Military Strategy Magazine  /  Volume 5, Issue 2  /  

André Beaufre in Contemporary Chinese Strategic Thinking

André Beaufre in Contemporary Chinese Strategic Thinking André Beaufre in Contemporary Chinese Strategic Thinking
To cite this article: Kumpe, Tim, “André Beaufre in Contemporary Chinese Strategic Thinking,” Infinity Journal, Volume 5, Issue 2, spring 2016, pages 34-42.

Sun Tzu, By 663highland (663highland)
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Comparing and contrasting Sun Tzu with other great military thinkers of the West has produced invaluable insights, and, as Michael Handel put it, "allows us to better understand these works on their own terms."[i] Prominent comparative analyses of Sun Tzu with others include: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini;[ii] Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Machiavelli;[iii] Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu.[iv] Yet so far, based on the author's knowledge, General André Beaufre has not been subject to comparative analysis with Sun Tzu in English academic discourse. This, though, is not the case for Chinese discourse. Chinese scholarship has taken André Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy and, based on content analysis, juxtaposed it with Sun Tzu's The Art of War. This paper commences with a brief introduction of André Beaufre and his major concepts of total strategy; then it proceeds with sketching the probable value of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy in Chinese military science. Finally, this writing expounds how Chinese scholarship views similarities and differences between Beaufre and Sun Tzu, and how Beaufre's total strategy might have influenced aspects of China's grand strategy.

André Beaufre

The French military strategist General André Beaufre (1902-1975)[v] is probably most famous for his An Introduction to Strategy (1963), translated in 1965. His most important books include: An Introduction to Strategy, Deterrence and Strategy and Strategy of Action. These three books together form a triptych which set out in outline the components of a theory of total strategy.[vi] Beaufre's ideas were shaped by his service background as a French military officer. André Beaufre's concept of strategy is not purely a military one. He strongly believed that "a positive strategy of action will have to rely not only upon nonnuclear but also upon nonmilitary means."[vii] Beaufre's definition of strategy in essence encompasses "the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution toward achieving the ends set by policy" and "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."[viii] Beaufre was the first who coined the word total strategy.[ix] Beaufre's definition of total strategy refers to the choice of means laid out by policy.[x] The major concepts of his total strategy encompass:

  • Total strategy: It is located at the top of the strategy pyramid and is under the direct control of the government which also decides how all other strategies are coordinated and employed.[xi]
  • Direct strategy mode and indirect strategy mode: Direct and indirect strategy are two different modes of total strategy. Both are classified according to the role played by force, ranging from the most insidious to the most violent methods. In the direct mode military strategy plays a preponderant role; in the indirect mode military force plays a secondary role.[xii]
  • Strategy of action: Due to the confines of nuclear or political deterrence, within the context of the strategy of action "it is the indirect strategy that is very important and not the direct strategy's adoption of material force. Although the means that direct strategy and indirect strategy are employing are different, but both are fighting for the country's ultimate purpose which is the freedom of action."[xiii]

For Beaufre total strategy must remain subordinate to national policy.[xiv] In his view the military sphere and the political sphere of policy and strategy go hand in hand; you cannot separate one from the other. Therefore, politics must be a part of military action.[xv] Regarding the interdependence between political and military affairs, Beaufre advocated that the implementation of all policy should additionally be assisted by the meticulously planning methods of military strategy.[xvi] In its relation to politics, strategy should recommend not dictate. It is the role of policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by strategy.[xvii]

Beaufre's total strategy is made up of deterrence strategy and strategy of action. Deterrence is the negative mode of strategy, to prevent the adversary from initiating an action; while strategy of action is the positive mode of strategy, which helps someone achieve something in spite of what others may do.[xviii] Due to the stalemate situation between the two major military powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) during the Cold War, Beaufre argued that the risk of a thermonuclear war had become very small. This, in turn, means that "in the rest of the world the powers in general, whether strong or weak, have very wide freedom of action; but this freedom of action can be exercised only outside the nuclear field and it is less wide for the nuclear powers than for the others."[xix]

The Value of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy in Chinese Military Science

The Summary of the Famous Works on Western Military Science, edited by Liu Qing, lists Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy among the 31 most valuable military books written by western military strategists on the theory of warfare;[xx] and recommends it as a must-read book for students of modern strategic thought in the age of nuclear weapons. In fact, Beaufre's broad framework of total strategy for the nuclear age is preferred over other narrower frameworks, which are seen as inferior in their systematic discussion of integrating nuclear weapons in a broad strategic framework.[xxi]

The Sun Tzu Research Institute of Binzhou Academy is China's elite institute for Sun Tzu scholarship.[xxii] The institute's website recommends the ten most authoritative reference books for the study of Sun Tzu's The Art of War. On this list the book Sunzi San Lun,[xxiii] authored by Niu Xianzhong,[xxiv] which includes a comparative analysis of Beaufre and Sun Tzu, ranks fifth.[xxv] Listed among the ten most important standard works for serious students of Sun Tzu, it can be assumed that Sun Tzu experts are also familiar with the parallels between Beaufre and Sun Tzu.

Experts and studies attest that the thoughts expressed in Sun Tzu's Art of War are a significant part of Beijing's military thoughts. Sun Tzu's advise is taken to wage cyber war against America, argued Major Richard Davenport, a psychological operations officer in the U.S. Army Central Command, in the Armed Forced Journal in 2009.[xxvi] A thesis which researches The Art of War's influence on China's military in a case study of the 1962 Sino-India War found that "the thoughts expressed in The Art of War could possibly be used as a practical tool for penetrating Beijing’s military thoughts."[xxvii] Due to his many personal encounters with high-ranking officers from China's military establishment, Former Director of the Japanese Defense Intelligence (Vice Admiral) Fumio Ota opined, "Since all Chinese military personnel seem to memorize Sun Tzu, Chinese strategy must be based on Sun Tzu." As he was told by the Vice President of PLA National Defense University (PLANDU)," Sun Tzu is the centerpiece of the education in PLANDU." And, by 2006, the PLA made the decision to adopt "Sun Tzu as the educational textbook not only for officers but also for all enlisted soldiers/sailors."[xxviii]

Just as Sun Tzu's thinking has a tremendous clout on Beijing's military thoughts and therefore on its strategic behavior, it is very likely that Beaufre–dubbed as the western Sun Tzu–has also been studied extensively by Chinese strategists. Due to André Beaufre's similarities with Sun Tzu, the works of Beaufre are seen as the key for in-depth studies enabling a fruitful reinterpretation of Sun Tzu's wisdoms and their application to contemporary strategic thinking and its resultant decision-making. Niu wrote:

By making a comparison and contrast of a selection of suitable expressions from Sun Tzu and Beaufre one can claim that the thinking of both men is very similar. Now we only need to make the next step in the discussion and try to compare both men's system of thinking. Beaufre has a complete system of thought and as a modern person his system of thought is of course distant and more complex: 1) total strategy, 2) indirect strategy, 3) strategy of action, 4) strategy for tomorrow. These words have all been created by Beaufre, but they are not really completely new concepts. They have only been changed and put in a new packing.[xxix]

In other words, Niu's book Sunzi San Lun,[xxx] canonized among the ten most authoritative reference books for the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War, suggests that if you want to have a better understanding of Sun Tzu study Beaufre; or, if you want to have a modern outlook on Sun Tzu, Beaufre will be very helpful for that undertaking. Very careful not to aggrandize Beaufre above China's greatest strategist, Sun Tzu, this advice, which is tantamount to the idiom old wine in new wineskins, may have been followed without greater opposition.

Sun Tzu and Andre Beaufre

For Sun Tzu specialist Niu Xianzhong, André Beaufre is the only Western strategist that he ranks to be on par with Sun Tzu.

Among the great masters of western strategy the person who deserves the most esteem is the French general André Beaufre. Regarding the history of western strategic thought, only Beaufre's qualifications really match those of Sun Tzu in terms of what he mentions and discusses. Therefore, one can say that Beaufre is the Western Sun Tzu, only that he was born 2500 years later.[xxxi]

Just as J. Mohan Malik found that "there is a remarkable similarity between the views of Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu,"[xxxii] Sun Tzu pundit Niu Xianzhong concluded in his comparison and contrast of text passages from Sun Tzu and Beaufre that both of them are very similar in their views.[xxxiii] Whereas it is possible to make a connection between Sun Tzu's military ideas containing many of the tenets of the indirect approach and Liddell Hart's formalized concept of the 'indirect approach[xxxiv] , linking Sun Tzu and André Beaufre in terms of the former shaping the thinking of the latter is not possible. It is true that Beaufre acknowledged that at least part of his concepts originate from Liddell Hart,[xxxv] but Beaufre never mentioned the strategist Sun Tzu in his books. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence that demonstrates that Beaufre had ever read Sun Tzu. Finally, as Niu Xianzhong saw it, Liddell-Hart had a rather shallow understanding of Sun Tzu. This is why, even if André Beaufre had been very much inspired by Liddell-Hart, Beaufre's work displays his qualities as an original thinker.[xxxvi]

The following paragraphs roughly delineate the parallels which Sun Tzu pundit Niu Xianzhong, apparently translator of the first Chinese version of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy,[xxxvii] saw between Sun Tzu and André Beaufre.[xxxviii] The focus of the discussion lies on the similarities and differences which can be extrapolated from Beaufre's thinking in An Introduction to Strategy and Sun Tzu's thinking in The Art of War.

For both Sun Tzu and Beaufre, cognizance and ignorance of strategy are the major reasons for victory or defeat in battle. Beaufre, who witnessed France's decline from a first class to a third class country as it repeatedly encountered disasters such as the military defeat by Hitler, the loss of Indo-China, and the fearful political defeat associated with Suez, summarized the entire experience of defeat in the following manner:"For me the inescapable conclusion is that in most cases ignorance of strategy has been our fatal error."[xxxix] In this sense, Beaufre believed that every defeat in the final analysis could be traced back to ignorance. This idea almost completely tallies with what Sun Tzu said[xl] when he made reference to the five constant factors governing strategy and determining the deliberations of decision-makers: " He who knows them will be victorious. He who knows them not will fail" (知之者胜,不知者不胜).[xli]

Although there is no doubt that the two strategists equally attached importance to knowledge, both differed in their approach to knowledge. While for Sun Tzu the possession of knowledge is one of the most important concepts in his entire system of thinking, because without knowledge it is impossible to act, and, even more important, impossible to win, Beaufre adopted a rather passive attitude towards knowledge. Beaufre only emphasized ignorance as an error that gets you killed, yet he was not clear-cut in pointing out that knowledge is the major prerequisite for victory or defeat. By comparison, Sun Tzu's statements seem to be more active regarding the attitude towards the attainment of knowledge and the role it plays for victory or defeat.[xlii]

Like André Beaufre, Sun Tzu believed that different circumstances require different strategies. Regarding the choice of method, Beaufre stated that it isn't "limited to the military field only" but also includes the political, economic, and diplomatic fields.[xliii] Sun Tzu was also convinced that in the choice of method you can select among different strategies.[xliv] In the passage Attack by Strategem Sun Tzu wrote: "Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities" (故上兵伐謀,其次伐交,其次伐兵,其下攻城).[xlv]

The content of André Beaufre's concept of strategy is very similar to everything Sun Tzu associated with "laying of plans" (jì, 计),[xlvi] argued Niu.[xlvii] Beaufre had an original idea about the meaning of strategy. He believed that strategy does not manifest itself as a single defined doctrine but as method of thought, its objective is "to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action."[xlviii] Although it is unclear whether Sun Tzu ever believed that strategy is a method of thought, Sun Tzu's concepts of strategy are very similar to those of Beaufre. Sun Tzu said: "The art of war is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field" (经之以无,校之以计,而索其情).[xlix] To clarify the meaning of laying of plans (jì, 计) requires an exegesis. This is done with a macro approach and micro approach. According to the macro approach, laying plans either refers to the first chapter of Sun Tzu's Art of War, which Giles dubbed Laying Plans, or it explains the general meaning of the character (jì, 计). Similar to Beaufre's abovementioned words, the chapter Laying Plans as well as the intrinsic meaning of the character jì (laying of plans),when linking it with a method of thought, suggest that Sun Tzu's concept of strategy was tantamount to organized thinking, including categorization of phenomena, prioritization of events, and selection of the most effective course of action in order to attain a given objective. The micro approach of the meaning of the word laying plans in this passage makes reference to the selected quotation found in the passage Laying Plans as a part of Sun Tzu's concept of strategy. Like in Beaufre's concept of strategy (method of thought), the words taken from the quotation found in the passage Laying Plans as a part of Sun Tzu's concept of strategy suggest that both strategists' concept of strategy is very similar in its meaning: "The art of war is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field."

Both André Beaufre and Sun Tzu's thinking on the whole tallies with praxeology.[l] In An Introduction to Strategy Beaufre wrote: "Our civilization requires a science of how to take or to use the word coined by Raymond Aron, a 'praxeology' "[li] The Polish scholar Krzysztof Gawlikowski praised Sun Tzu as the founder of Chinese praxeology. Gawlikowski noted that all conclusions that western scholars came up with on praxeology are more or less identical with what Sun Tzu discovered 2000 years earlier, although these scholars when developing their thinking about praxeology had never studied Sun Tzu's book.[lii] Whereas Sun Tzu is considered to be the founder of Chinese praxeology, Beaufre constructed an entire system of how to take action.[liii]

Like André Beaufre, Sun Tzu was a dialectical thinker. Both Beaufre and Clausewitz, in many respects holding identical views, had been to some extend under the influence of dialectics.[liv] In his famous definition, Beaufre conceptualizes the essence of strategy as," the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."[lv] Since Sun Tzu lived more than 2000 years ago, it is only natural that he didn't use this neologism. But the basis of his thinking was also nevertheless dualism. For this reason, concluded Niu, the difference between Sun Tzu and Beaufre is only a matter of appearance, but both strategists share the same kind of theory as their philosophical basis.[lvi]

For Sun Tzu planning had top priority; similarly, Beaufre also attached importance to strategic planning. Beaufre believed that planning had to overcome the resistance of the enemy until being able to attain one's ideal objective. In other words, "If the plan is a good one, there should be no risk of set-backs. The result will be a 'risk-proof' strategy, the object of which will be to preserve our own liberty of action."[lvii] In Sun Tzu's book one can find corresponding expressions that accord with Beaufre's aforementioned ideas, only that the manner of expression in the classical Chinese prose is more concise than that of the French strategist and that is all. Sun Tzu said:" He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated" (故其战胜不忑,不忑者,其所措必胜,胜已败者也).[lviii] Sun Tzu's so-called “bù tè, 不忑” perfectly matches the meaning of Beaufre's 'risk-proof', according to Niu. Moreover, when Sun Tzu emphasized that, "Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him" (故善战者致人而不致于人),[lix] he, like Beaufre, had the objective in mind to guarantee our side's freedom of action.[lx]

Beaufre believed that when waging war there are two basic doctrines one has to adhere to. One is the rational application of force doctrine. The other is the doctrine of guile. Whereas the former "fits the case where we are stronger than the enemy[…], or the case where the enemy is the stronger but is dangerously dispersed," the latter "is imperative if we are the weaker."[lxi] Similarly, Sun Tzu said:" In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack–the direct and indirect (战势不过奇正)."[lxii] A juxtaposition of Beaufre's doctrines with Sun Tzu's quote shows that the first is the direct method (zhèng, 正) – the rational application of force –, and the second is the indirect method (qí, 奇) –guile–. Beaufre believed that the former originated from Clausewitz and that the latter was brilliantly expounded by Liddell Hart.[lxiii] In their approaches in maneuvering, the former emphasized the direct method, but he didn't stress the indirect method; the latter stressed the indirect method, but he didn't emphasize the direct method. Only Sun Tzu was really able to master the change between the direct and indirect method.[lxiv] Therefore, Beaufre and Sun Tzu have in common that both believed in the existence of two major doctrines in warfare.

Like Beaufre, Sun Tzu believed in the importance of being well informed and exercising foresight.[lxv] Beaufre advocated "the creation of highly effective intelligence and research organizations" enabling decision-makers to "control the process of evolution of force by fully-thought-out decisions arrived at in good time."[lxvi] Similarly, Sun Tzu emphasized foresight, resourcefulness, and the confirmation of intelligence as the basis for strategic planning. [lxvii]

According to André Beaufre and Sun Tzu, a superior strategy can produce a desired result without any serious fighting. In this the psychological dimension of warfare is the decisive factor which either makes or breaks your opponent before any physical fighting occurs.[lxviii] Moreover, these points are also illustrated from a slightly different angle by the approaches of both strategists which categorize battle into two phases. For Beaufre, the design of a battle can be roughly divided into two phases: First, a preparatory phase; and, second, a decisive phase. The crux of victory and defeat is the psychological factor. In the first phase one has to cause the psychological collapse of the enemy. If this has been done successfully the requirement for a decisive battle may have been overridden.[lxix] Very coincidental, this is exactly Sun Tzu's so called " supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting" (不战而屈人之兵, 善之善折也).[lxx] This requires further explanation and a corrected translation: Sun Tzu's "zhàn" (战) means making war "huìzhàn" (会战)[lxxi] and not fighting a battle. Furthermore, "bǎizhànbǎishèng, 百战百胜" means winning one hundred times making war[lxxii] (war preparation), and not really fighting one hundred times a battle (a decisive battle). [lxxiii]

For André Beaufre the major tenet for winning a decisive battle in pre-eighteenth century warfare was to force the enemy to accept battle under unfavorable conditions. Under these circumstances, the winning side would ensure victory through either great numerical superiority at the decisive point or "a highly advantageous position on the ground."[lxxiv These concepts bear striking resemblance to some of the principles found in Sun Tzu's Chapter 6-Weak Points and Strong such as "whoever is first in the field awaits the coming of the enemy" (先处战地而待敌),[lxxv] "but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him" (致人而不致于人), "By discovering the enemy's disposition and remaining invisible ourselves" (形人而我无形),[lxxvi] "Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations for us" (寡者備人者也,眾者使人備己者也),[lxxvii] and other principles. [lxxvii]

Both André Beaufre and Sun Tzu had a very similar understanding of maneuver. Apart from the many different Chinese characters which Lionel Giles translated with maneuver, there is one Chinese word which Sun Tzu used in his text that accords with André Beaufre's concept of maneuver. Beaufre believed that all decisions in strategy must be made within a framework consisting of three main coordinates: time, space, and the armed forces. Another even more complex factor governing "the order and inter-relationship of successive situations," which has to be taken into consideration, Beaufre designated as maneuver.[lxxix] According to the Far East English-Chinese Dictionary, the translation of the verb maneuver into the Chinese is as follows: "-v.t. 1 调遣。( diàoqiǎn) 2 计透 (jìtòu) to maneuver the enemy into (out of) position. 誘敵深入( 離開)某地。"[lxxx] In other words, to maneuver implies using strategems to lure the enemy to adopt some kind of action which is beneficial to our side.[lxxxi] Sun Tzu's employment of the characters dòngdí 动敌 suggests that he utilized a very suitable word to express this concept. He said: "Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearance, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at" (善动敌者,形之敌必从之,予之敌必取之).[lxxxii] Therefore, the most suitable Chinese characters for the word "manoeuvre" should be dòngdí (动敌), because the word manoeuvre is a compound word consisting of the characters dòng (动 [move, act, get moving (dòng=动)] and 敌[ enemy (dírén=敌人)], thus connoting motion and action to keep the enemy on the move.[lxxxiii]

Elaborating on the factor of maneuver, Beaufre argued that "To some extent this governs the other factors; it is the direct product of the dialectic of conflict, or in other words of the abstract counterplay between the two opponents." Corresponding to other Western strategists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, who made use of special analogies, Beaufre employed fencing as an analogy and pointed out," it is clear that there are a number of possible forms of action and reaction."[lxxxiv] Beaufre's fencing analogy seemingly has the identical meaning of Sun Tzu's "Military tactics are like unto water" (兵形象水).[lxxxv] The one who is fencing must first analyze and explain the enemy's method of fencing and then attempt to get the upper hand. And the one who is using soldiers must "[He who can] modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in wining" (因故变化而取胜). [lxxxvi]To elucidate maneuver in progress, Beaufre discussed different types of action with his fencing analogy. He argued that to ensure freedom of action the one who is fencing (taking different types of action) must always retain the initiative.[lxxxvii] This is also exactly what Sun Tzu said: "Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men."[lxxxviii]

Conclusion

This analysis suggests two conclusions. First, it is important to engage deeply with the military writings and concepts of Beaufre. If Chinese strategists value Beaufre and his concepts of strategy, China analysts should also study Beaufre more extensively because this may significantly enhance their understanding of contemporary Chinese strategic thinking. In other words, we should heed Sun Tzu's advice: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt."[lxxxix]

Second, the circumstantial evidence presented in this paper suggests that Beaufre's writings might be one of the major sources for reinterpreting Sun Tzu and helping Chinese analysts get a more modern outlook of how Sun Tzu can be applied to contemporary politics and military challenges in the nuclear age. Just as the Chinese Communist Party has co-opted western capitalism and mixed it with its socialist values and then dubbed it socialism with Chinese characteristics; by the same token, the sources analyzed in this paper indicate that the writings of the French strategist André Beaufre, which promote the idea of total strategy in a nuclear era, may have been employed to renovate China's grand strategy.

Parallelism suggests that in the same manner that Sun Tzu's teachings are consulted for crafting aspects of China's grand strategy and the role of China's military therein, it is likely that Beaufre's total strategy concepts are also being consulted, if not utilized, as part of China's grand strategy. For instance, over the years, Sun Tzu's The Art of War has been employed for crafting aspects of China's international peaceful development strategy (grand strategy), which is both assertive and cooperative.[xc] Interestingly, André Beaufre's indirect strategy –in which "the availability and the use of force are just as necessary as in direct strategy" and force may be reduced but still plays an important part[xci] – has been identified as an aspect of international strategy,[xcii] and Beaufre describes it as a vehicle to preserve peace.[xciii]

 

Table. **Compiled by Tim Kumpe based on content analysis.

References

[i] Handel, Michael I. 1996. Masters of war: Classical strategic thought. 2nd ed. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 4.
[ii] Handel, Michael I. 1992. Masters of war: Sun tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini. Portland, Or: Frank Cass.
[iii] Handel, Michael I. 1996. Masters of war: Classical strategic thought. 2nd ed. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
[iv] Malik, J. M. 1999. “The Evolution of Strategic Thought.” In Contemporary Security and Strategy. Edited by Craig A. Snyder, 13–52. New York: Routledge.
[v] “Beaufre, André.” 2010. In The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Edited by Jacob E. Safra and Jorge Aguilar-Cauz. 15th ed., 21. Micropaedia, Ready Reference Volume 2. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
[vi] Beaufre, André, and English Translation by Faber and Faber. 1967. Strategy of Action. New York: Frederick. A. Praeger.16 [Beaufre, Strategy of Action.]
[vii] Weigley, Russell F. 1967. “Strategy of Action by Andre Beaufre: R.H. Barry.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 374: 189.
[viii] Beaufre, André, Translated by Major-General R.H. Barry, and With a Preface by Captain B.H. Liddell Hart. 1965. An introduction to strategy, with particular reference to problems of defense, politics, economics, and diplomacy in the nuclear age. London: Faber and Faber.22. [Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.]
[ix] Eric Ludendorff (1865-1937) recommended a total war theory, but he never mentioned a total strategy. It is clear that Beaufre's thinking must have been influenced by Ludendorff. See, Niu Xianzhong. 2003. Zhanlüe Yanjiu. di yi ban. Guilin: Guangxi shi fan da xue chu ban she. 26
[x] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy. 23.
[xi] Ibid., 30.
[xii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy. 134.; Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 102-112.
[xiii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.134-135.; Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 112-113.; Quoted from Zhang Shuhui. June/ 2009. “China's Strategy of Containing Taipei through Washington: June, 1995- March, 2008.” Master's Thesis, Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University. 23.
[xiv] Ibid., 130.
[xv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy. 133; Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 104-105.
[xvi] Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 130-131.
[xvii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy .50. ; Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 53-54.
[xviii] Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 26-28.; "When you wish to prevent something, that is deterrence; when you wish to achieve something, that is 'action'." (Beaufre, Strategy of Action. 27); Gould, Wesley L. 1968. “Arms and Influence. by Thomas C. Schelling; Strategy of Action. by d'Armee Andre Beaufre.” The Journal of Politics 30 (2): 588–89.
[xix] Beaufre, Andre. 1966. Deterrence and strategy. New York: Frederick. A. Praeger.138-139.
[xx] Other authors include Xenophon, Gaius Julius Caesar, Sextus Julius Frontius, Flavius Regetius Renatus, Napoleon, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ferdinand Foch, Giulio Douhet, William Mitchell, J .F .C .Fuller, Charles de Gaulle, Ludendorff, Bernard Brodie, Heinz Guderian, Robert E .Osgood, Maxwell D .Taylor, Thomas C .Schelling, Henry A . Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Hanson W .Baldwin, John M .Collins, Daniel O .Graham, and Alvin Toffler. For this, see Liu Qing, and Du Zhengai, eds. 2001. Xi fang jun shi xue ming zhu ti yao = The summary of the famous works on western military science. Nanchang Shi: Jiangxi ren min chu ban she.
[xxi] Zhang Jingshan. 2001. “Bofuer--Zhanlüe Rumen=Beaufre--An Introduction to Strategy.” In Xi fang jun shi xue ming zhu ti yao = The summary of the famous works on western military science. Edited by Liu Qing and Du Zhengai, 347–60. Nanchang Shi: Jiangxi ren min chu ban she.
[xxii] The Sun Tzu Research Institute of Binzhou Academy was founded in 2005 as the first nationwide organization among all the colleges and universities in China specializing on the research of Sun Tzu's Art of War. For this, see Bi Hailin 毕海林. 2009. “Binzhou Xueyuan Sunzi Yanjiuyan Jianjie 滨州学院孙子研究院简介 (Brief Introduction to Sun Tzu Research Institute of Binzhou Academy).” Accessed September 06, 2014. http://www.chinasuntzu.cn/a/guanyuwomen/2009/1210/2.html.
[xxiii] Niu Xianzhong. 1996. Sunzi san lun: Cong gu bing fa dao xin zhan lue. Chu ban. Zhan lue si xiang cong shu 7. Taibei Shi: Mai tian chu ban gu fen you xian gong si.
[xxiv] Niu Xianzhong (鈕先鍾; July 1913-7 February 2004) was a professor of political science and strategic studies at Tamkang University. He was born in Jiujiang, Jiangxi Province. He earned his bachelor's degree from Jinling University, Nanjing. He is regarded as an authority on military and security issues. He taught at the Graduate Institute of European Studies (GIES) as well as at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies (GIIASS), Tamkang University, and the Three Armed Services University. (See, 淡江大學國際事務與戰略研究所 [Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University]. “紀念鈕老師 [In Rememberance of Dr. Niu].” Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.titx.tku.edu.tw/web/10.htm.)
[xxv] Binzhou Xueyuan Sunzi Yanjiuyuan 滨州学院孙子研究院 (Sun Tzu Research Institute of Binzhou Academy). 2014. “Sunzi Bingfa Gailun Jinpin Kecheng Jiaoxue Cankao Wenxian 孙子兵法概论精品课程教学参考文献 (Teaching References for Top Quality Introductory Courses to the Art of War by Sun Tzu).” Accessed September 05, 2014. http://jpkc.bzu.edu.cn/szbf/index_files/2class/wenxian/index.htm.
[xxvi] The Economist. 2011. “Sun Tzu and the art of soft power: China is using a new tool to boost its influence abroad. Is it the right one?”, December 7. Accessed September 06, 2014. http://www.economist.com/node/21541714.
[xxvii] Zhang Yifei. 2014. “Does Sun Tzu's The Art of War influence China's military behavior? A case study of the 1962 Sino- India War.” Graduate Theses and Dissertations. Paper 13702., Iowa State University. vi.
[xxviii] Ota, Fumio. 2014. “Sun Tzu and Chinese Strategy.” East Sea (South China Sea) Studies, June 6. Accessed September 06, 2014. http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/publications/1054-sun-tzu-and-chinese.
[xxix] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 211-212.
[xxx] Niu Xianzhong. 1996. Sunzi san lun: Cong gu bing fa dao xin zhan lue. Chu ban. Zhan lue si xiang cong shu 7. Taibei Shi: Mai tian chu ban gu fen you xian gong si.; See also Niu Xianzhong. 2003. Sunzi san lun: Cong gu bing fa dao xin zhan lüe. 1st ed. Jun shi si xiang wen ku. Guilin: Guangxi shi fan da xue chu ban she.
[xxxi] Niu Xian Zhong. 2003. Zhanlüe Yanjiu. 1st ed. Guilin: Guanxi Shifan Daxue Chuban She. 265. [钮先钟. 2003. 战略研究. 第1版. 桂林: 广西师范大学出版社. 265.]
[xxxii] Malik, J. M. 1999. “The Evolution of Strategic Thought.” In Contemporary Security and Strategy. Edited by Craig A. Snyder, 27. New York: Routledge.
[xxxiii] Niu Xianzhong. 2003. Sunzi san lun: Cong gu bing fa dao xin zhan lüe. 1st ed. Jun shi si xiang wen ku. Guilin: Guangxi shi fan da xue chu ban she. Di Shi Jiu Zhang, Sunzi Yu Bofuer. 205-212. [Niu Xianzhong 2003. Sunzi San Lun, Chapter 19, "Sun Tzu and Beaufre," 205-212. ] From now on, Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre.
[xxxiv] Malik, J. M. 1999. “The Evolution of Strategic Thought.” In Contemporary Security and Strategy. Edited by Craig A. Snyder, 26. New York: Routledge.
[xxxv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.
[xxxvi] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 206.
[xxxvii] Bo fu er, and Xianzhong Niu. 1966. Zhan lue xu lun. Tai bei shi: Guo fang ji hua ju bian yi shi.[薄富爾(Andre Beaufre)著, and 鈕先鍾譯. 1966. 戰略緖論. 台北市: 國防計劃局編譯室.] The first nationwide Chinese translation of An Introduction to Strategy available in mainland China was released in 1997. See, Beaufre, Andre. 1997. Zhan lue xu lun. Haila'er: Neimenggu wen hua chu ban she. [薄富尔著, and 钮先钟译. 1997. 战略绪论. 海拉尔: 内蒙古文化出版社.] There is, however, evidence that suggests that earlier independent translations--apparently made by the Research Department of the Academy of Military Science--existed as early as 1989. For this, see Zhang Jingshan. 2001."Bo fu er: Zhanlüe Rumen." In Xifang Junshixue Mingzhu Tiyao: The summary of the famous works on western military. Edited by Liu Qing (editor-in-chief) and Du Zhengai (assistant editor-in-chief). 1st ed., 347–60. Nanchang City: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe. [张敬山. 2001. “博福尔: 战 略入门.” In 西方军事学名著提要: The summary of the famous works on western military. Edited by 刘庆主编 and 杜正艾副主编. 第一版, 347–60. 南昌市: 江西人民出版社.] Zhang Jinshan's summary of Beaufre's An Introduction to Strategy is based on the 1989 translation by the Academy of Military Science. See An de lie•Bo fu er: 《Zhanlüe Rumen》( An Introduction to Strategy ) ,Junshi Kexueyuan Waiguo Junshi Janjiu Bu Yi, Junshi Kexue Chubanshe 1989 Nian Chuban. [安德烈•博福尔:《战略入门》( An Introduction to Strategy ) , 军事科学院外国军事研究部译, 军事科学出版社1989 年出版。]
[xxxviii] Whereas the broad argument follows Niu's delineation, the discussion of the parallels is sometimes more detailed and sometimes briefer than the original. This is done for the sake of clarity.
[xxxix] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 12-13. Quotation on page 13.
[xl] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 207.
[xli] Ko Chen-Sien (Ge Zhenxian)[Editor] 葛振先著, and Chou Ie-Hong (Zhou Yihong) [Painter] 周以鴻圖. 1973. 孫子兵法中英文詳解 = The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English. 1st ed. Taibei 臺北市: Zhengzhong Shuju 正中書局.13. The English translation of this edition is based on Mr. Leonel Giles' English version as an original. (From now on, Ko, The Art of War by Sun Tzu in Chinese and English.)
[xlii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 207.
[xliii] (Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 13.) "There will be a special strategy to fit each situation; any given strategy may be best possible in certain situations and the worst conceivable in others."
[xliv] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 207.
[xlv] English Translation by Lionel Giles. Copyright 2006-2014. “《謀攻 - Attack by Stratagem》.” Accessed August 20, 2014. http://ctext.org/art-of-war/attack-by-stratagem.
[xlvi] The Chinese Text Project translates計as始計Laying Plans, saying that "《始計 - Laying Plans》is also known as:《計》]." See, Chinese Text Project. Copyright 2006-2014. “《始計 - Laying Plans》.” Accessed August 20, 2014. http://ctext.org/art-of-war/laying-plans.
[xlvii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 207.
[xlviii] Beaufre noted: "The point, as we shall see, is that strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. "( Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 13.)
[xlix] Ko, The Art of War by Sun Tzu in Chinese and English ,11
[l] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 207-208.
[li] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 14.
[lii] Gawlikowski, Krzysztof. 1994. “Sun Wu as the Founder of Chinese Praxiology, Theory of Struggle and Science.” Hemispheres (Warsaw) (9): 9–22.
[liii] Beaufre, André. 1967. Strategy of Action. New York: Frederick. A. Praeger.
[liv] Echevarria, Antulio J. 2007. Clausewitz and contemporary war. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.; Strachan, Hew, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. 2007. Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
[lv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 22. For dialectics, for instance, see also Ibid., 25.
[lvi] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 208.
[lvii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 25; Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 208-209.
[lviii] Sunzi, Ge Zhenxian, Zhou Yihong, and Giles Lionel. 1973. Sunzi bing fa Zhong Ying wen xiang jie = The art of war by Sun-tzu, in Chinese and English. Taibei: Zheng zhong shu ju. [Ko Chen-Sien (Ge Zhenxian)[Editor] 葛振先著, and Chou Ie-Hong (Zhou Yihong) [Painter] 周以鴻圖. 1973. 孫子兵法中英文詳解 = The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English. 1st ed. Taibei 臺北市: Zhengzhong Shuju 正中書局. 61.]
[lix] Ko Chen-Sien (Ge Zhenxian)[Editor] 葛振先著, and Chou Ie-Hong (Zhou Yihong) [Painter] 周以鴻圖. 1973. 孫子兵法中英文詳解 = The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English. 1st ed. Taibei 臺北市: Zhengzhong Shuju 正中書局. 86.
[lx] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 209.
[lxi] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 42-43.
[lxii] Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, 75.
[lxiii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 42.
[lxiv] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre,210.
[lxv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 45-46.
[lxvi] Ibid., 46.
[lxvii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre,211.
[lxviii] For Beaufre, see Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 57. "[...]the art of battle consists in maintaining and strengthening the psychological cohesion of one's own troops while at the same time disrupting that of the enemy's. The psychological factor is therefore all-important." (Ibid.); For Sun Tzu, see Malik, J. M. 1999. “The Evolution of Strategic Thought.” In Contemporary Security and Strategy. Edited by Craig A. Snyder, 27. New York: Routledge.
[lxix] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 57. Beaufre noted: "A decision has therefore sometimes been achieved by military means alone as a result of superior strategy and without a major battle in the strict sense of the term." (Ibid.)
[lxx] Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, 42.
[lxxi] Alternative translations of huizhan include: 1)join in a battle, 2)launch a mass campaign
[lxxii] This passage is translated by Lionel Giles in the following manner: "[...] to fight and conquer in all your battles."See, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, Chapter (3) Political Warfare and the key to Victory, 42.
[lxxiii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre,211. To clarify some of the confusion surrounding the usage of the word zhan 战 Niu also explained: "The word which Sun Tzu used for warfare (战争) is兵(bing), but the character 兵 also means strategy, national defense, military affairs and other complex meanings." (Ibid.)
[lxxiv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 60.
[lxxv] Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, Chapter (6) Weak Points and Strong, 86
[lxxvi] Ibid., 87-88.
[lxxvii] Ibid., 88-89.
[lxxviii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre,211.
[lxxix] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 35-36.
[lxxx] Editor in Chief: Liang Shih-chiu, Fu Y.-c. Manuscript Reader, Chu L.-c. Editor, and Jeffrey C. T. C. H. W. Compilers, eds. 1993. Far East English-Chinese dictionary = 遠東英漢大辭典. Taipei, Taiwan: The Far East Book Co., Ltd. 1257.
[lxxxi] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 209.
[lxxxii] Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, Chapter (5) Use of Energy, 76.
[lxxxiii] Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 209.
[lxxxiv] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 36. ; See also, Niu, Sun Tzu and Beaufre, 209-210.
[lxxxv] Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, Chapter (6) Weak Points and Strong, 90-91.
[lxxxvi] Ibid., 91.
[lxxxvii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 36-41.
[lxxxviii] Sun Tzu, Chapter (6) Vacuity and Substance. For this, see Sawyer, Ralph D., and Mei-chün Sawyer. 1993. The Seven military classics of ancient China: [Wu jing qi shu]. History and warfare. Boulder: Westview Press. 166.; According to Ko, this quote from Sun Tzu reads: "Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him." (Ko, The art of war by Sun-Tzu in Chinese and English, Chapter (6) Weak Points and Strong,86.); To make his point Niu quoted Li Weigong's paraphrase of Sun Tzu: " One thousand essays, ten thousand sections do not go beyond compel others, do not be compelled by them (千章万句,不出乎致人而不致于人而已,臣当以此教诸将。)” Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong, Book 2. See, Sawyer, Ralph D., and Mei-chün Sawyer. 1993. The Seven military classics of ancient China: [Wu jing qi shu]. History and warfare. Boulder: Westview Press. 337.
[lxxxix] Sun Tzu. 2002. The Art of War--Translated from the Chinese by Lionel Giles. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 81.
[xc] Du Bo. 2005. “"Zhanlüe Er Quren Zhi Bing" Yu Weihu Shijie Heping [Breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting and safeguarding world peace].” In Sunzi bing fa yu zhan lue wen hua [The Art of War by Sun Tzu and Strategic Culture]. Edited by Yao Youzhi and Yan Qiying, 362–67. Di Liu Jie Sunzibingfa Guoji Yantaohui Lunwen Ji [ Collection of Essays of the 6th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War]. Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chuban.; Renmin Ribao. 2009. “At the 8th International Sun Tzu's Art of War Conference Guo Qinglin stressed to grasp the essence of Sun Tzu's Art of War to promote the world's peaceful development.” March 11.;
Yao Jianing. 2014. “China's Military: 9th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War kicks off.” 中国军网 China Military Online, August 26. Accessed August 29, 2014. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-08/26/content_6112195.htm.
[xci] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.129.
[xcii] Boorman, Howard L., and Scott A. Boorman. 1966. “An Introduction to Strategy by André Beaufre.” Political Science Quarterly No. 3 (Vol. 81): 509.; Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.107-130
[xciii] Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy.130.
[xciv] Quoted from Handel, Michael I. 1996. Masters of war: Classical strategic thought. 2nd ed. London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 19.

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