How the Congolese Wazalendo Illustrate the Importance of Strategy

Introduction[1]

Since November 2021[2], the reinvented Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel force continues to dominate large swaths of territory in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite the best efforts of the Congolese military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and other international forces[3], the M23 continues to control and expand its territorial holdings. Their strategy comprises combating the DRC’s government, under President Felix Tshisekedi, in eastern DRC in response to what many within the M23 perceive as Congolese policies that violate past peace agreements, along with attacks against the minority groups, the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge.[4] At the time of writing[5], these anti-M23 forces have largely been ineffective in stopping the rebels’ advancements. This led to the creation of the Wazalendo, loosely translated as ‘patriots’ in Swahili, in November 2022.[6] While the size of this new force varies, it is estimated to contain between 20,000 and 30,000 fighters.[7]

Unlike conventional forces such as the FARDC, the Wazalendo comprises irregular forces, often including a wide range of different rebels, many of whom have their own strategic goals. Within this new force are the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), Nduma Défense of Congo-Renovated (NDC-R), the Collective of Movements for Change (CMC) and localised Mai-Mai community forces.[8] These forces had at times historically fought against each other, but now work together alongside the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), who seek a return to Rwanda to reignite the Genocide against the Tutsi, often known as the Rwandan Genocide.[9] The introduction of this coalition of rebels raises questions about military oversight[10], human rights abuses[11] and, as this article focuses on, the strategic lessons about the use of rebel forces in warfare.

This article focuses less on the politics and human rights abuses of the Wazalendo and instead attempts to situate the military actors’ failures within the framework of strategic theory. Despite initial hopes by the Congolese government that the Wazalendo could supplement the FARDC in its fight, the Wazalendo has largely failed to do so. President Tshisekedi misunderstood the importance of how more military actors, such as irregular fighters, do not necessarily lead to better results. The irregular force’s inability to stop the M23 is a result of a misunderstanding of strategic theory. As discussed in a previous article,[12] the FARDC’s war against the M23 remains ineffective due to a poor understanding of strategy. The political failures within the Congolese strategy can best be explained by M.L.R. Smith’s assertion that, “[strategy is] concerned with the ways in which available means can be employed to reach desired ends.”[13] Beyond the Congolese government’s vague objectives of defeating the M23, there is little clarity about what constitutes an end, given the Congolese history of conflict[14] and the interests of the different military actors. Within the context of Wazalendo, its failure to combat the M23 stems from a misunderstanding of the role of irregular actors in warfare, problems with operational art at the operational level, and the broader failure of policy found within strategy. The continued Congolese failure of public policy is important for understanding the shortcomings of the FARDC, Wazalendo, and its allies, as strategy is the continuation of policy.[15] Thus, poor policy leads to a doomed strategy.[16]

Strategic Theory and Irregular Forces

Smith cautions against creating artificial divisions between conventional and irregular warfare.[17] Bucking against the trend of the early 2000s response to the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attacks, he warns not only against confusing tactics, such as terrorism, with strategy[18], but also against how we perceive military actors. The division between irregular and conventional forces should perhaps best be understood as a recent phenomenon. The magnitude of World War II influences our perceptions of military might and hinders our understanding of how irregular forces should be seen as just as legitimate as conventional forces.[19] Irregular or nonstate military actors often are seen as holding political doctrine, often focusing on revolutionary or Marxist beliefs, along with different warfare tactics such as ambush, small-scale ambushes, roadside bombings and assassination.

However, Smith argues against this notion and instead suggests that all militaries, whether irregular or conventional, use similar tactics at a different scale. Conventional and irregular forces will often share similar ends, differing only in their ways and means. Even the tactics, i.e. the ways, were at times similar. Nevertheless, the two operated within the same public policy and leadership. Stephen Biddle writes in great detail about nonstate warfare, highlighting the different roles and responsibilities between conventional and irregular warfare.[20] Specifically, he argues that the artificial separation between the two actors leads to a misunderstanding of strategy, which can be problematic in conducting and understanding warfare.[21]

Carl von Clausewitz describes how irregular military actors, including populist fronts such as the Volkskrieg, can be beneficial in defensive strategy but not in waging a full-scale offensive war.[22] This description is a significant aspect of understanding the Wazalendo problem. The loose confederation of various rebel forces that joined to combat the M23 comprises a multitude of actors, each with its own strategic ends. It is the Mai-Mai, which were created during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)[23], that follows Clausewitz’s concept of popular war the best. However, they are not alone; others contain a wide range of military objects. While the Congolese government has denied any connection to it[24], the FDLR’s inclusion within the Wazalendo introduces a new anti-Tutsi sentiment, including attacks against the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, an objective beyond fighting the M23. Other incorporated rebel groups have their own strategic goals and interests. The significance of Wazalendo’s loose confederation, which contains conflicting objectives, raises questions about its relationship with the FARDC.

The Wazalendo do not fit within the same framework as a revolutionary military rebelling against a foreign entity, but rather as a paid force created only after the Congolese government realised the true extent of the FARDC’s failures. Their military motivations to fight the M23 and the local Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations do not hide the ways they treat civilian populations, which at first might seem to focus more on being a gang of robbers. Nevertheless, they should still be seen as a political actor rather than just a brigand, given their military agreements not only with the FARDC but also their political ones with the Tshisekedi regime. There are multiple cases of Wazalendo’s banditry, but their primary purpose in being created continues to be combating the M23. Despite their initial military motivations, they are often disconnected from, or even in contention with, the FARDC’s operational art, as described later. Thus, despite what can best be described as similar ends between the two military actors, the lack of coordination leads the Wazalendo to fall outside Clausewitz’s description of effective military actors, as they are more likely to be destructive and, at times, uncontrollable.

Scholars in strategic theory might argue against the division between conventional and irregular forces. However, the Wazalendo fall beyond this divide as they provide little in terms of military benefit, as seen in their inability to stop the M23[25], their conduct of human rights abuses[26] or their participation in the illegal mineral trade[27]. Fundamentally, the Congolese government’s decision to add yet another actor to its war against the M23 illustrates a military and strategic fallacy: the assumption that additional forces can override poor strategy. The Wazalendo, as an ill-thought-out military force, becomes even more noticeable at the operational level. Specifically, how Wazalendo’s operational-level tactics often disrupt supplies from reaching the FARDC’s conventional forces.

Wazalendo, FARDC and the Operational Level

Another aspect of Wazalendo’s ineffectiveness can be found at the operational level. It can be difficult to provide a succinct definition of the operational level in strategic theory. The operational level focuses on implementing strategy, sitting between strategy and tactics.[28] Colin Gray describes the operational level as, “combinations of purposefully linked military engagements…Operations are strategy as action.”[29] B.A. Friedman disagrees with Colin Gray’s definition and instead suggests that he is describing operational art.[30] Operational art, as defined by Colin Gray, is “Operational art, then, can be seen as translating strategic imperatives into tactical actions in the physical world.”[31] However, Milan Vego characterises it more as providing the mechanisms before, during and after a military operation.[32] This includes planning, resourcing and conducting specific battles in support of a campaign’s objectives.[33] It follows Clausewitz’s indirect definition of operational art as “preparations for war.”[34] The role of operational art in strategy is significant, as it encompasses the elements necessary for any tactic and military operation to successfully fulfil strategic goals.

The FARDC, the DRC’s conventional army, already suffers from inconsistencies, a lack of supplies and morale, as well as logistical issues in its fight against the M23. The outsourcing of warfare to the Wazalendo creates problems not only on the battlefield, in terms of combat coordination with the FARDC, but also logistical challenges at the operational level. How can the FARDC properly formulate operations and decide tactics when the Wazalendo have relatively free range to conduct military operations that could support or hinder the Congolese conventional forces? African conflict researchers Judith Verweijen and Michel Thill write, “Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.”[35] This indicates that the Wazalendo are not contributing effectively to combating the M23.

In an attempt to combat the M23 following the FARDC’s failures, President Tshisekedi and his government provided funding, weaponry and assistance to the Wazalendo.[36] However, they seemingly ignore how the existing FARDC’s operational level and art are riddled with problems, as seen both historically during operations against other Congolese rebels[37] and in the current operations against the M23.[38] Rather than addressing these issues, President Tshisekedi’s government instead formulated yet another military actor, the Wazalendo. This decision seemingly follows the belief that more combatants, i.e., overwhelming the enemy, means a greater chance of victory. As Clausewitz writes, “It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point.”[39] However, its addition only increases the likelihood that the fog of war[40] will negatively impact the FARDC’s forces fighting the M23. The lack of operational control and planning leads to internal fighting between the FARDC and the Wazalendo as seen in the Battle for Uvira[41], a town in eastern DRC. Between February 15 and 17, 2025, Wazalendo forces and the FARDC engaged in combat. The reason these two forces fell into conflict, according to the allegations, was the distribution of military equipment.[42] This infighting led to the M23 later encircling the town[43] and to rumours of a possible anti-Banyamulenge pogrom[44]. Military supplies directed towards the Wazalendo not only undermine the FARDC’s morale but also create opportunities for additional corruption.[45]

Ideally, civilian and military leaders are supposed to be able to control the soldiers under their command through compliance.[46] However, controlling the Wazalendo has become a significant challenge.[47] The Battle for Uvira illustrates how the Wazalendo, at times, will ignore the government’s direction or end the fight against the M23 to pursue their own interests and goals beyond their military mandate. Their actions raise questions about whether the Congolese government can fully control the rebels.

In Wazalendo-held territory, many began collecting tolls, taxes and extorting mines from the illegal mineral trade.[48] These decisions and actions are often the responsibility of the state government rather than a rebel force, but the lack of clear direction on strategy and accountability shapes how the rebel group pursues its own strategic ends, which might differ from those of President Tshisekedi’s government. Their actions create a political headache for President Tshisekedi, as he has seemingly ceded state responsibilities to these relatively uncontrollable forces. There are also internal problems with monitoring and organising the Wazalendo, as it comprises different rebel forces with their own structures.[49] These internal hierarchies and structures create additional confusion at the operational level regarding supply, ranks, and logistics. During the Second Congo War, it was typical for rebel forces to control large swaths of territory.[50] Its continuation illustrates how President Tshisekedi and his forces wish to retain power, even if they lose control of other parts of the country to the Wazalendo. He is relying on their numbers and abilities to defeat the M23. His desire follows Isabelle Dyvesteyn’s comment that, “control can only be achieved by physical occupation and such an occupation requires a large number of troops.”[51] But it fails to reconcile with Clausewitz’s warnings about the consequences of ignoring the friction between the “real war and war on paper.”[52] The Wazalendo are not simply a new reserve force to aid the FARDC in combating the M23. Rather, they are an independent force that hinders the FARDC’s operational capabilities. A primary reason the Congolese government failed to rein in and properly direct the Wazalendo stems from an unclear policy, which is critical to enact an effective strategy in any war.

Rebels cannot fix broken policy

Clausewitz provides warnings about the repetition of history. Specifically, he emphasises the importance of understanding history when critically analysing war.[53] It is through understanding history that military or political leaders can appropriately decide the course of action, whether that be in terms of policy, strategy or tactics. For the DRC, history appears to be in a state of repetition, as even Congolese scholar Jason Stearns refers to this notion in the subtitle of his second book, “The Unending Conflict in the Congo.”[54] While Jason Stearns refers to the constant of Congolese instability, it can also be interpreted as the continued failure of the Congolese government’s strategy since the end of the Second Congo War to establish control and peace. As discussed in a previous article[55], the primary failure of President Tshisekedi’s government against the M23 has been its inability to construct a clear and coherent strategy to not only defeat the eastern Congolese rebel force but to establish a new environment that is not a breeding ground for the more than 120 existing rebel forces[56] in the country. Fundamentally, without a clear policy and thus strategy, rebel groups such as the Wazalendo will pursue the most effective ways to reach their desired end, even if that contradicts Congolese policy and strategy.

Since the M23’s return, the Congolese government has failed to foster the appropriate policies that its military, the FARDC, could base a strategy on. This is critically important, as failures in public policy will lead to a lack of a clear strategy in warfare.[57] Clausewitz perhaps provides a warning about the role of politics, as all military strategy is political in nature and a continuation of public policy.[58] The lack of a clear strategy creates confusion about how military actors implement their ways and means to achieve ends that are ill-defined by public policy. Smith warns that “strategy is concerned with the ways in which available means are employed in order to achieve desired ends.”[59] President Tshisekedi’s regime has yet to establish a clear end to not just defeating the M23 rebellion but also to over a hundred others, which all detract from the Congolese government’s authority.

Additionally, the M23 is just the reincarnation of past rebel groups, such as the Congrès National Pour la Défense du People (CNDP) in the late 2000s, which was historically linked to the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) during the Second Congo War.[60] Each of these incarnations pursued a similar strategic objective: protecting the Banyarwanda and, to a lesser extent, the Banyamulenge. However, questions do arise about the M23’s intentions to protect these Congolese minority groups[61]; its involvement in the illegal mineral trade[62] and in conducting human rights abuses[63]. Nevertheless, the M23’s current political and military leadership appears, unlike its early 2010 incarnation, to be more focused on fulfilling its strategic goal of protecting the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations in eastern DRC through effective means to stop the FARDC, and other forces[64] , including the Wazalendo forces.

For the Congolese government, its deficits in developing clear policy and strategy greatly affect its military might. The Wazalendo illustrates how strategic ambiguity can lead to those fighting to reorient their efforts towards their own ends rather than those desired by policymakers. The addition of the Wazalendo to the warfare in eastern DRC should not be seen as a way to solve the crisis. Rather, it will likely be ineffective or, as seen during the Battle of Uvira, create even greater problems for the conventional FARDC forces that inadvertently aid the M23. The lesson learned from the FARDC’s current failure to defeat the M23 also applies to the Wazalendo: “With the FARDC’s inability to enact the policy and strategy through tactics and operations, the Congolese government must reconsider its policies.”[65] Fundamentally, without a clear strategy, military forces will inevitably fail. President Tshisekedi and his government must focus less on the means of fighting the M23, i.e., the introduction of the Wazalendo, and instead focus on how to achieve the end of the instability in eastern DRC. This includes a political way forward with the M23, as well as advancing political, economic, and social development. Clausewitz’s description of war as a continuation of politics[66] applies to all wars, including in eastern DRC. The failure to develop a clear strategy to defeat the enemy requires the construction of new politics and public policy.

Conclusion

The war raging in eastern DRC is an example of the difference between a coherent and a muddled strategy. The M23’s operational successes are primarily due to its leadership, which focused on crafting a clear strategy to promote its interests. Their level of success is undeniable, despite some international human rights actors trying to trivialise the M23 as little more than a puppet force of the Rwandan military.[67] It might be argued that the attempt to reduce the M23 as composing elements of the Rwandan military stems from a misunderstanding of military strength. As Smith notes, warfare often involves a weaker and a stronger side, and being a rebel force does not inherently mean they are the weaker side.[68] The FARDC’s failure to defeat the M23 led to the creation of another rebel group, the Wazalendo, composed of multiple other rebel movements. Despite President Tshisekedi’s hope that this new force will help combat the M23, the Wazalendo’s relative ineffectiveness stems from a broader lack of strategy. Essentially, the Wazalendo offers a crucial understanding of strategy, highlighting that the emergence of new military actors cannot compensate for a lack of coherent objectives grounded in policy. In fact, this proliferation will worsen the state’s strategic incoherence.

The Wazalendo does not fit within Clausewitz’s explanation of the Volkskrieg, or popular front, as it is not composed of a single force attempting to fulfil a strategic end. Rather, it is a coalition of various rebel forces, many of which have their own interests and may or may not align with the Congolese government. The Wazalendo’s internal dynamics are not the only concern, as their inclusion in battles against the M23 creates confusion and even hostility at the operational level between the Wazalendo and the FARDC. This lack of clarity about the Congolese government’s strategic goal for the eastern region is evident in the military losses suffered by the FDLR, FARDC, and Wazalendo at the hands of the M23. The Congolese government must understand the key themes and warnings inherent in strategic theory if there is any hope for its victory. If not, the M23’s clear strategy will continue to succeed.