it remains useful as an analytical tool for present-day conflicts. Knowing that the Prussian theorist confused the concepts of center of gravity and center of mass can actually assist modern military thinkers and doctrine writers in resolving the decades-long debate over what a center of gravity is and how to use it. The concept of center of mass, or main effort, applies well to designing operations and campaigns. The concept of center of gravity applies best to identifying a conflict’s core dynamic, the thing upon which everything else depends.