Warfare of Position: When the Decisive Struggle Precedes the First Shot

Years before the advent of violence during the 1948 communist insurgency in the British colony of Malaya, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had already transformed the political landscape through a deliberate information warfare campaign. The MCP set up a secret parallel government by infiltrating civil society groups like village associations. They radicalized people by indoctrinating them through propaganda that manufactured compelling political narratives. The MCP used these networks to establish a de facto parallel administration that collected taxes, operated courts, distributed food, enforced discipline and mobilized labor. All while promoting propaganda that increasingly portrayed the British as illegitimate and incapable of governing rural communities.[1] These activities were not peripheral political agitation; they systematically reshaped how key communities interpreted the established government’s legitimacy. By the time armed conflict began, many rural populations already viewed MCP cadres as defenders of local interests and the British administration as distant, coercive, or predatory. This resulted in a serious disadvantage for the colonial administration once the violent phase of the revolution began.[2]

The Malayan example represents the emergence of a different philosophy of war that departed from the classical European assumptions that war was the use of violence to decisively destroy an enemy’s military. This philosophy of war was codified into a coherent doctrine called the war of position, by Antonio Gramsci as a strategy to advance revolutionary struggles when the revolutionaries were unable to directly challenge an existing government. In Gramsci’s original formulation, “war of position” refers to a prolonged struggle over meaning, legitimacy and social norms. Conducted primarily within civil society rather than through direct confrontation with a state’s hard power. Writing in the context of early twentieth-century Europe, Gramsci distinguished war of position from a “war of maneuver,” the latter denoting rapid, decisive efforts to seize formal political authority through force or insurrection. War of position instead operates through the slow, attritional contestation of cultural, ideological, and symbolic terrain. Competing actors seek to shape how reality itself is interpreted and understood.[3] This logic is not unique to Gramsci, as Sun Tzu similarly emphasized shaping conditions in advance—through deception, influence, and psychological advantage—to secure victory before combat occurs, or ideally without fighting at all [4].

What is the War of Position?

Central to this concept is Gramsci’s notion of hegemony: the condition in which a dominant group secures consent not merely through coercion, but by embedding its worldview into everyday assumptions, moral frameworks and common sense. Civil society, encompassing media, education, religion, cultural institutions and informal social practices, thus becomes the primary battlespace of war of position.[5] Here, meanings are normalized, identities are formed, and legitimacy is quietly constructed or eroded. Rather than producing immediate political outcomes, war of position reshapes the interpretive environment over time. It conditions what actions later appear reasonable, inevitable, or morally justified. This long-term struggle over meaning is cumulative and asymmetrical: gains are incremental, setbacks are often invisible and decisive effects may only become apparent when a subsequent war of maneuver succeeds or fails based on the interpretive terrain already established.[6]

To avoid conceptual slippage, it is important to clarify that Gramsci’s use of “war of maneuver” differs from contemporary military doctrine: it refers to direct political confrontation with state power aimed at rapid institutional change, not operational tempo or battlefield agility. By contrast, war of position denotes a prolonged struggle accumulating advantages over time by conditioning the interpretive environment rather than seeking immediate resolution through force.[7] This argument does not claim that Western strategic thought ignores political struggle outside armed conflict. Instead, modern Western military institutions and doctrines tend to prioritize decisive, kinetic action over the slow, cumulative dynamics of positional struggle.[8] The present manuscript advances this discussion by using Gramsci’s framework of war of position to explain how meaning, legitimacy and consent are accumulated within civil society. The latter translates into a strategic advantage that shapes kinetic confrontation.

A Meta-Theory of War

Ben Zweibelson’s recent work on a meta-theory of warfare, based upon Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework of sociology paradigms, presents a unique understanding of how each paradigm understands warfare.[9] The dominant philosophy of warfare in Europe and North America is the functionalist paradigm, where war is understood as a rational, instrumental activity carried out by states to maintain order, enforce rules, or achieve defined political objectives. Within this framework, information warfare is typically treated as a supporting function that enables or amplifies physical violence rather than as a site of conflict in its own right. War of position falls within the radical humanist paradigm, where victory essentially means liberation from visible and invisible forms of oppression present in the dominant hegemonic order. From this perspective, political struggle does not pause during periods of nominal peace, but persists through discourse, culture and symbolic influence as actors seek long-term political supremacy. Thus, it has a type of messianic eschatology where the ultimate goal is the creation of a utopian society.[10] In a war of position, information conveyed through discourse and the influence of culture become the central instruments of conflict. It shapes whether, when and to what extent physical force is ultimately employed. These factors determine whether physical force will be necessary and its scope and scale if it is required.[11]

The Strategic Logic of a War of Position

In many conflicts, force succeeds or fails depending on how people interpret it. Populations do not react to violence only in material terms. They respond through beliefs, norms and expectations that shape their understanding of governmental authority and their obligations as citizens. As David Galula observed, “the objective of the conflict is the population,” and its support or resistance depends on perceptions of legitimacy.[12] Hew Strachan likewise notes that war is judged not only by physical effects but by the meanings societies assign to those effects. When these meanings favor one actor, even limited force can produce decisive outcomes. When they do not, large-scale violence may become ineffective or counterproductive.[13] In a war of position, this interpretive terrain becomes the true center of gravity. Actors seek to shape how communities understand coercion, rule and threat long before open violence begins.[14] Lawrence Freedman explains that modern strategy often depends on shaping the context in which force will be applied, because that context determines whether violence appears justified or abusive.[15] During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian strikes failed to produce a rapid political collapse because Ukrainian and international audiences interpreted the violence as illegitimate aggression rather than effective coercion. This interpretive framing, reinforced by Ukrainian information efforts, mobilized resistance and transformed an intended quick maneuver into a prolonged conflict.[16]

In a war of position, information warfare becomes the main method for shaping the environment in which future violence will occur. A main war of position information warfare tactic is the subversion of existing meanings. The definition of key words is altered so that they not only mean something new, but the entire concept itself may also be delegitimized or demonized. Toppling historic statues is an example of this because the collective meanings about the statue’s subject are altered from being heroes’ to being villains.[17] In a war of position, information activities are not supporting efforts; they are the operational core.[18] In the war of position, violence is often an ancillary activity, a form of agitation propaganda, designed to evoke strong emotional reactions. When urban activists destroy property during a riot, the primary goal is not the destruction of property. Instead, it communicates symbolic resistance to oppressive systems by stoking public consciousness, polarizing opinion and forcing the broader society to reckon with the protesters’ ideological narrative.[19] Successful wars of position will render future violence less necessary, frequent and intense. Information warfare therefore provides the practical means by which a war of position is waged, enabling actors to alter the strategic environment before force is applied.[20]

Western Strategy & Misunderstanding Positional Conflict

Western strategic thinking often struggles to recognize wars of position because they are rooted in the functionalist paradigm, which treats war primarily as a state-directed instrument for achieving political aims through physical force. This tradition, shaped heavily by Clausewitz and reinforced by modern military institutions, assumes that battle outcomes and material capabilities determine strategic success.[21] Western conceptions of war emphasize the controlled use of violence and often underappreciate the political and cultural conditions that shape how that violence will be interpreted.[22] It is important to clarify that this argument does not suggest Western strategic thought denies the continuity of political struggle outside periods of armed conflict. Clausewitz’s contribution, in particular, must be understood within its proper scope: On War is a theory of war as an instrument of policy, not a general theory of political struggle in peacetime. The distinction between Clausewitz and Gramsci is therefore not civilizational or moral, but analytical and structural.[23] This focus can obscure conflicts in which the decisive struggle occurs within the institutions, narratives, and social expectations of civil society rather than on the battlefield. Scholars of Gramscian conflict note that states oriented toward wars of maneuver often overlook the slow cultural and ideological work through which adversaries erode legitimacy before violence begins.[24] This dynamic is illustrated by the Peruvian government’s delayed recognition that the Shining Path had already reshaped local authority through embedded cadres and ideological control prior to major violence.[25]

Furthermore, in democratic societies, the war of position is often hiding in plain sight as just another legitimate political movement — this is despite the fact that the long-term goal is the destruction of that system. Scholars of Gramscian conflict argue that state security forces accustomed to wars of maneuver frequently overlook evidence for a successful war of position because the process is slow and gradual.[26] For example, the Chinese Communist Party has waged a sustained war of position in Taiwan by shaping media narratives, cultivating United Front networks and influencing civil organizations to weaken trust in democratic institutions and redefine Taiwanese identity.[27] If successful, these activities will either make a CCP military invasion either unnecessary or easier.

The strategic consequence of a war of position is that the decisive point lies in shaping how a society interprets conflict itself. As John Boyd argued in his work on decision cycles, the side that influences an opponent’s perceptions and disrupts its ability to orient to events gains advantage even before physical engagement occurs.[28] Likewise, research on soft power shows that the capacity to guide preferences and define legitimate behavior can produce strategic outcomes without coercion.[29] In this sense, the interpretive realm becomes the true center of gravity, because it determines whether violence will mobilize support, provoke resistance, or fail entirely to achieve political aims. Physical strength remains relevant, but its effectiveness is governed by the narratives, symbols, and expectations that prepare the ground on which force will operate.

The Sociocultural Terrain as a Battlespace

The central feature of a war of position is that the decisive struggle takes place within civil society, which functions as a form of strategic terrain. This terrain consists of the institutions, norms and interpretive frameworks through which a population understands political authority and social order. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, power operates not only through physical force but through the ability to shape the “symbolic structures” that define what people perceive as legitimate, natural, or possible.[30] These structures are built and reproduced in schools, media, religious organizations, unions and community networks, the very spaces where meaning is generated and contested. James C. Scott’s work on everyday politics similarly shows that the stability of any political order depends on shared cultural expectations that make authority recognizable and coherent.[31] Because these expectations determine whether people comply with, resist, or ignore state directives, they form a critical battlespace in conflicts where legitimacy is at stake. In wars of position, control of this sociocultural environment becomes strategically decisive because it shapes how populations interpret both coercion and governance long before violence is applied.

In practical terms, the sociocultural battlespace consists of several components that shape how political authority is interpreted. These include narratives that explain who holds power and why. They identify frameworks that define social boundaries of who belongs to the group and those who don’t. Creating or debilitating institutional trust that determines whether directives are accepted or resisted.[32] Scholars have shown that these elements form the cognitive foundation of legitimacy because they create the mental models through which people judge political actors and evaluate the use of coercion. Benedict Anderson demonstrates that collective identities emerge from shared stories and communication networks, giving political orders an imagined coherence that can be strengthened or undermined.[33] Clifford Geertz adds that individuals act within “webs of meaning” that assign significance to events, including the application of force.[34] These meaning-systems become strategic targets in a war of position because altering them changes how communities perceive both governance and coercion. When an actor gains influence over these components, through education, media, organizational penetration, or narrative framing, it can redefine the political environment without resorting to violence.[35]

Decentralized Networks and Organic Intellectuals

A war of position does not have to advance through a centralized power structure, which can make it even more difficult to detect and analyze. In Gramsci’s thinking, the agents of progress are organic intellectuals, who are embedded in everyday social institutions as teachers, journalists, or anyone else who can evangelize the revolution. They articulate, transmit and normalize alternative worldviews that challenge the current hegemony.[36] Rather than relying primarily on hierarchical coordination, these intellectuals can operate autonomously across universities, media organizations, cultural institutions and civic networks. Collectively, they gradually reshape interpretive frameworks that sustain political authority. Gramsci emphasized that hegemonic struggles are won when a broad constellation of organic intellectuals succeeds in redefining common sense, not when a single vanguard issues directives.[37]

Contemporary scholarship on ideological movements echoes this insight, noting that diffuse networks of activists, scholars, and organizations can wage sustained cultural and informational campaigns without centralized leadership. Their cohesion derives from shared narratives, interpretive schemas, and normative commitments rather than command structures.[38] In strategic terms, this decentralized model enables multiple symbolic and informational actions to emerge simultaneously across different domains, each reinforcing the others and cumulatively eroding the legitimacy of existing institutions. The result is a resilient, adaptive form of positional conflict in which power resides in the saturation of ideas rather than the coordination of forces.[39]

Implications for Modern Strategy: Why Warfare of Position Matters Now

Recognizing the sociocultural terrain as a battlespace has direct implications for how modern security forces understand competition and prepare for conflict. In a war of position, the decisive struggle unfolds before the first shot is fired.[40] Once a population accepts the revolutionary’s ideology, their attitudes and beliefs are generally set, which significantly impacts the choice of strategies that are available. This dynamic helps explain why governments involved in these conflicts often discover that tactical success cannot compensate for deeper structural disadvantage.[41] Security forces that focus solely on the kinetic contest may find themselves fighting inside an interpretive environment defined by their adversary.

While this article centers on Gramsci’s framework of war of position, the underlying argument aligns with a broader tradition of strategic thought that emphasizes perception, culture and indirect influence as decisive elements of conflict. Colin Gray’s conception of strategy as culturally embedded underscores that war is fought not only through force, but through the values, assumptions, and interpretive frameworks that shape how force is understood and legitimized.[42] Similarly, the indirect strategies articulated by Liddell Hart emphasize shaping an adversary’s perceptions and options over time rather than seeking immediate decision through direct confrontation.[43] Thomas Schelling’s work on coercion further reinforces this logic by demonstrating how outcomes in conflict are often determined by how signals are interpreted rather than by physical action alone. Seen in this light, war of position is not an outlier concept derived from critical theory, but a complementary lens within a long-standing strategic conversation about how meaning, expectation, and legitimacy condition the use and effectiveness of power. Gramsci’s contribution lies in offering a vocabulary for analyzing these dynamics systematically within civil society, making explicit processes that are often implicit in strategic practice.[45]

Meanwhile, rivals compete through the slow shaping of social meaning: weakening trust in institutions, redefining national identity, and weaponizing historical narratives. These efforts are not peripheral information operations; they are the operational backbone of positional conflict, consistent with research showing that legitimacy, identity, and trust are central targets of modern information campaigns.[46] Because a war of position begins with altered expectations, eroded trust, and shifting ideas of legitimacy rather than visible aggression, states may not recognize the contest until they are already fighting inside an adversary’s narrative architecture. This asymmetry, in which one side wages a war of position and the other prepares for a war of maneuver, generates strategic surprise without battlefield movement and leaves militaries vulnerable to losing a war they never realized had begun.[47]

Conclusion

Warfare of position reveals that the most decisive contests in modern conflict occur not on physical terrain but within the sociocultural environment that gives meaning to power. Long before hostilities begin, adversaries shape the narratives, identities, and expectations through which communities interpret authority and coercion. Once established, these frameworks determine whether military action will achieve its political aims or undermine them. Western strategy, long oriented toward wars of maneuver, has struggled to recognize this shift. Rivals who compete through information, culture, and institutional influence are not softening the battlefield; they are defining it. By the time visible aggression appears, the decisive struggle may already have been lost. For contemporary security forces, the implication is clear: understanding and contesting the sociocultural battlespace is not an adjunct to strategy but a prerequisite for it. Force can only succeed when it operates within an environment that supports its political purpose. Recognizing warfare of position as a distinct strategic form allows practitioners to see how meaning is shaped, how legitimacy is built or eroded, and how adversaries set the conditions under which violence will or will not matter. To ignore this domain is to risk entering future conflicts already at a disadvantage. Fighting a battle whose outcome has been decided by a war few realized had begun.