Military Strategy Magazine  /  Volume 10, Issue 2  /  

Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset: From Cyrus to the 2023 War in Gaza

Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset: From Cyrus to the 2023 War in Gaza Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset: From Cyrus to the 2023 War in Gaza
Image credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit / CC BY-SA 3.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/, via Wikimedia Commons at
To cite this article: Rodríguez, Manuel Lozano, “Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset: From Cyrus to the 2023 War in Gaza,” Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 10, Issue 2, spring 2025, pages 27-33. https://doi.org/10.64148/msm.v10i2.3

Introduction

Understanding the evolution of political obedience is crucial in military strategy. Throughout history, obedience has secured political power and underpinned military effectiveness. This paper examines how enforcing political obedience influences military objectives, drawing on theorists like Clausewitz, Machiavelli, and Lipsius. The discussion progresses through historical examples and, by the end of this paper, offers a comprehensive insight into how political obedience operates as a strategic asset—enabling or hindering a state’s military capabilities and overall strategic posture.

Modern strategic thinkers reinforce this view: Antulio J. Echevarria II stresses that successful strategy requires aligning military operations with political direction [i]; Sharon K. Weiner highlights how civil-military relations can bolster or undermine strategic outcomes [ii]; and Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain notes that without domestic political resolve, even a superpower’s coercive threats may ring hollow.[iii]

In this paper, ‘obedience’ refers broadly to individuals’ willingness to follow directives from authority. ‘Political obedience’ specifically means aligning one’s behavior with the political leaders’ aims, extending beyond mere military discipline, which is the narrower adherence of soldiers to hierarchical military orders alone. By ‘strategic asset,’ this paper refers to any capability, resource, or condition that substantially enhances a state’s capacity to effectively achieve long-term military and political objectives, particularly by facilitating internal coherence and external strength.

From Obedience to Political Obedience

Obedience has always been central to social order. In ancient times, it was linked to prophylactic sacrifices that established moral frameworks and power relations.[iv] As states evolved, political obedience (and its attendant “sacrifices”) became more sophisticated. Giovanni Pontano’s De Obedientia illustrates how obedience expanded from the household to the state, linking individual behavior to political stability.[v] Sharing a common “the religious is political” bias helps foster obedience across an entire society.

Another foundation for the study of political obedience lies in Machiavelli’s critique of Xenophon. A key example comes from the 5th century BCE: Cyrus the Great sought to capture the religious virtues of obedience, gratitude, and reverence normally accorded to the divine, and redirect them toward himself. To do this, he made sure his subjects could not tell apart a ruler whose authority is sanctioned by divine will from one who is divine in nature.[vi] Machiavelli understood this well, asserting that rulers must focus on the harsh realities of governance, since “how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live”.[vii] His perspective reflects the need for leaders to enforce obedience by manipulating beliefs and using force rather than by sincerely practicing idealized virtues.

The work of Justus Lipsius further illustrates this shift. In his 1589 Politicorum, Lipsius adapted Roman military and political principles to help rulers maintain stability in turbulent times. He emphasized that political obedience was not simply a matter of moral duty but a strategic necessity—particularly in periods of war or internal strife.[viii] Lipsius underscored that without political obedience, a state could not effectively manage internal dissent or external threats.

Obedience and the Military

While notions of political obedience vary internationally—such as Germany’s emphasis on preventing military “interference” in politics or American concerns regarding military politicization—these differences, although relevant in their contexts, do not fundamentally alter the strategic relevance of political obedience discussed herein. The analysis presented remains adaptable across diverse political and military contexts. Indeed, beyond the Middle East, Myanmar’s Tatmadaw shows how regime survival hinges on unwavering military loyalty [ix], while the Afghan Taliban exemplifies how enforcing ideological obedience to a leader yields strategic cohesion.[x] To begin with, without political obedience, even the best-equipped military efforts can falter.[xi] Aligning military and civilian obedience ensures that strategic objectives face no internal resistance. In volatile regions, obedience underpins both political stability and military effectiveness. Clausewitz observed that with the rise of nationalism, military obedience took on a new dimension, binding soldiers to a sense of national identity and ideological commitment.[xii]

Machiavelli also recognized the strategic importance of military obedience. In The Prince, he argued that rulers must master the “art of war” as a means to maintain power. Military obedience, for Machiavelli, was not only a tool for battlefield success but also a way to enforce political stability.[xiii] By maintaining strict military discipline, rulers ensured that their political will was carried out both internally (within their territories) and externally (against their enemies).

As Lipsius observed, military discipline and political stability are inseparable; successful governance requires obedience in both the military and civilian spheres.[viii] By maintaining firm control over the armed forces, rulers could ensure that strategic objectives—whether defensive or expansionist—were pursued without internal disruption.

Strategist Colin S. Gray noted that “politics is simply influence and the process that achieves it,” underscoring the role of obedience in strategy.[xiv] Obedience within the military is a tool for exerting political influence: it enables states to project power, maintain internal order, and pursue strategic objectives with coherence. Without such obedience, military efforts would lack direction, undermining both tactical operations and long-term strategy.

Ultimately, the shift from traditional military obedience to a more politically integrated form of obedience reflects its growing strategic importance. Whether through Clausewitz’s vision of war as an instrument of policy or Machiavelli’s focus on discipline as a pillar of power, obedience remains the glue that binds military actions to political objectives. In other words, the ability to secure political obedience—whether through coercion, economic incentives, or genuine loyalty—determines a state’s capacity to mobilize its military effectively and maintain control.

Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset in the Israeli-Arab Context

In the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, political obedience has played a critical role in shaping military operations and national security outcomes. It transcends mere military hierarchy and becomes a strategic tool wielded by both state and non-state actors to secure national and ideological objectives. This section explores how political obedience has been used as a military asset on both the Israeli and Arab sides.

During the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in British Mandatory Palestine, Zionist factions became divided over strategy—some advocating restraint (havlagah) and others retaliatory “tit-for-tat” tactics. This division led to internal conflicts; for example, the Haganah militia even sank an arms shipment to prevent it from reaching rival Jewish paramilitary groups.[xv] David Ben-Gurion, who would become Israel’s first Prime Minister, stressed the need for unity and obedience within the Zionist movement: “I agree to negotiations with the Revisionists on only one basis: their acceptance of political obedience to the Zionist Organization”.[xvi] This underscores that political obedience was seen as foundational for the Zionist cause and, by extension, for what would become Israel’s military strategy.

As a result, Israel’s post-independence “nation-in-arms” concept integrated political loyalty directly into its military structure, ensuring that citizens—especially reservists—served the aims of national defense in line with the state’s political objectives. Yagil Levy highlights how, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, hesitation by Israel’s leaders to mobilize reservists (due to political calculations) had adverse military consequences, including a shift in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from a predominantly conscript force toward a more professional army.[xvii] Early political hesitation eventually exacted a price in military effectiveness – the chickens had come home to roost.

In the Arab context, political obedience is often enforced through authoritarian means, where military loyalty is not only to the state but also to ruling ideologies. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt (1954–1970) exemplified how a regime’s political goals—pan-Arab nationalism in this case—could align the military’s mission to ideological ends, though this sometimes led to strategic miscalculations (as seen in the 1967 Six-Day War).[xviii] Similarly, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies leverage economic incentives to ensure political loyalty, tying military obedience to the ruling families’ control over national resources.[xix] This obedience-oriented mindset underpinned, for example, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015–present).[xx] A parallel example is provided by ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which declared its own caliphate in 2014. As Chehab notes, ISIS harnessed a militant interpretation of Islamic governance (featuring the creation of a ‘Khilafa’ or caliphate) to justify top-down authoritarian rule and perpetuate political obedience through Islamic rigorism.[xxi]

On a broader civilizational level, Islamic political thought has its own paradigm of obedience, one that in some ways hearkens back to Xenophon’s portrayal of Cyrus more than to modern nation-states. Islamic political theory often demands unwavering obedience to the ruler as a religious duty, on the premise that the ruler (Caliph, Imam, etc.) enforces the will of God.[xxii] This expectation extends even to sub-state actors and militant emirates, and it is unbound by the territorial limits of the modern nation-state. Such obedience is reinforced by a fusion of religious and political authority—backed by Sunni ulema, Shia marājiʿ (religious authorities), and influential leaders of the Islamic world.[xxiii] As a result, the way Islam’s political obedience supports jihadist military strategy is often esoteric to outsiders and even feared by many within the Muslim world. What is clear is that political Islam frequently uses the plight of unbelievers (kāfirūn) as a rallying point to cement support for war. In practice, any highly publicized tactical success carries an implicit strategic value beyond its immediate effect.

Across both sides of the Arab–Israeli conflict, political obedience functions as a strategic mechanism. In Israel, political obedience has secured national cohesion through a citizen-soldier tradition and the calculated mobilization of reservists in defense. In Arab states and Islamist movements, authoritarian controls or religious imperatives align military strategy with the preservation of political leadership. Whether maintained through citizen-soldier patriotism, religious fervor, or material incentives, political obedience remains key to executing military strategy effectively.

Political Obedience and Military Strategic Leadership in the 2023 War in Gaza

Jihad means the conquest of all non-Muslim territories.

Ayatollah Khomeini [xxiv]

In the 2023 Israel-Hamas War, political obedience has been central in shaping each side’s military strategy. On the Israeli side, political obedience is intertwined with the IDF’s reliance on reservists—whose mobilization and deployment are subject to government decision-making and political consensus.[xxv] As Machiavelli warned, effective leadership requires both wisdom and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.[xxvi] When political leaders fail to align their aims and expectations with those of their military, strategic setbacks ensue, as seen during the initial phase of this conflict on the Israeli side.

Israel’s wartime leadership has indeed faced internal challenges. According to strategist Kobi Michael, Israel’s top political echelon showed a suboptimal capacity for adaptation and learning over the course of the war.[xxvii] This discussion focuses on those leadership positions that most significantly influence the war’s trajectory. For instance, Bezalel Smotrich—a lawyer with no formal economic training, yet serving as Israel’s Minister of Finance—and Itamar Ben-Gvir—barred from mandatory IDF service in his youth due to extremist views, yet now serving as Minister of National Security—have drawn criticism for their roles in the crisis. Machiavelli cautioned that giving wise advice to an inept leader is futile.[xxviii] Whether due to a shortage of wisdom or other factors, the Israeli war effort has been burdened by political infighting and incoherence from the very beginning, even before the conflict formally erupted.

For Hamas, by contrast, political obedience is rooted in a rigid ideological framework that demands absolute loyalty. This unwavering commitment enables Hamas to maintain strict control over its fighters and the Gazan population, allowing it to wage prolonged guerrilla warfare and mount stubborn urban defenses.[xxix] The complex urban battlefield of Gaza—replete with tunnels, booby traps, and human shields—means that Israel cannot decisively defeat Hamas without incurring high casualties. This reality in turn feeds Hamas’s jihadist fanaticism, as the protracted struggle itself reinforces their narrative of heroic resistance. Furthermore, political leaders can reinforce loyalty and submission by deciding who remains in death-risk spaces.[xxx] In the Gaza context, in the short-to-middle-term, this obedience seems more stubborn than any coerced displacement towards less dangerous positions.

Anyhow, in Lebanon, Hezbollah provides another example of how political obedience fuses with military strategy.[xxxi] As both a political party and a guerrilla army, Hezbollah is embedded in a religious-political framework that demands obedience to Iran’s Supreme Leader (the Wali al-Faqih) as well as to Hezbollah’s own leadership and doctrine.[xxxii] This dual loyalty—far from causing chaos—creates a unique form of disciplined coherence that strengthens Hezbollah’s military effectiveness. It allows the group to pursue a clear strategic vision aligned tightly with its political and ideological objectives. Hezbollah’s capacity to straddle the line between political actor and military force exemplifies how deeply political obedience can serve as a strategic asset.

Complicating matters further, the strategic leadership dynamics of this war extend beyond the immediate region. The close intertwining of U.S. and Israeli politics has imbued the Jewish state with some of Washington’s political vices, such as lowlife partisan polarization and a withering res publica managerial honesty.[xxxiii] Sooner or later, corruption and political dysfunction inevitably affect military performance. These factors set the stage for examining how moral authority—or the lack thereof—has influenced political obedience in this conflict.

Lessons on Political Obedience and Moral Authority from the Israel-Hamas War

In The Prince, Machiavelli associates’ power with force and the ability to compel obedience. Yet in his Discourses on Livy (and later in his Florentine Histories), he also highlights the role of moral authority in buttressing a ruler’s power.[xxxiv] The ongoing Israel-Hamas War offers a lens to evaluate how moral authority (or its absence) interacts with political obedience on each side. During this conflict, Gazans have at times exhibited an almost Orwellian level of obedience to Hamas’s directives. However, it cannot be said that Israel’s top political leaders (with the possible exception of Defense Minister Yoav Galant) have demonstrated a strong degree of moral authority in the eyes of the public.[xxxv] This raises the question of whether Hamas and Hezbollah leaders possess a greater aura of moral authority among their constituents. Things become hairy here… Recent public opinion data from the war underscore the importance of perceived legitimacy and leadership. In early 2024, Yahya Sinwar’s approval rating in Gaza stood 27 points higher than Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approval in Israel.[xxxvi] Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon is more complex, but its approval rating did climb by 9 points over two years (notably among Druze and Christian communities).[xxxvii] Moreover, by mid-2024, 78% of Lebanese surveyed viewed Israel’s actions in Gaza as “terrorist acts,” whereas only 11% said the same about Hezbollah’s missile attacks against Israel.[xxxviii] These figures suggest that, in the court of public opinion, Israeli leaders struggled to command moral authority relative to their adversaries.

This disparity creates a strategic disadvantage for Israel. Israeli leaders must rely on personal credibility and moral authority to unify the public and sustain political obedience in support of their military strategy. In contrast, Hamas and Hezbollah need far less personal moral authority, because they can draw on entrenched anti-Israeli sentiment (judeophobia) to rally their base. In effect, these groups leverage extreme ideological narratives and hostility toward Israel to secure obedience and support, regardless of the moral standing of individual leaders.

For example, Hamas’s 1988 Charter invokes religious obligation by quoting the Qur’an (Sura Al-Tawbah 9:14) to portray the fight against Israel as a divine mandate. Similarly, Hezbollah draws on scripture—citing Sura Al-Isra 17:4–7—to depict Jews as a source of corruption and evil.[xxxix] Such religious justifications confer a kind of ready-made moral authority upon Hamas and Hezbollah leaders: every act of violence against Israel is framed as righteous and necessary. This in turn bolsters obedience among their fighters and garners tolerance (or even approval) from other Arab and Muslim audiences for any military tactics they choose. No matter how Israeli leaders respond, Hamas and Hezbollah can cast them either as weak or as brutal oppressors. Thus, the incentive for these jihadist organizations to continue attacking Israel remains high.

On the Israeli home front, the traditional “rally ’round the flag” effect initially helped unite the public, as has often been the case in Israel’s past conflicts.[xl] Yet that unity faded quickly during the 2023 war. Between February and June 2024, public confidence in the Israeli government plummeted, which in turn dragged down confidence in the IDF’s senior command.[xli] (Notably, 2023 also saw American public confidence in the U.S. military fall to its lowest level in over two decades.)[xlii] In stark contrast to the rallying effect observed among Israel’s adversaries, Israeli society became increasingly fractured as the war progressed.[xliii] Consequently, the once-presumed political obedience to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s cabinet has been called into question. With his ability to command unity diminished, Israel’s military strategy found itself caught between the devil and the Red Sea.

Conclusion

Politics is nothing but a struggle for rulership—a struggle to set rules and to be obeyed. Accordingly, political leaders cultivate a society in which their seat of power is more secure while uprooting the claims of those who question their authority or challenge their monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force. Civil-military relations are, at their core, power relations and thus inherently political. Moreover, these relations extend beyond the interactions of military and political elites; they encompass the ties between the military and society at all levels. For example, obedience was not only a military asset but also a political precondition for unity and coherence among Zionist factions during the creation of modern Israel. Indeed, political obedience (or the lack thereof) inevitably influences military strategy—the more contested the political leadership, the more burdensome this influence becomes.

This study has traced the vital role of political obedience from early modern statecraft up to the 2023 Israel-Hamas War. We have seen that political obedience in the military domain is more than just following orders; it is what transforms soldiers into instruments of state power and stability, whether for good or ill.

Failures and divisions within political leadership can sow confusion and hesitation, ultimately hampering strategic military goals. The history of Israeli–Arab conflicts, including the recent Israel-Hamas War, underscores this point. When Israel harnessed political obedience effectively—as in its historic “nation-in-arms” approach—the IDF achieved greater cohesion and purpose in its operations. However, during the 2023–2024 war, intense internal political turmoil in Israel undercut what had previously been a unifying boost to public confidence in the IDF. In each case, political obedience (or its breakdown) directly influenced military effectiveness.

For military strategists, this analysis offers not just historical insight but also practical lessons. It is a reminder that military strategy does not operate in a vacuum; it is profoundly shaped by the political context that either fosters or hinders obedience. This understanding is crucial for everyone involved in strategic planning, from military leaders to policymakers. The key takeaway is that political obedience is a dynamic force that can make or break a military campaign. Recognizing its power—and its pitfalls—can help guide future decisions, whether in active conflict zones or in shaping defense policies. By integrating this perspective, strategists can better navigate the complex terrain of modern warfare, where the lines between politics and military action are often blurred.

History teaches how, as the importance of obedience extended beyond individual soldiers grew, to align military actions with broader political visions became more essential. Thus, political obedience often determines how wars are won or lost long before the first shot is fired.

“Mentem feilicet tunc hominibus adimit fupera illa Mens:

quæ cujuscumque fortunam mutare conftituit, confilia corrumpit.”[xliv]

Justus Lipsius

“The mind will then be lost to men, that foolish mind:

no matter how determined to change the fortune, it spoils the plans.”

References

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[xv] Krause, P. (2017). Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win. Cornell University Press.
[xvi] Milstein, U. (1996). History of the War of Independence: The First Month (Vol. 2). University Press of America.
[xvii] Levy, Y. (2011). The Decline of the Reservist Army. Military and Strategic Affairs, 3(3), 63–74.
[xviii] Ajami, F. (1992). The Arab predicament: Arab political thought and practice since 1967. Cambridge University Press.
[xix] Bazoobandi, S., & Alexander, R. (2020). Oil and Political Stability in the GCC.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Chehab, A. (2015). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): The Return of the Khilafa (Caliphate).
[xxii] Khomeini, A. M. (1985). The Little Green Book. I.3. Tehran: Kultural Freedom; Strindberg, A., & Wärn, M. (2011). Islamism. pp. 312-314. Polity Press.; Al-Mawardi, A. H. A. (1996). al-Ahkam al-Sulthaniyah wa-Wilayat al-Diniyah. pp. 86-92. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.
[xxiii] Khomeini, A. M. (1985). The Little Green Book. pp. 115-129. Tehran: Kultural Freedom.; Strindberg, A., & Wärn, M. (2011). Islamism. pp. 43-46. Polity Press.
[xxiv] Khomeini, A. M. (1985). The Little Green Book. p. 3 Tehran: Kultural Freedom.
[xxv] The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. (n.d.). Hamas Covenant 1988 (English Translation). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp
[xxvi] Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. (Chapter XXV). Clarendon Press.
[xxvii] Michael, K. (2011). Limitations of Strategic Maneuver: The Israeli Case. Infinity Journal (4), 12–16.
[xxviii] Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe, 347. Clarendon Press.
[xxix] Gray, C. S. (2014). Politics, Strategy, and the Stream of Time. Infinity Journal, 3(4), 4–9; Bazoobandi, S., & Alexander, R. (2020). Oil and Political Stability in the GCC; Michael, K. (2011). Limitations of Strategic Maneuver: The Israeli Case. Infinity Journal (4), 12–16; The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. (n.d.). Hamas Covenant 1988 (English Translation). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp
[xxx] Lozano Rodríguez, M. (2023). Bioethics of displacement and its implications. (Chapters. 10, 19). IGI Global.
[xxxi] Qāsim, N., Khalil, D., & Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: the story from within, 41-53, 67-73, 158-168. Saqi.
[xxxii] Khomeini, A. M. (1985). The Little Green Book. Tehran: Kultural Freedom; Strindberg, A., & Wärn, M. (2011). Islamism. Polity Press; Özkaya, T. (2009). Hezbollah and its position towards Israel. (Master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University); Qāsim, N., Khalil, D., & Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: the story from within, 29, 52-62, 76, 190-209. Saqi.
[xxxiii] Author’s analysis (2024) using Worldwide Governance Indicators. A Granger causality test (lag 2) indicates that U.S. control-of-corruption scores significantly influence Israel’s scores two years later (F = 3.97, p = 0.038), whereas the reverse does not hold. Data source: Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2023). Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update. World Bank.
[xxxiv] Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. (Trans. H. C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov). University of Chicago Press.
[xxxv] Silver, L., & Smerkovich, M. (2024, June 20). How Israelis view their government, institutions and leaders. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/20/how-israelis-view-their-government-institutions-and-leaders/
[xxxvi] Cleveland, C., & Pollock, D. (2023, October 10). Polls show majority of Gazans were against breaking ceasefire; Hamas and Hezbollah unpopular among key Arab publics. The Washington Institute.
[xxxvii] Arab Barometer. (2024, July 14). How does the Lebanese street view Hezbollah? And how their opinions about it may constitute the next stage of the conflict in the Middle East. https://www.arabbarometer.org/ar/2024/07/
[xxxviii] Ibid.
[xxxix] Ali, M. M. (2011). Holy Quran. Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam Lahore, USA.
[xl] Tiargan-Orr, R., & Eran-Jona, M. (2016). The Israeli public’s perception of the IDF: Stability and change. Armed Forces & Society, 42(2), 324–343.
[xli] Silver, L., & Smerkovich, M. (2024, June 20). How Israelis view their government, institutions and leaders. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/20/how-israelis-view-their-government-institutions-and-leaders/ ; Tiargan-Orr, R., & Eran-Jona, M. (2016). The Israeli public’s perception of the IDF: Stability and change. Armed Forces & Society, 42(2), 324–343; The Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI). (2024, July 16). Israeli Society Index, July 2024. JPPI. https://jppi.org.il/
[xlii] Gallup. (2023, July 31). Confidence in U.S. Military Lowest in Over Two Decades. Gallup.com. https://news.gallup.com/poll/509189/confidence-military-lowest-two-decades.aspx
[xliii] Qāsim, N., Khalil, D., & Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: the story from within. Saqi; Shikaki, K., & Ladadweh, W. (2024, March 20). Public Opinion Poll (No. 91). Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2091%20English%20press%20release%2020%20March%202024.pdf
[xliv] Lipsius, J. (1751). Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex. p. 9. Ex Typographia Kaliwodiana.