Beyond Random Acts of Touching: Six Core Pillars on How to Think About Security Cooperation

A sign hangs in the workspaces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Multinational Special Operations Forces Advisory Team that simply states: “No RATS.”[1] This commandment is not a pest control advisory, but a blunt reminder against “Random Acts of Touching”—the all-too-common practice of providing military assistance without a coherent strategic framework, a phrase first popularized by former commander Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland in 2011.[2] In our experience interacting and interviewing security cooperation (SC) professionals over the last decade, this frustration is endemic; most are frustrated by senior leaders not giving them the authorities, resources, or a clear strategy to avoid the RATS trap.[3]

Since 2000, about $780 billion has been spent on military assistance activities by Western governments, yet these efforts have consistently struggled to link tactical activity with strategic effect.[4] Combat operations since 2001 in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Niger, and Somalia that were viewed as corrupt, failing, and/or fragile and others led to a focus on foreign internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA). While both are approaches to developing security forces, the former is oriented against an internal threat, whereas the latter was oriented on forces capable of fighting external and/or regional threats.[5] In many cases, Western SFA built Fabergé Egg armies that were shiny and expensive but easily broken by less-trained and underequipped insurgents when advisors were no longer around to babysit.[6]

The problem stems from a fundamental inability to discern clear objectives amid competing desires for national security, regional stability, and partner self-sufficiency. This creates cascading deficiencies and reveals a lack of a comprehensive theory to guide the enterprise. Anytime a country commits to SC, the first question must be “What are we doing this for?” However, policymakers often retort with “because that’s what the partner wants” or “that’s what we’ve always done,” rather than justifications grounded in enduring national interests or strategic direction. In other cases, the bureaucracy defaults to a checklist approach, treating a complex political activity as a tactical drill or technical game to be won.[7] These behaviors breed strategic disconnects in SC, where tactical considerations overshadow strategic objectives, resulting in a fragmented and ultimately ineffective approach.[8] These behaviors are not unique to SC; they are characteristic of what M.L.R. Smith termed the “roots of bad strategy,” where bureaucratic processes and tactical activity substitute for coherent logic in the use of force.[9] Hence, this article applies the principles of good strategy directly to the SC enterprise.

Surprisingly, despite SC being a major feature of warfare from the Peloponnesian War to modern great power competition, it remains a strategic footnote.[10] This article addresses that gap by providing foundations for a theory for the advising, educating, equipping, and training foreign security forces. First, we define the scope and limits of SC as a distinct instrument of statecraft. Second, we propose six core pillars to guide this enterprise, offering a durable framework to ensure that SC is strategically aligned with national interests, regionally focused, and culturally attuned. By adopting these pillars, policymakers and practitioners can finally move beyond “random acts of touching” and forge a purposeful, effective approach to building partners.

Defining Security Assistance and Cooperation

For the purposes of this article, the definition of SC is derived from the American doctrinal definition, which covers any military-related activity by a donor country that provides assistance to build relationships that promote specific national security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide the donor country’s forces with access to allies and partners in peacetime or wartime. This definition deliberately focuses on the strategic logic of the enterprise itself rather than starting with SC activities that are elements of that larger enterprise.[11] The tools of SC are diverse, spanning a spectrum from hardware to human capital.[12] They include government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) of weaponry; professional development through International Military Education and Training (IMET); strengthening partner institutions via Institutional Capacity Building (ICB)[13]; training and equipping efforts through Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and direct transfers through Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which has been used extensively to arm Ukraine since 2014.[14]

Crucially, understanding SC requires defining it by its boundaries—by what it is not. It is not a panacea or a substitute for sound strategy, but a means to a political end. It is not an act of charity driven solely by partner requests, but an instrument of national interest. Most importantly, providing assistance is not a guarantee of unconditional allyship. The donor’s interests remain paramount, creating inherent political tensions. This is perfectly illustrated by the West’s “Anti-Strategy” in Ukraine: Providing enough aid for Kyiv to not lose, but withholding capabilities that could strike deep into Russia, thus subordinating Ukraine’s victory to the West’s fear of escalation.[15] It reflects a competing strategic objective of trying to manage escalation with a nuclear-armed Russia. This highlights a core challenge in which a partner’s immediate war aims are balanced against a donor’s broader strategic risk calculations. Ultimately, SC is inherently a political act.

Finally, SC is not humanitarian or development aid. While the lines can blur – providing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) or non-lethal aid (i.e., medical equipment and training) has the dual benefit of improving disaster response and enhancing a military’s logistical and command-and-control capabilities – the primary objective of SC remains squarely focused on enhancing security capacity to achieve shared security goals. Without this clarity of purpose, SC efforts risk becoming unfocused, inefficient, and ineffectual.

Six Core Pillars for a General Theory of Security Assistance and Cooperation

To move SC from “random acts of touching” to a coherent instrument of statecraft, its practitioners must be guided by a general theory grounded in core pillars. These are not a checklist but a reasoning framework, ensuring every SC activity is deliberate, purposeful, and tethered to national interest. These core pillars are necessary but insufficient for a general theory, which is beyond the immediate scope of this proposal. Nonetheless, without these six pillars, a general theory of SC is infeasible.

1. National Interest Primacy

SC must be an expression of the sending nation’s strategic interests. It is not an act of charity, but a tool of enduring national interests intended to enhance national security, project influence, and achieve specific foreign policy goals. However, a harsh reality often intervenes in the form of domestic inertia, whose effects may conflict with those enduring national interests. While the traditional view of inertia is to preclude new efforts, it also applies to the continuation of existing ones. Over time, SC relationships can become detached from their original strategic calculus, perpetuated by bureaucratic habit, powerful domestic lobby groups, and political path dependency. The “Bureaucratic Politics Model” is instructive here, reminding us that state actions are often the result of internal bargaining and compromise, not a singular rational choice.[16] This inertia creates a principal-agent problem, where the SC enterprise (the agent) continues activities based on historical precedent rather than the current strategic needs of the state (the principal).[17] The U.S. relationship with Israel, for example, is sustained by powerful domestic constituencies and historical momentum, creating a dynamic where the provision of assistance can sometimes appear to operate on its own logic, partially insulated from shifting regional dynamics and global political costs, as seen with international consternation towards Israel for its actions against Palestinians in Gaza after the Hamas 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks.[18] Acknowledging this inertial force is the first step toward consciously re-aligning SC with contemporary strategic imperatives, rather than allowing it to run on autopilot where it seems like the United States is just trying to “Train the World.”[19]

2. Historical, Political, and Cultural Context

Fundamentally, SC cannot be a one-size-fits-all endeavor. The recipient nation’s specific historical, political, and cultural context can and should inform the development of SC programs. Imposing Western models of military organization or societal norms without adaptation is a common point of failure. For example, promoting gender integration, while laudable, may encounter significant cultural resistance that, if not navigated with skill and patience, can undermine the entire relationship. Similarly, training a partner in combined arms maneuver warfare may be irrelevant if their primary threat is a low-tech insurgency in dense jungle terrain. This requires advisors who are not just technical experts, but also possess deep regional knowledge, linguistic skills, and cultural empathy. It means listening to the partner and co-developing solutions, rather than imposing them. Without this adaptability, SC becomes an exercise in forcing a square peg into a round hole, resulting in what in the SC community is known as low absorption rate, and a frustrating and fruitless endeavor for all involved.

3. Competitive Strategic Advantage

Short of crisis, SC is a primary tool for shaping geopolitical outcomes. This was true during the Cold War and remains so in great power competition. This pillar posits that assistance should be used proactively to bolster allies, creating resilient regional security architectures that favor donor interests and deter aggression. It is an instrument of strategic competition, not just a reactive measure. The most potent contemporary example is the massive security assistance funneled to Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion. This effort is a clear application of the pillar: Degrade a primary adversary’s military and economic capacity, bleed its resources, and signal resolve, all without committing your own forces into direct combat. This echoes Cold War-era strategies, such as U.S. support for the Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.[20] In the Indo-Pacific, SC with partners like the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan is explicitly designed to build a credible counterweight to Chinese expansionism, reinforcing a “first island chain” defense. This pillar requires a long-term chess-player’s mindset, using SC to build advantageous positions on the global map and posture the United States and its allies for strategies of denial of adversaries and cost imposition on competitors.

4. Coalition Combat Capability

If a country intends to fight alongside its allies and partners, it must ensure they can operate as a cohesive force. This pillar holds that a key objective of SC is to foster technical, procedural, and human interoperability, which is the bedrock of effective coalition warfare.[21] NATO is the gold standard, with its Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) dictating everything from ammunition calibers to communication protocols. Modern SC extends this concept globally. The sale of F-35 fighter jets to a dozen allies, for instance, is more than just FMS; it creates a shared, high-tech tactical network, enhancing data-sharing and combined operational effectiveness. This pillar extends beyond hardware. Programs like exchanges and IMET are crucial for building human interoperability, creating a global network of foreign officers favorably inclined towards American policy and objectives from their education in American military doctrine, strategic thought, and ideally, democratic values. This can be thought of as shared “software” among allies: Common understanding of command, doctrine, and planning that becomes far more valuable than shared “hardware” in a crisis.

5. Policy-Strategy Alignment

Every SC activity must be inextricably linked to a clear political objective. A bottom-up “bag of tactics” approach is a recipe for strategic failure. The central question must always be: “To what political end are we conducting this training?” The answer to that question will come through a unified strategic approach implemented through a comprehensive campaign plan.[22] The decades-long effort in Afghanistan is a tragic lesson in this pillar’s neglect. The U.S. and its allies became exceptionally skilled at the tactical tasks of training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, yet these activities were untethered from the fundamental political realities of the country, such as endemic corruption and weak central governance. The result was a technically proficient but politically hollow force that collapsed without advisors. In some cases, this pillar also means honestly accepting a limited political goal: if a partner is simply a short-term proxy to fight a terrorist group, acknowledging this “By-With-Through” (BWT) approach up-front will drive a better, more realistic strategy.[23]

6. Long-Term Sustainability

Providing equipment that a partner cannot maintain and training soldiers for an institution that cannot pay or manage them is a strategic dead end. SC efforts absent long-term sustainability of a partner’s defense enterprise through Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) are likely to be inconclusive. The goal is not to create a permanent dependency, but to graduate partners into self-sufficiency. This is arguably the most difficult aspect of SC, as it moves beyond the comfortable realm of tactical training and into the complex political work of reforming defense ministries, enterprise logistics, and embedding civilian oversight, often within historical and cultural contexts that vary considerably from American ones. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are cautionary tales, where the focus on generating combat units far outstripped the unglamorous but essential work of building their necessary institutional backbone. A sustainable security partner requires more than just skilled soldiers; it requires a functioning bureaucracy, a non-corrupt procurement process, and a professional officer corps: all outcomes of successful ICB.

Contextualizing the Six Pillars

Planners and strategists must understand the design of other actors in any SC context. For instance, Russia has turned private military companies into expeditionary tools that trade regime protection for resources, especially across Africa.[24] China fuses military and economic statecraft: pairing training and equipment with infrastructure finance, all under a formal military-civil fusion strategy.[25] Planners that ignore these competitive logics risk optimizing for the wrong thing. Good SC design must therefore anticipate how Moscow and Beijing will counter these efforts, so that resilient programs can be set under more favorable conditions.

Conclusion: From Theory to Practice

Translating these six pillars from theory into practice requires a fundamental shift in how Western governments conceive of, organize for, and execute missions to arm, train, and assist foreign security forces. The ad hoc, tactically-focused, and often inertial approach that defines so many current efforts must be replaced by a culture of strategic purpose. This means asking the right questions before committing resources, a process we have distilled into a “Design Logic Test” for any SC plan (see Table 1).

Table 1. The Design Logic Test for any SC Plan.

Moving forward, policymakers and practitioners must not only adopt this principled framework but also enact institutional reforms to support it. We offer four recommendations to encourage this transformation.

First, it is advisable that strategic planning for SC be revitalized and elevated. Any initiative must begin with a clear, written statement of the specific national interest at stake and the precise political objective it is designed to achieve, directly addressing Pillars 1 (National Interest Primacy) and 5 (Policy-Strategy Alignment). This process cannot be a military-only exercise; it requires interagency collaboration, with the ministry of foreign affairs (or State Department) leading the definition of political goals. Diplomacy is crucial, as use of the military often follows the core pillars well, while other governmental efforts can sometimes contribute to ‘random acts of touching’ due to a differing planning culture or a failure to appreciate the complexities of security cooperation. Success must be defined at the outset not by the number of soldiers trained, but by the desired change in the environment.

Second, the SC enterprise needs a re-evaluation of long-term value. Referring back to Pillar 6 (Long-Term Sustainability), sustainable partners are the only ones of lasting strategic value. Achieving this depends on a cultural shift that rewards the unglamorous, long-term work of building foreign ministries of defense, logistics systems, and professional military education programs so that the host-nation military actually buys into owning the process so that a virtuous cycle of defense institutional growth occurs after advisors leave. A key remedy would be Western militaries creating dedicated career paths for SC specialists, ensuring a cadre of dedicated experts – that can inculcate a T.E. Lawrence-like passion for advising – rather than it being a temporary broadening assignment outside of combat arms.

Third, there must be greater investment in the human dimension of SC. To effectively implement Pillar 2 (Historical, Political, and Cultural Context), a generation of strategic-thinking advisors must be created who are more than just technical experts. This means prioritizing and funding advanced education in language, regional studies, and culture for the SC workforce. It involves selecting personnel based on their capacity for empathy, creative problem-solving, and political acumen. The goal should be to field advisors who can embed and listen as well as they instruct – sort of like an anthropologist or sociologist – and who can co-develop solutions with partners rather than imposing Western templates. It also means providing them adequate administrative support for documenting and processing SC requests and the delivery of SC, since a major complaint of most SC practitioners is the time wasted trying to figure out what titles and authorities they are using when providing training and equipment. Absent this context, SC may be a fool’s errand, with little if any hope of attaining the strategic objectives that are essential to SC as an instrument of statecraft.

Finally, assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) should be reformed to measure strategic effects, not just tactical outputs. Developing a new AM&E framework should assess progress toward the political objectives established during the planning phase. Are our efforts actually reducing corruption? Is adversary influence receding? Answering these questions requires qualitative analysis, not just quantitative data. One gap in existing assessments of strategy such as the Annual Joint Assessment survey or the Chairman’s Risk Assessment is that they do not adequately capture SC contributions. True assessment of SC progress toward strategic ends therefore requires strategic humility by acknowledging when an approach is failing and having the institutional courage to adapt, curtail, or even terminate assistance when it no longer serves the national interest. It also requires recognizing that effective SC is more than just incentives or resources. It is about calibrated political leverage through knowing when to employ the appropriate mix of reassurance, conditionality, pressure, and support when partner behavior diverges from shared objectives. In practice, this translates into applying the right SC “carrots and sticks” to encourage host-nation compliance and realignment with shared interests.[26]

The choice is clear: The West can continue its “random acts of touching,” spending vast sums on disjointed efforts that produce ambiguous results and risk strategic failure. Or, it can embrace a more disciplined, strategic, and effective approach. By grounding Security Cooperation in a general theory guided by these core pillars, we can transform this tool of statecraft from a source of frustration into a source of enduring strength. While the pillars are a start, they are not a substitute for a general theory of security cooperation. Only then can we replace the “No RATS” sign with one that signifies a new era of deliberate, purposeful, and strategically coherent approaches to military assistance and advising.