Military Leadership In the 18th Century: Lessons for Strategic Leadership, Strategy, and Statesmanship Today

Introduction

Twenty-first century leaders in a variety of military profession specialties require a purposeful and deliberate leadership framework to be effective in this era of geopolitical, technological complexity, and limited peace. Leadership is the enduring ability to align means with strategic ends by motivating subordinates and adapting to changing political, technological, and operational conditions, while deliberately adapting one’s leadership style and skills to meet the shifting character of war. In this article the author argues that the nature and character of war are inextricably linked to the nature and character of leadership. The nature of war remains constant—rooted in violence, friction, and uncertainty—and the character of warfare evolves as these external factors shift. The nature of leadership, enduring in its principles, like the nature of war, is just the same as it was over 250 years ago. While the nature of leadership is the ability to effectively link means to strategic goals by motivating subordinates and remain adaptable to political and operational changes, the character of war is a manifestation of war’s conduct in a specific historical context, influenced by technological innovations, political dynamics, social values, economic conditions, and cultural norms. This article argues that as the character of war evolves, the character of leadership, consisting of leadership style and skills, must also be deliberately developed and changed in response. Using a historical case study, this article demonstrates how leadership style, strategy-making, and statesmanship can deliberately shape the outcome of war.

This author advances three core assertions for leadership during the American Revolution which are just as relevant today: 1) Leadership style must align with organizational goals and the strategic context; 2) Intangible leadership skills remain central despite technological change; and 3) Leaders must remain flexible in pursuit of strategic goals.[1] This article first examines a historical case study of NY-NJ Campaign of 1776; second, it analyzes the leadership styles and strategies of American General George Washington and British General William Howe; third, it asserts why a leadership framework consisting of leadership style, strategy-making, statesmanship, and civil-military dialogue is well-suited for today’s era of renewed major-power rivalry.

The main differences in leadership challenges between the 18th century and the 21st century are the proliferation of new technologies and exponentially greater variability of inputs, as well as increased demand for outputs for information and military decision-making today. This article provides a perspective on a sensible and adaptable leadership framework model for any defense professional. This author does not suggest that defense professionals should already possess particular fixed expectations of leadership style and skills but instead argues in favor of continuous development of leadership character using a leadership framework to best prepare for the complexity and uncertainty in military and global affairs to come.

The American Revolution[2] comprised both conventional and irregular warfare methods and provides perspective on how the nature of leadership remains constant, the style of leadership is recognizably distinct, and the importance of honing effective leadership skills. This article aims to not only replay a meaningful and interesting segment of Anglo-American history but also enlighten military leaders, strategists, and policymakers in today’s renewed era of major-power rivalry.

The character of leadership has significantly changed between the American Revolution and today, just as the character of war has, in that all leadership levels within the military and defense consortium in the 21st century are expected to equip themselves with an understanding of constant leadership “renewal”, technological innovation, rapid problem solving, and critical thinking to swiftly and effectively carry out the political objectives of civilian national leaders and policymakers.[3]

What are priorities for leadership style and skills necessary to lead military units in the current era of renewed major-power rivalry and in preparation for future large scale warfare? What is the future of large scale warfare? Today’s major-power rivalry and battlefields consist of all sorts of threat vectors we need to consider, and the geopolitical world is not getting any more manageable. These questions are not only thought-provoking but essential to provide better understanding and clarity to enable the right military leader in the right context.

Historical Background of The Revolution

The turning point in the NY-NJ Campaign of 1776 hinged on the balance between preservation and perseverance. General George Washington was looking at a dismal end of the American Revolution (the Revolution) in the winter of 1776, until he was able to effectively change military strategy during the interlude between the Battles of Long Island and Trenton. British Commander-In-Chief General William Howe’s indecisive leadership and flawed military strategy during the final phases of the Battle of Long Island resulted in a tactical win but strategic loss that in turn opened the door for General Washington’s decisive leadership and effective pivot in military strategy. When the American cause was looking particularly grim, Washington led a desperate and strategically consequential attack at Trenton, NJ. These pivotal moments for General Howe, at the Battle of Long Island, and General Washington, at the Battle of Trenton, changed the direction of war in favor of the Americans during the NY-NJ Campaign of 1776.

The Revolution provides a case study for an atypical insurgency with elements of conventional and irregular warfare methods in the post-Westphalian age. American revolutionaries during the Revolution comprised bourgeoise-class separatists with a mixture of limited professional military arms experience and grassroots civilian enlisted militiamen. A key advantage the Americans held over the British in 1776 was that British experiences in centuries of war leading up to the Revolution were against “foreign states”, not this hybrid-culture enemy of professional-guerrilla troops with a unique “Alien” appreciation for freedom, liberty, and happiness.[4] The British generals overall had more military command experience, but the American generals had gained some experience serving as auxiliary commanders in fighting wars with the British, most recently during French and Indian Wars. At the Battle of Long Island, the British initially demonstrated they were able to tactically overrun American colonists due to the disparity in manpower, resources, and military strategy.[5]

General Howe’s leadership style was suitable for the military he led and for his strategy of annihilation. It resulted in tactical success but would lead to long-term strategy failure. General Washington and his army would prove themselves at the Battle of Trenton. British military style of warfare included a great appreciation and understanding of irregular warfare; however, the method of warfare at the time of the Revolution, “broke with European practice by placing greater reliance on mobility and the terror of bayonet charges.”[6]

General Washington’s leadership style fit the American separatist military. Although his initial tactical performance was poor, his strategic decision-making skills better aligned with American political and military objectives of the long war of attrition necessary to achieve American independence. General Howe’s flawed strategic decision-making prevented the British from decisively ending the American uprising at the Battle of Long Island and during the NY-NJ Campaign of 1776. This contrast between Washington and Howe provides the basis for analyzing how leadership character, consisting of style and skills, were the differentiator of outcomes during an important segment of the Revolution.

Leadership Style Analysis

In the late 18th century, the British had a professional standing military while the Americans were “an officer corps struggling to survive a volatile social and political environment suspicious of military professionalism.”[7] Both generals demonstrated the qualities of a successful leader, but their leadership styles were different. Leadership analysis for General Washington and General Howe is best understood through two well-established leadership styles—transformational and transactional leadership.[8] General Washington led with transformational leadership—“leader behaviors that transform and inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization.”[9] General Howe’s transactional leadership style involves “contingent reinforcement…followers are motivated by the leaders’ promises, praise, and regards, or negative feedback, reproof, threats, or disciplinary actions correct them.”[10] While General Washington and General Howe differed in leadership styles, their styles were well matched for the militaries they commanded.

Strategy Analysis

The Revolutionary War favored Washington’s leadership style for the military that he commanded and strategy[11] he eventually adopted during the NY-NJ Campaign. British strategy led by General Howe is best characterized by Clausewitz, who described war of annihilation and positional warfare as effective military strategy based on the large armies he witnessed during the Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th Century. Alternatively, Clausewitz also described in his treatise, On War, four principles of a “Peoples War”[12] which clearly represents the Revolutionaries’ method of waging war. General Howe and the British, with their organized larger force, employed a war of annihilation and positional warfare versus General Washington, who eventually changed course in strategy between the Battles of Long Island and the Battle of Trenton. Washington decided to use asymmetric advantage, a keystone to revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, focusing his combat, personnel, and logistics towards a strategy of attrition and mobile warfare. This strategy framework, depicted in Table 1 below, provides the basis for further analysis during the Battles of Long Island and Trenton.

Table 1 – American and British Strategy Framework During the NY-NJ Campaign of 1776

Key Decision Points

There are two key decisions made by General Howe at the Battle of Long Island and General Washington at the Battle of Trenton. The first key decision that resulted in British failure of annihilation strategy was when General Howe decided to not pursue and further inflict casualties on the colonists during General Washington’s failed defensive stand at Brooklyn Heights on Long Island. Clausewitz would determine this was a failure of decisive action for Howe and in a more modern sense this would have been a failure to consolidate gains. The second key decision during the battles in the NY-NJ campaign was in Washington’s plan to indirectly attack General Howe and the British by attacking Hessian-controlled Trenton, NJ. Washington, considering the British focus on winter quartering, mounted a three-pronged envelopment attack on Hessian forces in a combination of guerilla and mobile warfare strategy. This section on leadership and strategy analysis demonstrates that, while effective leadership style and tactical achievements are important, leadership skills in strategy-making, statesmanship, and civil-military dialogue are essential to successfully aligning military operations with political objectives.

Renewed Major-power Rivalry

What General Washington and General Howe remind us of today is the importance of aligning the right leadership style and skills with the situation. Leadership will always be a fundamental and necessary human endeavor. The character of leadership exhibited by Washington was a pivotal deciding factor for a successful American Revolution. The character of leadership is relevant today but requires an adjusted and calibrated framework for the culture and mission of any organization, just as during the American Revolution.

Renewed Major-power Rivalry Leadership Style

Presidential Medal of Freedom recipient Dr. John Gardner writes about the concept of leadership stating, “Leaders need not be renewers. They can lead people down old paths, using old slogans, toward old objectives. Sometimes that is appropriate. But the world changes with disconcerting swiftness. Too often the old paths are blocked and the old solutions no longer solve anything.” One clear distinction between the two American revolution leaders was their leadership style. General Washington’s transformational leadership style “renews” while General Howe’s transactional leadership “accepts and works within the structure it is.”[13]

A leader advances by building on a solid foundation of leadership principles. It is the style of leader and acquired leadership skills, unique to each leader, that determines the right leader for the right context. It is therefore now during this “lull” period between great wars when military professionals ought to experiment and hone their leadership style to deliver our national leaders and policymakers an unmatched capacity to win in future unforeseen conflict. How do we determine the right leader in the right context?[14] What leadership style and skills are required to lead in the 21st Century? What institutional knowledge and first-hand operational experience are required to lead effectively in the next major war? After setting a foundation of continuous military study in depth, width, and context, how do we best prepare for the future of war?[15]

Leadership in this era of renewed major-power rivalry requires problem solving skills and critical thinking. Such rapid problem solving and critical thinking skills begin with the study of military history and international relations through reading and writing about subject matter such as Strategic Studies, Military Innovation, and Grand Strategy that should be made available to all military professionals, but chiefly mid-level career military professionals. Reading and writing help to enhance a professional understanding of one’s own profession.[16] Whether it be extemporaneous note taking or official publication writing, the utility in putting thoughts into words enhances problem solving and critical thinking.

Renewed Major-power Rivalry Leadership Skill 1: Strategy-making

American political scientist and international relations scholar Dr. Richard Betts provides clear strategy-making tenets that remain salient guideposts for military planners and strategists. Dr. Betts writes, “If a strategist’s logic proves faulty in selecting means appropriate to ends, the fault can usually be attributed to imperfect information. If the problem is that the ends are wrong, we are in the realm of policy and values, not strategy.”[17] For strategy-making today Dr. Betts also reminds us that, “Strategy fails when some link in the planned chain of cause and effect from low-level tactics to high-level political outcomes is broken, when military objectives come to be pursued for their own sake without reference to their political effect…” and “strategy is the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable.”[18][19] Despite failing to destroy Washington’s forces at Long Island, Howe’s misaligned tactics toward annihilation underscore Betts’ point that tactics divorced from political aims become futile. In comparison, Washington’s “low-level” tactical failures early in the Revolution were redeemed by strategic adaptation to best align tactics necessary to achieve political aims. In today’s increasingly interconnected and complex world, rapid pace and multiple political dilemmas occurring simultaneously, Dr. Betts’ tenets on strategy-making are more important than ever for military practitioners to support and inform civilian national leadership.

Dr. Stephen Biddle argues that irregular warfare can exist in regular warfare, or traditional interstate conventional warfare, and elements of conventional warfare can exist in irregular warfare.[20] The fact is that interstate, state versus non-state actors, civil wars and revolutionary wars have and will continue to involve elements of the conflict continuum (regular through irregular warfare spectrum). Aside from active combat settings where opposite sides of any conflict or crisis engage in military activity resulting in casualties, there is another justification for irregular warfare: the non-kinetic realm of instruments of power being used for interstate competition.[21] In large part major powers’ national resource consumption today are at the core of renewed major-power rivalry for conducting irregular warfare. Renewed major-power rivalry is not only a contest of will but also strategy and policy centered around deterrence, compellence, and strategic disruption.[22]

Just as Washington aligned his tactics and strategy of attrition under political aims, leaders today should ensure that military actions in never-before-seen locations and domains (e.g., the Arctic and space) contribute to strategic objectives and political aims rather than isolated tactical gains. Howe’s persistent ineffective leadership failed to achieve political goals, while Washington succeeded by adapting his organization and strategy. During the Revolutionary War, Washington emerged as the more effective strategic leader not because of superior resources or experience, but because of his ability to adapt his leadership style, align strategy with political objectives, and exemplify statesmanship.

Renewed Major-power Rivalry Leadership Skill 2: Statesmanship & Civilian-Military Dialogue

In distinguishing between a statesman and a soldier, British historian General J.F.C. Fuller notes a perennial truth that “To direct major campaigns required great insight into the political objectives of the state.”[23] Clausewitz goes further on this point, “…but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal.”[24] Although both military leaders possessed a leadership style well suited for the militaries they commanded, General Washington would prove to be a more effective statesman and strategist than the soldier and tactically competent General Howe—a key factor in the outcome of the NY-NJ Campaign.

More than ever before it is crucial that military practitioners understand national policies and that national policymakers stay attuned to developments at the operational and tactical levels of military activity. Dr. Betts again reminds us that following the “sequence of policy, strategy, and operations” in order does not need to be so and that feedback from lower levels can inform the higher as well.[25] This is an important connection, to enable lower-level military leaders to gain direct insights into what the nation, at the most executive levels of government, expects from them and also to allow for bottom-up feedback, including information on how policies are actually being implemented in practice or on the ground. Howe’s strategic miscalculation in continuing to execute a campaign of annihilation and positional warfare against Washington’s hybrid regular-militia Continental army, which had pivoted to a strategy of attrition and mobile warfare, changed the course of the Revolution in favor of the Americans. One of the main political objectives during The Revolution for Washington and Howe was to garner public support. Washington and the American War Council understood this point; however, Howe and the British monarchy were not in agreement that public support was to be valued as much as the strategy of annihilation of American revolutionary forces.[26]

Disseminated civilian-military dialogue and bottom-up feedback from information gathered on deployments, overseas training, and multinational exercises is essential, not just to capture and inform national policy and decision makers, but also to spur technological innovation, engender constant renewal, and foster rapid problem solving and critical thinking at all levels of government simultaneously. Civilian-military coordination and synchronization is more important than ever to reconcile the ever-present political-military issue of “lead times for change in military capabilities are long, while political objectives can change quickly.”[27]

Conclusion

During the Revolutionary War Congress chose General Washington to be the right leader to lead America towards self-determination because of his transformational leadership style, flexibility in devising sound strategy, and statesmanship competencies. General Washington did not have the professional training and experience that General Howe possessed at the start of the NY-NJ Campaign. However, Washington made up for this lack of experience by learning through failure and listening to his most trusted military advisors to ensure the technology of his time, limited resources at his disposal, and the right tactics were employed to leverage battlefield success for political objectives.

General Washington had the completely opposite problem when it came to resources and technological capabilities that highly resourced and modernized contemporary militaries possess. Major status quo powers during renewed major-power rivalry will need to deal with the challenge of being inundated with new technology and capability like never before. While career and aspiring strategists must understand the actual and potential contribution of technology to modern warfare, it is no less vital for them to study the environment in which this technology operates. In this age of advanced technology, there is a natural tendency to overestimate the role of weapons and, as a result, to undervalue the non-tangible dimensions of leadership, strategy, and makings of war.[28]

While the nature of leadership as well as institutional, political, and technological context of leadership today may differ from 18th-century warfare, the alignment of strategy to political aims and adaptability of leadership character endure. The 21st century leadership framework proposed provides a workable recommendation and point of departure for military and civilian leaders to help understand and act in accordance with the changes to the character of war as well as rapidly changing technology, shifting complex geopolitical environment, and limited peace for renewed major-power rivalry.

The NY-NJ Campaign of 1776 offers enduring lessons on the interplay between the character of war and the character of leadership. By applying an analytical framework focused on leadership style, strategy-making, statesmanship skills and civil-military relation skills, this article highlights three core insights relevant to both historical and modern military contexts: 1) Leadership style must align with organizational goals and the strategic context; 2) Intangible leadership skills remain central despite technological change; and 3) Leaders must remain flexible in pursuit of strategic goals. In addition to highlighting these core concepts, this article extracts two mainstay principles for any leader, at any time, in any context: A leadership style tailored to circumstances and conditions is necessary to motivate and accomplish objectives for the organization’s success; and a winnable strategy is one that is not only iterative and exploratory but also effective in aligning resources to the military environment with cross-cutting policy objectives in mind.