André Beaufre in Contemporary Chinese Strategic Thinking

Sun Tzu, By 663highland (663highland)
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Comparing and contrasting Sun Tzu with other great military thinkers of the West has produced invaluable insights, and, as Michael Handel put it, "allows us to better understand these works on their own terms."[i] Prominent comparative analyses of Sun Tzu with others include: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini;[ii] Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Machiavelli;[iii] Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu.[iv] Yet so far, based on the author's knowledge, General André Beaufre has not been subject to comparative analysis with Sun Tzu in English academic discourse. This, though, is not the case for Chinese discourse. Chinese scholarship has taken André Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy and, based on content analysis, juxtaposed it with Sun Tzu's The Art of War. This paper commences with a brief introduction of André Beaufre and his major concepts of total strategy; then it proceeds with sketching the probable value of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy in Chinese military science. Finally, this writing expounds how Chinese scholarship views similarities and differences between Beaufre and Sun Tzu, and how Beaufre's total strategy might have influenced aspects of China's grand strategy.

André Beaufre

The French military strategist General André Beaufre (1902-1975)[v] is probably most famous for his An Introduction to Strategy (1963), translated in 1965. His most important books include: An Introduction to Strategy, Deterrence and Strategy and Strategy of Action. These three books together form a triptych which set out in outline the components of a theory of total strategy.[vi] Beaufre's ideas were shaped by his service background as a French military officer. André Beaufre's concept of strategy is not purely a military one. He strongly believed that "a positive strategy of action will have to rely not only upon nonnuclear but also upon nonmilitary means."[vii] Beaufre's definition of strategy in essence encompasses "the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution toward achieving the ends set by policy" and "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."[viii] Beaufre was the first who coined the word total strategy.[ix] Beaufre's definition of total strategy refers to the choice of means laid out by policy.[x] The major concepts of his total strategy encompass:

• Total strategy: It is located at the top of the strategy pyramid and is under the direct control of the government which also decides how all other strategies are coordinated and employed.[xi]
• Direct strategy mode and indirect strategy mode: Direct and indirect strategy are two different modes of total strategy. Both are classified according to the role played by force, ranging from the most insidious to the most violent methods. In the direct mode military strategy plays a preponderant role; in the indirect mode military force plays a secondary role.[xii]
• Strategy of action: Due to the confines of nuclear or political deterrence, within the context of the strategy of action "it is the indirect strategy that is very important and not the direct strategy's adoption of material force. Although the means that direct strategy and indirect strategy are employing are different, but both are fighting for the country's ultimate purpose which is the freedom of action."[xiii]

For Beaufre total strategy must remain subordinate to national policy.[xiv] In his view the military sphere and the political sphere of policy and strategy go hand in hand; you cannot separate one from the other. Therefore, politics must be a part of military action.[xv] Regarding the interdependence between political and military affairs, Beaufre advocated that the implementation of all policy should additionally be assisted by the meticulously planning methods of military strategy.[xvi] In its relation to politics, strategy should recommend not dictate. It is the role of policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by strategy.[xvii]

Beaufre's total strategy is made up of deterrence strategy and strategy of action. Deterrence is the negative mode of strategy, to prevent the adversary from initiating an action; while strategy of action is the positive mode of strategy, which helps someone achieve something in spite of what others may do.[xviii] Due to the stalemate situation between the two major military powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) during the Cold War, Beaufre argued that the risk of a thermonuclear war had become very small. This, in turn, means that "in the rest of the world the powers in general, whether strong or weak, have very wide freedom of action; but this freedom of action can be exercised only outside the nuclear field and it is less wide for the nuclear powers than for the others."[xix]

The Value of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy in Chinese Military Science

The Summary of the Famous Works on Western Military Science, edited by Liu Qing, lists Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy among the 31 most valuable military books written by western military strategists on the theory of warfare;[xx] and recommends it as a must-read book for students of modern strategic thought in the age of nuclear weapons. In fact, Beaufre's broad framework of total strategy for the nuclear age is preferred over other narrower frameworks, which are seen as inferior in their systematic discussion of integrating nuclear weapons in a broad strategic framework.[xxi]

The Sun Tzu Research Institute of Binzhou Academy is China's elite institute for Sun Tzu scholarship.[xxii] The institute's website recommends the ten most authoritative reference books for the study of Sun Tzu's The Art of War. On this list the book Sunzi San Lun,[xxiii] authored by Niu Xianzhong,[xxiv] which includes a comparative analysis of Beaufre and Sun Tzu, ranks fifth.[xxv] Listed among the ten most important standard works for serious students of Sun Tzu, it can be assumed that Sun Tzu experts are also familiar with the parallels between Beaufre and Sun Tzu.

Experts and studies attest that the thoughts expressed in Sun Tzu's Art of War are a significant part of Beijing's military thoughts. Sun Tzu's advise is taken to wage cyber war against America, argued Major Richard Davenport, a psychological operations officer in the U.S. Army Central Command, in the Armed Forced Journal in 2009.[xxvi] A thesis which researches The Art of War's influence on China's military in a case study of the 1962 Sino-India War found that "the thoughts expressed in The Art of War could possibly be used as a practical tool for penetrating Beijing’s military thoughts."[xxvii] Due to his many personal encounters with high-ranking officers from China's military establishment, Former Director of the Japanese Defense Intelligence (Vice Admiral) Fumio Ota opined, "Since all Chinese military personnel seem to memorize Sun Tzu, Chinese strategy must be based on Sun Tzu." As he was told by the Vice President of PLA National Defense University (PLANDU)," Sun Tzu is the centerpiece of the education in PLANDU." And, by 2006, the PLA made the decision to adopt "Sun Tzu as the educational textbook not only for officers but also for all enlisted soldiers/sailors."[xxviii]

Just as Sun Tzu's thinking has a tremendous clout on Beijing's military thoughts and therefore on its strategic behavior, it is very likely that Beaufre–dubbed as the western Sun Tzu–has also been studied extensively by Chinese strategists. Due to André Beaufre's similarities with Sun Tzu, the works of Beaufre are seen as the key for in-depth studies enabling a fruitful reinterpretation of Sun Tzu's wisdoms and their application to contemporary strategic thinking and its resultant decision-making. Niu wrote:

By making a comparison and contrast of a selection of suitable expressions from Sun Tzu and Beaufre one can claim that the thinking of both men is very similar. Now we only need to make the next step in the discussion and try to compare both men's system of thinking. Beaufre has a complete system of thought and as a modern person his system of thought is of course distant and more complex: 1) total strategy, 2) indirect strategy, 3) strategy of action, 4) strategy for tomorrow. These words have all been created by Beaufre, but they are not really completely new concepts. They have only been changed and put in a new packing.[xxix]

In other words, Niu's book Sunzi San Lun,[xxx] canonized among the ten most authoritative reference books for the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War, suggests that if you want to have a better understanding of Sun Tzu study Beaufre; or, if you want to have a modern outlook on Sun Tzu, Beaufre will be very helpful for that undertaking. Very careful not to aggrandize Beaufre above China's greatest strategist, Sun Tzu, this advice, which is tantamount to the idiom old wine in new wineskins, may have been followed without greater opposition.

Sun Tzu and Andre Beaufre

For Sun Tzu specialist Niu Xianzhong, André Beaufre is the only Western strategist that he ranks to be on par with Sun Tzu.

Among the great masters of western strategy the person who deserves the most esteem is the French general André Beaufre. Regarding the history of western strategic thought, only Beaufre's qualifications really match those of Sun Tzu in terms of what he mentions and discusses. Therefore, one can say that Beaufre is the Western Sun Tzu, only that he was born 2500 years later.[xxxi]

Just as J. Mohan Malik found that "there is a remarkable similarity between the views of Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu,"[xxxii] Sun Tzu pundit Niu Xianzhong concluded in his comparison and contrast of text passages from Sun Tzu and Beaufre that both of them are very similar in their views.[xxxiii] Whereas it is possible to make a connection between Sun Tzu's military ideas containing many of the tenets of the indirect approach and Liddell Hart's formalized concept of the 'indirect approach[xxxiv] , linking Sun Tzu and André Beaufre in terms of the former shaping the thinking of the latter is not possible. It is true that Beaufre acknowledged that at least part of his concepts originate from Liddell Hart,[xxxv] but Beaufre never mentioned the strategist Sun Tzu in his books. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence that demonstrates that Beaufre had ever read Sun Tzu. Finally, as Niu Xianzhong saw it, Liddell-Hart had a rather shallow understanding of Sun Tzu. This is why, even if André Beaufre had been very much inspired by Liddell-Hart, Beaufre's work displays his qualities as an original thinker.[xxxvi]

The following paragraphs roughly delineate the parallels which Sun Tzu pundit Niu Xianzhong, apparently translator of the first Chinese version of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy,[xxxvii] saw between Sun Tzu and André Beaufre.[xxxviii] The focus of the discussion lies on the similarities and differences which can be extrapolated from Beaufre's thinking in An Introduction to Strategy and Sun Tzu's thinking in The Art of War.

For both Sun Tzu and Beaufre, cognizance and ignorance of strategy are the major reasons for victory or defeat in battle. Beaufre, who witnessed France's decline from a first class to a third class country as it repeatedly encountered disasters such as the military defeat by Hitler, the loss of Indo-China, and the fearful political defeat associated with Suez, summarized the entire experience of defeat in the following manner:"For me the inescapable conclusion is that in most cases ignorance of strategy has been our fatal error."[xxxix] In this sense, Beaufre believed that every defeat in the final analysis could be traced back to ignorance. This idea almost completely tallies with what Sun Tzu said[xl] when he made reference to the five constant factors governing strategy and determining the deliberations of decision-makers: " He who knows them will be victorious. He who knows them not will fail" (知之者胜，不知者不胜).[xli]

Although there is no doubt that the two strategists equally attached importance to knowledge, both differed in their approach to knowledge. While for Sun Tzu the possession of knowledge is one of the most important concepts in his entire system of thinking, because without knowledge it is impossible to act, and, even more important, impossible to win, Beaufre adopted a rather passive attitude towards knowledge. Beaufre only emphasized ignorance as an error that gets you killed, yet he was not clear-cut in pointing out that knowledge is the major prerequisite for victory or defeat. By comparison, Sun Tzu's statements seem to be more active regarding the attitude towards the attainment of knowledge and the role it plays for victory or defeat.[xlii]

Like André Beaufre, Sun Tzu believed that different circumstances require different strategies. Regarding the choice of method, Beaufre stated that it isn't "limited to the military field only" but also includes the political, economic, and diplomatic fields.[xliii] Sun Tzu was also convinced that in the choice of method you can select among different strategies.[xliv] In the passage Attack by Strategem Sun Tzu wrote: "Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities" (故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城).[xlv]

The content of André Beaufre's concept of strategy is very similar to everything Sun Tzu associated with "laying of plans" (jì, 计),[xlvi] argued Niu.[xlvii] Beaufre had an original idea about the meaning of strategy. He believed that strategy does not manifest itself as a single defined doctrine but as method of thought, its objective is "to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action."[xlviii] Although it is unclear whether Sun Tzu ever believed that strategy is a method of thought, Sun Tzu's concepts of strategy are very similar to those of Beaufre. Sun Tzu said: "The art of war is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field" (经之以无，校之以计，而索其情).[xlix] To clarify the meaning of laying of plans (jì, 计) requires an exegesis. This is done with a macro approach and micro approach. According to the macro approach, laying plans either refers to the first chapter of Sun Tzu's Art of War, which Giles dubbed Laying Plans, or it explains the general meaning of the character (jì, 计). Similar to Beaufre's abovementioned words, the chapter Laying Plans as well as the intrinsic meaning of the character jì (laying of plans),when linking it with a method of thought, suggest that Sun Tzu's concept of strategy was tantamount to organized thinking, including categorization of phenomena, prioritization of events, and selection of the most effective course of action in order to attain a given objective. The micro approach of the meaning of the word laying plans in this passage makes reference to the selected quotation found in the passage Laying Plans as a part of Sun Tzu's concept of strategy. Like in Beaufre's concept of strategy (method of thought), the words taken from the quotation found in the passage Laying Plans as a part of Sun Tzu's concept of strategy suggest that both strategists' concept of strategy is very similar in its meaning: "The art of war is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field."

Both André Beaufre and Sun Tzu's thinking on the whole tallies with praxeology.[l] In An Introduction to Strategy Beaufre wrote: "Our civilization requires a science of how to take or to use the word coined by Raymond Aron, a 'praxeology' "[li] The Polish scholar Krzysztof Gawlikowski praised Sun Tzu as the founder of Chinese praxeology. Gawlikowski noted that all conclusions that western scholars came up with on praxeology are more or less identical with what Sun Tzu discovered 2000 years earlier, although these scholars when developing their thinking about praxeology had never studied Sun Tzu's book.[lii] Whereas Sun Tzu is considered to be the founder of Chinese praxeology, Beaufre constructed an entire system of how to take action.[liii]

Like André Beaufre, Sun Tzu was a dialectical thinker. Both Beaufre and Clausewitz, in many respects holding identical views, had been to some extend under the influence of dialectics.[liv] In his famous definition, Beaufre conceptualizes the essence of strategy as," the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."[lv] Since Sun Tzu lived more than 2000 years ago, it is only natural that he didn't use this neologism. But the basis of his thinking was also nevertheless dualism. For this reason, concluded Niu, the difference between Sun Tzu and Beaufre is only a matter of appearance, but both strategists share the same kind of theory as their philosophical basis.[lvi]

For Sun Tzu planning had top priority; similarly, Beaufre also attached importance to strategic planning. Beaufre believed that planning had to overcome the resistance of the enemy until being able to attain one's ideal objective. In other words, "If the plan is a good one, there should be no risk of set-backs. The result will be a 'risk-proof' strategy, the object of which will be to preserve our own liberty of action."[lvii] In Sun Tzu's book one can find corresponding expressions that accord with Beaufre's aforementioned ideas, only that the manner of expression in the classical Chinese prose is more concise than that of the French strategist and that is all. Sun Tzu said:" He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated" (故其战胜不忑，不忑者，其所措必胜，胜已败者也).[lviii] Sun Tzu's so-called “bù tè, 不忑” perfectly matches the meaning of Beaufre's 'risk-proof', according to Niu. Moreover, when Sun Tzu emphasized that, "Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him" (故善战者致人而不致于人),[lix] he, like Beaufre, had the objective in mind to guarantee our side's freedom of action.[lx]

Beaufre believed that when waging war there are two basic doctrines one has to adhere to. One is the rational application of force doctrine. The other is the doctrine of guile. Whereas the former "fits the case where we are stronger than the enemy[…], or the case where the enemy is the stronger but is dangerously dispersed," the latter "is imperative if we are the weaker."[lxi] Similarly, Sun Tzu said:" In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack–the direct and indirect (战势不过奇正)."[lxii] A juxtaposition of Beaufre's doctrines with Sun Tzu's quote shows that the first is the direct method (zhèng, 正) – the rational application of force –, and the second is the indirect method (qí, 奇) –guile–. Beaufre believed that the former originated from Clausewitz and that the latter was brilliantly expounded by Liddell Hart.[lxiii] In their approaches in maneuvering, the former emphasized the direct method, but he didn't stress the indirect method; the latter stressed the indirect method, but he didn't emphasize the direct method. Only Sun Tzu was really able to master the change between the direct and indirect method.[lxiv] Therefore, Beaufre and Sun Tzu have in common that both believed in the existence of two major doctrines in warfare.

Like Beaufre, Sun Tzu believed in the importance of being well informed and exercising foresight.[lxv] Beaufre advocated "the creation of highly effective intelligence and research organizations" enabling decision-makers to "control the process of evolution of force by fully-thought-out decisions arrived at in good time."[lxvi] Similarly, Sun Tzu emphasized foresight, resourcefulness, and the confirmation of intelligence as the basis for strategic planning. [lxvii]

According to André Beaufre and Sun Tzu, a superior strategy can produce a desired result without any serious fighting. In this the psychological dimension of warfare is the decisive factor which either makes or breaks your opponent before any physical fighting occurs.[lxviii] Moreover, these points are also illustrated from a slightly different angle by the approaches of both strategists which categorize battle into two phases. For Beaufre, the design of a battle can be roughly divided into two phases: First, a preparatory phase; and, second, a decisive phase. The crux of victory and defeat is the psychological factor. In the first phase one has to cause the psychological collapse of the enemy. If this has been done successfully the requirement for a decisive battle may have been overridden.[lxix] Very coincidental, this is exactly Sun Tzu's so called " supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting" (不战而屈人之兵， 善之善折也).[lxx] This requires further explanation and a corrected translation: Sun Tzu's "zhàn" (战) means making war "huìzhàn" (会战)[lxxi] and not fighting a battle. Furthermore, "bǎizhànbǎishèng, 百战百胜" means winning one hundred times making war[lxxii] (war preparation), and not really fighting one hundred times a battle (a decisive battle). [lxxiii]

For André Beaufre the major tenet for winning a decisive battle in pre-eighteenth century warfare was to force the enemy to accept battle under unfavorable conditions. Under these circumstances, the winning side would ensure victory through either great numerical superiority at the decisive point or "a highly advantageous position on the ground."[lxxiv These concepts bear striking resemblance to some of the principles found in Sun Tzu's Chapter 6-Weak Points and Strong such as "whoever is first in the field awaits the coming of the enemy" (先处战地而待敌),[lxxv] "but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him" (致人而不致于人), "By discovering the enemy's disposition and remaining invisible ourselves" (形人而我无形),[lxxvi] "Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations for us" (寡者備人者也，眾者使人備己者也),[lxxvii] and other principles. [lxxvii]

Both André Beaufre and Sun Tzu had a very similar understanding of maneuver. Apart from the many different Chinese characters which Lionel Giles translated with maneuver, there is one Chinese word which Sun Tzu used in his text that accords with André Beaufre's concept of maneuver. Beaufre believed that all decisions in strategy must be made within a framework consisting of three main coordinates: time, space, and the armed forces. Another even more complex factor governing "the order and inter-relationship of successive situations," which has to be taken into consideration, Beaufre designated as maneuver.[lxxix] According to the Far East English-Chinese Dictionary, the translation of the verb maneuver into the Chinese is as follows: "-v.t. 1 调遣。( diàoqiǎn) 2 计透 (jìtòu) to maneuver the enemy into (out of) position. 誘敵深入( 離開)某地。"[lxxx] In other words, to maneuver implies using strategems to lure the enemy to adopt some kind of action which is beneficial to our side.[lxxxi] Sun Tzu's employment of the characters dòngdí 动敌 suggests that he utilized a very suitable word to express this concept. He said: "Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearance, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at" (善动敌者，形之敌必从之，予之敌必取之).[lxxxii] Therefore, the most suitable Chinese characters for the word "manoeuvre" should be dòngdí (动敌), because the word manoeuvre is a compound word consisting of the characters dòng (动 [move, act, get moving (dòng=动)] and dí 敌[ enemy (dírén=敌人)], thus connoting motion and action to keep the enemy on the move.[lxxxiii]

Elaborating on the factor of maneuver, Beaufre argued that "To some extent this governs the other factors; it is the direct product of the dialectic of conflict, or in other words of the abstract counterplay between the two opponents." Corresponding to other Western strategists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, who made use of special analogies, Beaufre employed fencing as an analogy and pointed out," it is clear that there are a number of possible forms of action and reaction."[lxxxiv] Beaufre's fencing analogy seemingly has the identical meaning of Sun Tzu's "Military tactics are like unto water" (兵形象水).[lxxxv] The one who is fencing must first analyze and explain the enemy's method of fencing and then attempt to get the upper hand. And the one who is using soldiers must "[He who can] modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in wining" (因故变化而取胜). [lxxxvi]To elucidate maneuver in progress, Beaufre discussed different types of action with his fencing analogy. He argued that to ensure freedom of action the one who is fencing (taking different types of action) must always retain the initiative.[lxxxvii] This is also exactly what Sun Tzu said: "Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men."[lxxxviii]

Conclusion

This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, it is important to engage deeply with the military writings and concepts of Beaufre. If Chinese strategists value Beaufre and his concepts of strategy, China analysts should also study Beaufre more extensively because this may significantly enhance their understanding of contemporary Chinese strategic thinking. In other words, we should heed Sun Tzu's advice: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt."[lxxxix]

Second, the circumstantial evidence presented in this paper suggests that Beaufre's writings might be one of the major sources for reinterpreting Sun Tzu and helping Chinese analysts get a more modern outlook of how Sun Tzu can be applied to contemporary politics and military challenges in the nuclear age. Just as the Chinese Communist Party has co-opted western capitalism and mixed it with its socialist values and then dubbed it socialism with Chinese characteristics; by the same token, the sources analyzed in this paper indicate that the writings of the French strategist André Beaufre, which promote the idea of total strategy in a nuclear era, may have been employed to renovate China's grand strategy.

Parallelism suggests that in the same manner that Sun Tzu's teachings are consulted for crafting aspects of China's grand strategy and the role of China's military therein, it is likely that Beaufre's total strategy concepts are also being consulted, if not utilized, as part of China's grand strategy. For instance, over the years, Sun Tzu's The Art of War has been employed for crafting aspects of China's international peaceful development strategy (grand strategy), which is both assertive and cooperative.[xc] Interestingly, André Beaufre's indirect strategy –in which "the availability and the use of force are just as necessary as in direct strategy" and force may be reduced but still plays an important part[xci] – has been identified as an aspect of international strategy,[xcii] and Beaufre describes it as a vehicle to preserve peace.[xciii]

Table. **Compiled by Tim Kumpe based on content analysis.