A New Fight: Deception, Adaptation, and Regeneration

Introduction

One of the most widespread and well-known concepts of Carl von Clausewitz is the distinction between the enduring nature of war and its changing character. This dichotomy is widely recognized, although there are differing opinions that question the very existence of an immutable nature of war[i]. From a practitioner’s perspective, this distinction has limited utility as it does not allow any kind of prioritization or evaluation of war’s characteristics. As well as other strategic concepts, even this one does not allow immediate implementation. Conversely, technological innovations tend to integrate seamlessly into the realm of warfare. The practical applications of technology serve as strong incentives for nations and organizations to strive for supremacy in this domain. Interestingly, alongside the relentless pursuit of innovative technological advancements, there lies an opportunity to establish a new paradigm—one that redefines success beyond mere technological dominance or the rapid proliferation of tech products and services. This article advocates for a conceptual tool that helps identify strategic drivers that are not strictly tied to technology. Moreover, it can enable the assessment of the characteristics of war from a historical perspective. Therefore, this paper introduces and describes this new tool, named “continuum of persistence”. Furthermore, it shows how the continuum can be populated and used. Finally, this work exploits the continuum to identify possible strategic drivers with no sensible relation to technological innovations.

The continuum of persistence

Figure 1

Image by the author, Renato Messina

Several scholars have cautioned against overestimating the role of technology in warfare[ii]. Seeking to identify a pathway that avoids the monopoly of the technological paradigm, it is useful to look at the phenomenon of war through a novel approach. It should ideally distinguish between ephemeral trends and enduring constants in the history of war. To construct such a tool, Clausewitz’s dichotomy on the immutable nature and changing character must be framed not as two distinct and separate sets, but as a Continuum of Persistence. This continuum is a spectrum with a broad intermediate zone between its two poles, namely the enduring nature and the changing character (Figure 1). Its specific purpose is to better evaluate technological innovations and determine whether they align with historically persistent elements of war. It serves as an adjunct analytical tool for the use by strategists in determining the role of technologies and other features of war in relation to their historical continuity. The utility lies in its flexibility to accommodate any purpose, characteristic, resource, or method of conducting war. While

not revolutionary, this approach clarifies what remains decisive in warfare, as it has been persistently so until now. The presumption behind this assertion is that potential “revolutions in military affairs” do not occur fully overnight. It is therefore sensible—albeit counterintuitive—to be generally “conservative”, when choosing a way to conduct hostilities that is not strictly dependent on technology. Ultimately, no model can guarantee victory in future wars, but this lens helps identify factors likely to retain relevance, at least in the near term.

Populating the continuum

It is easy to rely on the classic strategic paradigm of ends, ways, and means to utilize the continuum of persistence. Keeping a certain flexibility of interpretation, we can position, for example, strategic means and, more broadly, technological advancements towards the right end of the spectrum, the one related to the changing character of war. The reason behind this choice is that specific military technologies and resources are almost all subject to constant change and evolution over time, with increasing frequency nowadays. Conversely, the ways of conducting war are more persistent and less variable. Sieges, raids, naval blockades, embargoes, and guerrilla warfare are still commonly employed methods[iii] that, despite fluctuating trends, are usually in the intermediate zone of the continuum. Here, innovations are rarer. Indeed, immediate technological advancements do not always promptly lead to an evolution in the ways of waging war. Focusing instead on the ends of war, the specific objectives of a war can be located towards the left end of the continuum, where there is the immutable nature. This argument stems from the idea that all war aims are fundamentally political and fall into relatively immutable subcategories such as economics, resource control, security concerns, or ideology. Of course, it is easy to find exceptions to all these examples. Hybrid warfare, lawfare, multidomain operations, and precision strike—to name just a few—could be evaluated differently and each one is rightly open to debate. However, the point is not to decide on a precise order of persistence, but rather to place all these concepts in relation to one another and provide them with a context that allows us to appreciate their ongoing overlap. Moreover, nothing prevents us from using the continuum with other concepts or simple descriptive features of war. For example, it is possible to use the continuum to assess the principles of war (now often referred to as principles of joint operations[iv]). We could therefore attempt to evaluate how specific principles have evolved from a practical and historical perspective and assess which ones are truly relevant in relation to their persistence over time. If we accept the continuum of persistence, there would be many topics that could test it and potentially demonstrate its usefulness. This tool can help to find answers to contemporary questions like: where is the paradigm of the precision strike[v]? Is the existence of the operational level now a consolidated and established concept[vi]? Could cognitive warfare be near the extreme of the immutable nature of war? While all these are interesting questions, here the priority is the practical implications of this approach, namely—What is the priority in conducting and preparing for war today?

Moving Along the Continuum

To address this question, the path to follow is a sober approach to the technological paradigm, recognizing the increasing difficulty of maintaining a technological advantage over extended periods of time. Without denying the importance of technological superiority, abundant historical evidence, both recent and past (see the Western campaign in Afghanistan), warns us against placing all our efforts on the technological paradigm. Technological evolution is one of the drivers of the changing character of war. Consequently, it can be at the right end of the continuum. Dominating this end can only grant temporary superiority over adversaries, especially in an era where technology seems to become increasingly accessible and related advantages appear to grow ever shorter. Eliot A. Cohen[vii] explains this by stating: “The most interesting and important consequences of technological change will probably flow from its effect on how human beings think about and conduct war, specifically: how they conceive of military action, how they assign responsibility, how they calculate military effects, and how they attempt to harmonize means and ends.”[viii] If this is true, the next competitive advantage will likely come from the intermediate zone rather than from a new technological innovation.

The intermediate zone

The intermediate zone is the realm of possibilities. Here we can identify several strategic drivers that fit our purpose to find solutions that rely as little as possible on the rapid and turbulent evolution of technology. The possibilities are numerous and influenced by factors that are difficult to isolate, such as cultural, geographical, and institutional ones. However, there are three elements that are in the intermediate zone for their substantial independence from technological evolutions. These three elements consist of the ability to deceive the enemy, the organizational capability to adapt and to regenerate combat power. The selection of these elements stems from some shared and distinct characteristics as strategic drivers. Firstly, they occupy an intermediate zone on the continuum, leaning closer to the left end (representing war’s enduring nature). Secondly, they are geographically and institutionally neutral. Whether conflicts occur in disparate regions or involve entities with divergent organizational structures, all actors always face the challenges of organizational adaptation and combat power regeneration. Thirdly, the three strategic drivers remain critically relevant across all phases of a war, both in the short and long term.

Deception

Deception is a constant element of warfare. It is affected by the propensity of distinct cultures to employ it and has experienced fluctuating prominence throughout history[ix]. These characteristics make it an ideal candidate to achieve a competitive advantage. Deception in war is primarily an issue of maintaining and institutionalizing expertise. Barton Whaley[x] highlights the challenges of deception learning curves in war, describing them as exceptionally steep. During wars, forces have to undertake a laborious process of trial and error to (re)build deception expertise[xi], which then tends to evaporate rapidly once hostilities end. Similarly, Whaley demonstrates that one of the indispensable factors for successful deception is the necessity of conveying it through multiple communication channels and an adversary’s sensors. From this perspective, technological evolution offers an increase in exploitable channels and sources for deception. In this domain, technological advancements have expanded the availability of sensors and communication channels between conflicting parties. Therefore, the concept of the “transparent battlefield” is inherently limited, as it frames this proliferation unidirectionally, failing to acknowledge that deception opportunities grow proportionally. It would be beneficial to name it “multi-sensors battlefield”, accounting for the several sensors present, without presuming to have fully understood the effects.

Adaptation

The second element, not strictly tied to technological evolution, which can be exploited is adaptability. Williamson Murray[xii], in Military Adaptation in War, with fear of change[xiii], highlights the main drivers of strong adaptability: trust in empirical analysis, effective feedback loops, balancing innovation with discipline, and integrating technology without over-reliance on it. Murray points out that sometimes the contribution of tactical adaptation has not been appropriately valued, suggesting that some form of institutional adaptation is always necessary to maximize its benefits. Illustrating the German case during World War I, Murray states: “The Germans demonstrated how quickly they could share lessons learned across their combat forces. By the end of January 1918, the army in the west, under the direction of the general staff, had established several schools through which junior officers and NCOs were funnelled. Interestingly, a number of senior officers – up to the rank of division commanders – were also sent through the schools, although one doubts whether they were exposed to the full curricula. Significantly, Ludendorff wanted to ensure that senior officers understood the new doctrinal approach fully.” In the same way, on the other side of the front, it is possible to point out significant examples of adaptations. In 1915 General Pétain reformed the tactical practice by reducing the time between artillery barrage and the infantry assault as well as by exploiting naval gun firepower in land warfare. Similarly, in 1917 British troops received the SS143 manual “Instructions for the training of Offensive Actions”. This document “gave greater authority to the platoon or company commander regarding the movement and deployment of the soldiers in their platoon or company. First, the platoon commander directed movement across no-man’s land and directed the assault on the German position. Second, each platoon was to be a self-contained unit. The idea of a self-contained unit is that its composition of men and equipment was to be complete. The new manual permanently integrated these weapons into the platoons and the platoon commander decided deployment within the platoon. The shift of power from their battalion commander to the platoon commanders was decentralization in the command structure but was meant to allow the platoon or company commanders to make decisions on the spot when needed.”[xiv]. Adaptation remains a relevant aspect of warfare, as highlighted by USEUCOM[xv] Commander Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli during his testimony before the US Senate on the posture of its organization[xvi]. Speaking about the adaptation of Russian forces after more than three years of war against Ukraine, the General stated: “However, the poorly resourced and disorganized Russian forces we saw during the initial invasion have improved significantly. Russian formations are gaining combat experience. The military has demonstrated its ability to learn from the battlefield, disseminate new concepts across organizations, and counter Ukrainian tactical and technical advantages. It has implemented rapid cycles of adaptation and is developing new capabilities to accelerate force modernization.”. Speaking about the Ukrainians during the Q&A session, Cavoli’s words were: “They went from being basically minutemen with Javelins stopping Russian invasion to being an organized force that is increasingly able to generate force in a reliable and predictable fashion.”[xvii].

Regeneration

The (re)generation of forces itself is the third driver that is essentially independent of technological evolution. Since attrition is an intrinsic characteristic of armed conflicts, the subsequent need to regenerate forces is inherent to war itself. Force regeneration is not merely a way to remain present in conflict but is also the primary means for both tactical and institutional adaptation during war. An article published in Military Review (January-February 2025) introduces the concept of “transformative reconstitution.”[xviii] The idea behind this concept is to structure forces for transitioning into protracted conflicts in a way that maintains and enhances qualitative advantages over time rather than simply replacing exhausted forces with fresh ones. Transformative reconstitution recognizes that effective regeneration does not merely involve numerically replacing losses but uses the regeneration process as an opportunity to adapt and evolve forces in response to battlefield realities. The authors recommend building a process of reconstitution able to provide a “second wave” of forces, adaptive by design and focused on low echelon units (platoons, companies, and battalions), while the “first wave” is structured around higher echelons units. Some notable hints are to produce supporting plans for reconstitution already attached to the operation order as well as to adopt the DOTMLPF-P (the acronym stands for “Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy Analysis”)[xix] approach in the entire process. Notably the “transformative reconstitution” foresees the “second wave” of forces fighting with the consciousness of the enemy adaptation to the current Multidomain Operations doctrine. Practical recommendations point out the integration of the reserve component units in the exercises of active component ones, training the proper retirement and/or passage of lines as well as forcing reserve leaders in positions of command into active service units during exercises.

Are there alternative choices? Yes.

Among the immediate questions that might arise, one is certainly whether there could be alternatives to these choices. The answer is obviously yes. The continuum offers several possibilities for reasoning. The position presented here aims more at fostering debate than at providing definitive answers, although it could serve as a bridge between strategic discourse and the practice of strategy. This position does not want to be anti-technological by principle, but rather to represent the search for a tool that helps practitioners to maintain a balanced approach toward technological innovations in warfare. Strategists can utilize this tool by mapping the war’s characteristics onto its position along the continuum. This process aids planners in self-reflection, helps identify the conflict’s long-term features, and evaluates the relevance of technological innovations in relation to those aspects.

Finally, it is worth concluding with a reflection on force preparation and training. As Murray wrote, “without the intellectual and educational preparation of the officer corps before war, military institutions have found it exceedingly difficult to adapt to the demands of war on the new battlefields.”[xx] Therefore professionals should consistently ask: What is the relationship between the resources that armed forces allocate to investment, R&D, and technology compared to those dedicated to training and education? This ratio could serve as an effective measure of our forces’ reliance on technological paradigms, providing a valuable framework for comparative studies across nations and historical periods.