As with my last editorial concerning where Greenland really was on the earth’s surface versus where people thought it was, I again have to take time to comment on the generally risible analysis of the Israeli and American air campaign against Iran, labelled Operation Epic Fury or Roaring Lion, depending on the actor, and notably both overly dramatic and silly names. Were Britain to be involved, one would hope for something a little more subtle, such as “Operation Helical,” “Starfish,” or even “Guinea Pig.”
As of the time of writing, and in full knowledge that new air strikes could commence prior to publication, the general news commentary concerning the effectiveness of the campaign seems to be based on the thinnest of strands of evidence and comprehension.
Can you win a war from the air? It is certainly possible, but historically, air power in isolation has a mixed track record. Can military skill compensate for poor policy? No, and Clausewitz wrote a book about that. We are not in uncharted territory here.
Air power has considerable power. The problem is that many civilian academics are simply unaware of it. The almost complete absence of commentary on how the IAF closed down Iran’s integrated air defence system in 2025 is proof that many in the international relations and security studies community struggle with the practical basics.
As Clausewitz noted, politics constrains violence from escalating; thus, incoherent or illogical politics constrain air power from reaching its actual potential, as does the law of armed conflict, albeit that is a source of opinion rather than fact. Degrading a nation’s oil industry from the air is well within reach of what effective air power can achieve, as is power generation and national transport infrastructure. Basing your campaign on the second-order effects of such action, such as a national uprising against the government, is negligent.
Breaking or degrading something that your enemy sees as valuable is always good, but regime change of behaviour is something very different from regime change. All of this is blindingly obvious even to the casual student of military strategy. Yet media commentators insist on preaching about “boots on the ground” and on citing T.R. Fehrenbach completely out of context. Control is not the objective.
None of this should excuse what seems to be both the media’s and the US Government’s very limited knowledge of how international maritime insurance works, or, in much the same way as failing to note where Greenland was, why the Strait of Hormuz, along with five to seven straits or archipelagos, are somewhat critical to international trade.
The real point here is that politics is the womb of War. Politics is neither reason nor logic, so do not assume that War is conducted using either.
William F. Owen
Editor-in-Chief, Military Strategy Magazine
Volume 11, Issue 1
May 2026