The only mention of Clausewitz in this entire work appears in this editorial. It would be easy to assert that Clausewitz never set foot on a warship in his life. More certain is that he wrote not a single word on Maritime Strategy. That is not important, but it is symptomatic of maritime or naval strategy failing to attain the importance it should amongst continental powers, in sharp contrast to the work done by maritime powers. Yet that distinction falls to very few countries, which have no interest in naval power.
The sea is that which connects the world. Ownership, freedom, or control are all critical to its understanding, as recent, ongoing events in and around the Strait of Hormuz should amply demonstrate. It is a unique domain requiring unique knowledge, and that alone should make us all cautious of multi-domain discussion. Perhaps Maritime Multi-Domain integration needs to be a subset of such a concept?
That alone should be a cautionary point in failing to recognise the history of naval strategy. While absent from this work, the fact that the Royal Navy was probably the arm that won the Crimean War of 1853-56 is far from well recognised in the context of the Sea of Azov Campaign. The vast majority of steel consumed by the US war industry in World War II went on shipbuilding in terms of pure tonnage. If you start doing the maths on Japanese production in comparison, the utter stupidity of their enterprise becomes apparent.
These are not and never have been hidden figures. The centrality of naval power to all human security affairs should be well recognised both today and in the rise and fall of world powers. In that respect, I cannot commend this work strongly enough, and it forces me to ask why and how we were so remiss to leave it an untrodden path for so long.
The fact that it was not easy to find writers in this area points to part of the problem. The fact that the Royal Navy is as small as it is and that the security of the Persian Gulf was seemingly ignored by the US Planners of Operation Epic Fury would strongly indicate a wider and systemic problem when it comes to any real understanding of naval power, which may require more understanding than just having aircraft carriers.
If you want to really grind your teeth, then remember that General Berger’s Force Design 2030 was informed by the fact that the US Marine Corps were the land component of the fleet and not an alternative to the Army. The Vikings didn’t walk from Scandinavia to the shores of Britain. The laptop or phone you are reading this on was almost certainly shipped by sea from somewhere, as was your car, and that blend of coffee you can’t start the day without… Maybe.
Read what follows and think. History is the only body of evidence that informs military strategy. Carl told us that strategy was the use of engagements for the objects of the war. Nothing about being at sea makes that less true.
William F. Owen
Editor-in-Chief, Military Strategy Magazine
Special Edition, “War on the Waves: Lessons on Naval Military History and Strategy”
August 2026