Multi-Dimensional Game-Theory Analysis of North Korean Nuclear Threat

Introduction

The North Korean nuclear threat is a current and present danger to South Korea, Japan, and far beyond due to its long-range missile capabilities[i],[ii]. It is therefore a topic of imminent importance[iii]. Game theory has been used in the past to analyze geo-political scenarios such as nuclear détente[iv][v]. “Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)” is an example: one’s action leads to a retaliation move by the other, with an unacceptable outcome of both players being eradicated[vi]. “Prisoner’s Dilemma” is another example of game theory, where the uncertainty of an accomplice’s confession leads to both players incriminating themselves. For simple games, these processes and corresponding probabilities can be summarized in “game-tree” diagrams (Figure. 1). Player A (PA) has an option of making move 1 or 2. In response, Player B (PB) can make one of two moves, depending on PA’s move 1 or 2, and so on.

Figure 1. An example of a game-tree diagram.

However, the mathematical formulations for game theory are mostly applicable when the game operates with relatively simple rules. For historical and current geo-political developments, the situation and the rules are much more complex, and it is difficult to assign mathematical probabilities. Thus, the “context” needs to be added in real-life games, requiring an alternate (contextual) approach of seeing the broader picture and including a complex set of variables. The basic tenet of the game theory is that each player will strive toward the optimum outcome/maximum benefit through a series of maneuvers, therefore contextual game theory is less mathematical but can still be of utmost use in analyzing situations such as the North Korean nuclear threat. In military and geo-political strategies, the series of moves and the rules themselves evolve with changing circumstances but are still analyzable under the above basic tenet of game theory.

In this work, we seek to analyze the options that can be exercised by North Korea, from here on denoted as NK (its formal name of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is avoided in this analysis) from a game theory perspective. As in natural and other social sciences, a good theory should explain past observed events, clarify the entire situation, and also be able to predict the likelihood of future outcomes. In this initial phase of the work, we attempt to analyze the recent behavior of NK in relation to other players, most notably South Korea (denoted as ROK, Republic of Korea) but also including other players as well, namely – China, USA, Japan and Russia.

2. Analysis of North Korean Nuclear “Game”

In a Rand report[vii], the ultimate aim of NK is reported to be the unification of the entire Korean peninsula under its rule. This had been written in the NK constitution, until recently rebuked in a public statement[viii]: NK has renounced the unification in favor of remaining completely isolated in the North. Thus, we can assess that while a unified Korea under NK rule may have been the original and final objective, immediate management of such a situation by current NK ruler has been deemed untenable[ix]. The scale of the economy and complexity of the South Korean society is possibly beyond the NK managerial capabilities. Given the free democratic culture deeply embedded in ROK populace and international ties, coercive unification by NK system will need to involve extreme violence or massive international and ROK resistance[x]. ROK military, with or without US presence, is formidable[xi], and will not be easy to dismantle regardless of the processes through which unification occurs.

The utmost interest of the NK ruling class may be to instinctively and wilfully preserve its power and control at all costs, a typical optimum and necessary outcome of a dictatorship. Therefore, NK actions can be interpreted in this context, consistent with their recent rebuke of the constitutional unification policy[xii]. NK now appears to seek preservation of its iron authority in the North, while managing and suppressing international and ROK pressure, all from the protected safety of Pyongyang with its nuclear arsenal.

The main participants (“players”) in the NK nuclear strategy (“game”) are NK, ROK, China, USA, Japan, Russia, and now includes Taiwan and remote Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine-NK triangle arose due to NK’s shipment of military equipment and personnel to Ukraine via Russia[xiii]. Individual roles of the above players are evolving, but overall inter-play has not changed all that much in the last 50-plus years, except for the recent inclusion of Ukraine. North Korea has aligned with China and Russia and continues to maintain throughputs of political, economic and military exchanges, recently enhanced due to the Ukraine war[xiv]. In particular, the presence of the Russian minister of defense during the highly orchestrated July 27th military parade[xv] was an early indication of potential arms deals, for mutual benefits, now completely acted out through shipment of military and combat personnel from NK to Russia[xvi]. NK-Russia synergy has regained momentum with the ongoing war in Ukraine. Thus, this alliance will remain for the immediate future. China has a keen interest in maintaining NK in its current state. Demise of NK means a potential advance of the ROK aligned with the USA right across China’s Manchurian border. China was extremely sensitive to THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense) installation in ROK, as the radar and anti-missile defense coverage extends well into China’s territory. China-Taiwan tension also places weight on the China-NK relationship. If NK can keep the USA and ROK preoccupied with nuclear threats, it is all to China’s advantage in proceeding with its claims on Taiwan. Thus, the broader perspective is that of a classic stand-off state between NK-China/Russia and ROK-US-Japan alliances. The set pieces are poised to take advantage of, as well as to create a weakening of the links between the above allied partners. This “game” situation can be visualized in Figure 2. In a similar analogy, it should not be assumed that Israel is not monitoring the North Korean nuclear development. Israel has demonstrated direct and indirect retaliations against its opponents’ acquisition of nuclear technology or weapons[xvii], and North Korea represents a potential proliferator to this part of the world.

Figure 2. Game Map for Analyzing the North Korean Nuclear Situation

Viewed from this perspective, the situation is at a potentially unstable stand-off between these two alliances. Actions, subtle and overt, will be considered and enacted by all players, to maneuver toward a “stable” or sustainable equilibrium, perceived or real. In a basic game theory, the players consider the gains and risks of simple moves such as no action (status quo), cooperate, or (act aggressively). In reality, the spectrum of choices is much broader wherein a combination or gradation of the actions are all possible. Moreover, “soft” actions (diplomacy, espionage, subversion, counter-intelligence, and propaganda) have been key factors in determining the outcome of conflicts throughout history. NK has been adept at these aspects of warfare, modified and optimized over the past 70 plus years[xviii], [xix]. Due to its relatively weaker economy and military (even with the nuclear arsenal), NK is known to exert a tremendous amount of its national resources, in developing adaptive strategies to ensure its survival[xx].

As noted in the introduction, NK’s acts in the past 50 years suggest that their sole aim is to preserve its dynastic rule, and the state or welfare of the remaining population is of interest only for the purpose of maintaining control and prolonging the regime[xxi]. Subjugation of ROK is also useful only if that achieves this goal. However, there are associated risks and repercussions that may outweigh the gains, if overt aggression is initiated in the current and foreseeable future. There is a range of strategic options that NK or any game player will consider, as outlined as Figure 3. As noted above, in history and politics the choices are not dichotomous, and each participant must consider a spectrum of actions and monitor their implications prior to making the next or parallel moves. Estimated gains/losses, from the NK’s standpoint, are parenthesized with a number between +10 (gain) to -10 (loss). These numbers are contextual estimates, and subject to adjustments depending on the evolving set of circumstances. However, these numbers should be useful in ranking of the option’s effectiveness in achieving the end results. This contextual game-theory approach, as opposed to a simpler but more mathematical one, allows us to analyze a complex game situation – evolving NK nuclear strategy.

Figure 3. Multi-Dimensional Game Options for North Korea

Let us consider these options from the player’s (NK) position:

1. Complete de-nuclearization (-10). As events in the last several years have proven, the negotiations with USA and ROK have been futile, with the dramatic reversal occurring in Hanoi, 2017 [xxii]. Moreover, the nuclear arsenal along with its pre-emptive use against perceived threat is written into NK constitution[xxiii]. Both the additional clauses and NK’s rhetoric amplifies their announced potential to use nuclear weapons. This is and should have been foreseen, as NK believes their survival against technologically and economically superior ROK and USA depends on possession of nuclear weapons. NK’s psyche is also deeply traumatized by the near-complete destruction of the entire infrastructure by American air bombing during the Korean war[xxiv]. We can see that the only practical defense against similar outcome is the development and possession of nuclear weapons. Now that it has successfully developed what appears to be a viable arsenal, the likelihood of abandonment, coerced or not, is close to non-existent. This would mean a return to what NK perceives as a very tenuous defensive position against ROK/USA, without the nuclear weapons. A game player does not throw away their ace, when the rest of his pieces are not very effective against the opponent. That is the reason why this scenario is considered to be at the bottom of NK’s possible courses of action.
2. Status-quo: Maintain a nuclear arsenal under international sanctions (-5). This is the current status (as of March 2025), and this is a precarious situation for both NK and the rest of the world, sometimes referred to optimistically as “strategic patience”. However, the longer the NK retains (or adds) to its nuclear weaponry while economic sanctions are held in place, it places NK in an untenable situation in the long term. Although current exchanges with Russia are relieving some of the economic pressure, this temporary reprieve will not be sustained, e.g. when the Ukraine conflict is resolved. Then, the worsening economy and depleting foreign currency are threats to the NK regime’s hold on power. Public discontent in NK may be suppressed for now, both economic and cultural pressure (e.g. South Korean videos are prevalent in NK’s markets[xxv]. In recent years, NK has turned to trades of illicit substances and also to large-scale cyber-frauds, but this cannot be a sustainable solution to NK or any country’s economic woes. In more dire circumstances, we cannot rule out what the West fears, selling of nuclear weapons to third parties. Therefore, although this is currently one of the few options left for ROK/USA, it is also not the course of action that NK can sustain in the long term (-5).
3. Partial control or influence on ROK and international politics, leading to removal of US forces (+5). As noted above, one of the NK’s strategic fronts is political and subversive influence on ROK politics (Thae, 2024). Some of the main slogans in this effort are: (1) protest of joint US-Korea military exercises; (2) removal of US forces from ROK; and (3) anti-Japanese propaganda. A Recent editorial on NK’s Rodong news cite Freedom Shield 2025 exercises as an aggressive and confrontational war exercises[xxvi], and these lines are invariably echoed by dubious labor unions (“Minju nochong”, “Han nochong”) in ROK[xxvii]. Pro-north, leftist presidents starting from Kim Dae-jung, Roh Mu-hyun, and recently Moon Jae-in have never failed to supply NK with massive sums of funds, which are now believed to have fueled NK’s nuclear program over the years[xxviii]. Leftist parties when holding the majority in the Korean parliament have continued to pass laws favoring NK. Although it cannot be proven that all or any of the above political moves are directly or indirectly influenced by NK, the outcomes are oddly synchronous to NK’s preferences[xxix]. Regardless, it is in NK’s interest to exert partial control or influence on ROK and international politics, so that its strategic stance is improved with little risks or costs of exercising any of its military options.
4. Control or influence ROK politics through a pro-North regime in the south (+10). The former ROK president exhibited strong pro-North inclinations, as noted above. A similar regime installed in the south will serve a useful function for NK, with minimal risk and optimum outcome. A strong leftist sentiment in the ROK has been a historical presence since 1945, continuously building its influence up to the present[xxx]. NK can leverage this political environment to its advantage. The current ROK constitution prohibits dictatorial leadership and merging with a communist state. However, this is not a bygone conclusion, since a 2/3rd majority (current leftist parties hold a combined 187 out of 300 seats in the parliament) can initiate a constitutional reform. NK’s Rodong news continuously berated ROK’s Yoon Sugyeol and his hardline stance on military preparedness and ROK-US-Japan alliance[xxxi]. He (Yoon) is now impeached and awaiting final verdict at the Korean Constitutional Court for declaring martial law in January 2025. The leftist party, in conjunction with labor and other pro-NK unions, is quite vocal and active in calling for a final removal verdict against Yoon Sugyeol[xxxii]. Again, this is just the scenario that NK would have wanted. By placing a pro-NK president at the top, along with a majority party in the parliament, NK can gain yet more control or influence, with the ultimate outcome being complete or near-complete control of ROK politics. In any game of war, defeating the opponent from within involves minimal risks with maximum benefit.
5. Military aggression against ROK with nuclear leverage, without US forces present (-3). There are varied evaluations of the NK military effectiveness. Its aging military infrastructure and insufficient supply chain are the weaknesses, while the preparedness of the field units is becoming known through involvements in Ukraine. Even with nuclear leverage and without US forces in the peninsula, NK’s gains may be limited and temporary since ROK maintains a military force ranked as high as 5th in the world. Therefore, any military aggressive maneuvers even with a nuclear threat contain a high risk of retaliation, since the ROK will be justified in using its modern military might that includes non-nuclear but massive munitions. All of this is under the scenario that the USA somehow decides to withdraw its forces from Korea.
6. Limited military aggression with conventional weapons and leveraging of nuclear arsenal, US forces present (-5). Based on scenario E, it is not difficult to imagine that involving the USA in a Korean conflict will only be met with more decisive reprisals against NK. With modern military technology, precise and massive destruction of key targets in NK can be visualized. Again, any NK’s gains will be limited and temporary.
7. Large-scale military aggression against ROK, using conventional weapons. US forces present (-9). Due to its ageing military infrastructure and insufficient supply chain, large-scale, sustained military operations by NK is not feasible. This scenario is expected to lead to its demise, along with heavy material and human casualties on both sides. There is likely to be irreversible and near-complete destruction of the NK infrastructure and regime. Also, what would NK gain by attacking, then occupying ROK that it will have difficulty maintaining or controlling, on top of severe international repercussions?
8. Nuclear aggression against ROK. US forces present (-10). This is the worst possible scenario for all the players, involving massive destruction on both sides, certainly meaning the end of NK. Also, assuming that Seoul is a main target for such an attack, the distance to DMZ (demilitarized zone) is only 35 km, so any nuclear fall-out would significantly affect the north side, on top of the south side becoming mostly useless for decades. NK is not likely to take this step except perhaps as a last resort. Obviously, the ROK and the USA also need to avoid placing NK in such a dire situation as to lead to this scenario.

3. Analytic Remarks

The range (-10 to +10) of game outcome has been derived in “context”, i.e. due to the complexity of the situation and options it is more effective to depart from purely mathematical analysis to contextual[xxxiii]. Based on this analysis, a few projections can be made of NK’s nuclear “game” strategy. First, it can almost certainly be concluded that NK will not de-nuclearize through negotiations or conventional international pressure. It is the ROK-US pressure upon NK that prompted the development of nuclear weapons there in the first place. This dates back to the Korean War (1950-1953), which leveled North Korea through massive bombing campaigns. Nuclear weaponry is seen as a vital, and probably the only method, that ensures NK regime’s survival. Secondly, as seen through NK’s recent revocation of the unification, NK is likely to consolidate its southern borders and remain reclusive toward the ROK and allied free world. Any interactions with the ROK and USA are counter-productive to NK’s goal of retaining its control and survival. Donald Trump’s past and ROK’s current standing offer of economic aid will not register much impression on NK, since the welfare of the state is not a high priority (a well-fed and informed public would be a major threat to the NK regime). Finally, it will continue to align with China and Russia, since vital resources are still needed, in order to sustain the economy and military functions. In that sense, Ukraine’s conflict with Russia has provided a channel for throughput of military and other resources with NK.

When we consider the series of actions by NK from the game theory perspective, NK’s strategic moves are neither unpredictable nor illogical. NK invests many resources in devising overt and covert strategies for preservation of its regime[xxxiv]. Until recently, these strategies were coordinated under the banner of Korean unification[xxxv]. However, with the development of the nuclear arsenal and changing geopolitics, NK appears to have shifted to a more cloistered strategy even denouncing Korean unification[xxxvi]. An array of strategic options for NK, within the current set of circumstances, has been considered from a game theory perspective in this work. Potential game strategies to defeat the above stand-offs will be analyzed in the sequel of this work.