Is Counterinsurgency Politically Possible?

Overview

It is extremely difficult, though not entirely impossible, for counterinsurgency (COIN) to achieve political success within the contemporary Western model. It is more possible, though still difficult, for alternative approaches to succeed politically – specifically through combining an enemy-centric strategy with the effective use of local allies. However, even the most sophisticated counterinsurgent will not necessarily be able to overcome barriers such as those posed by difficult terrain and cross-border support.

What does it mean for counterinsurgency to be “politically possible”? War, as Clausewitz observed, is the continuation of politics by other means.[i] In COIN, the goal is not merely to militarily defeat the insurgent, but to prevent the emergence of another insurgency – as demonstrated by modern COIN’s roots in the 19th century concept of “pacification” (discussed by theorists from the French Marshalls Bugot and Lyotet to British writers such as C.E. Callwell). For COIN to be politically possible, it must achieve a permanent political resolution to the conflict.

However, Western and Non-Western conceptions of COIN differ considerably in their approaches to both the military and political aspects of COIN. While Western COIN typically adopts a minimalist use of force while prioritizing a political solution through “hearts and minds”, non-Western COIN often uses a force-maximalist approach, believing that physical security must first be achieved for a political solution to occur.

The essay will examine successful examples of Western COIN – such as Northern Ireland and Malaya – and why such examples are relatively scarce, before discussing the unsuccessful example of Afghanistan and how it illustrates the flaws of the Western approach. The essay proceeds to contrast unsuccessful non-Western examples of COIN, such as South Sudan, with the successful example of Chechnya. The essay argues that Western COIN is only likely to be successful against small insurgencies without cross-border support. Western COIN’s emphasis on a “Hearts and Minds” approach is more difficult to apply to large populations, and its stress on nation-building frequently creates overextension among counterinsurgent forces. Moreover, high casualty sensitivity and unwillingness to make long term time commitments frequently undermines the success of Western Expeditionary COIN. The essay concludes with an analysis of successful non-Western approaches to COIN, noting that the combination of an enemy-centric strategy with alliances with local elites represents the most efficient approach.

As M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones argue in The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency, Western COIN theory rests largely on selective readings of history and vainly seeks to apply neat sets of principles in search of easy solutions, neglecting the contingent and unpredictable nature of warfare.[ii] While Western approaches to COIN may be “impossible” under the definition of Smith and Jones, other traditions do not necessarily fall into these pitfalls. This article argues that Western COIN must undergo changes to accommodate cultural and geographic factors in order to achieve political success.

Western vs. Non-Western COIN

“Western” vs “Non-Western” COIN is a somewhat arbitrary distinction. However, it is a useful tool for identifying two broad and differing trends in the practice of COIN.

Insurgency, for purposes of this article, will be defined as a violent attempt by armed actors to overthrow the state. Counterinsurgency will be defined as the integrated political and military strategy of the state (or intervening force against the insurgency) to defeat the rebels.

The modern Western population-centric approach to counterinsurgency first emerged during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, and its ideas were subsequently disseminated through Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency. Thompson is responsible for the first key principle of Western COIN: winning over the population by focusing on “Hearts and Minds”.[iii] Thompson stressed this concept as a solution to Maoist-style insurgency, which encourages the insurgents to move among the population as “the people are like water and the army is like fish”.[iv] “Hearts and Minds” would become a recurring theme in Western COIN from Vietnam[v] to Afghanistan.[vi]

Such beliefs were also influenced by the arguments of classical COIN theorists such as David Galula, who asserted that 80% of COIN was political.[vii] Galula’s influence on Western COIN theory, particularly after the rediscovery of his writings during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, has been considerable. Galula’s population-centric model proposed that the population of insurgent areas contained three groups – a minority sympathetic to the insurgents, a minority sympathetic to the counterinsurgents, and a neutral majority. Galula strongly emphasized winning over the neutral majority, inspiring a subsequent emphasis on “Hearts and Minds”. However, Galula’s model does not take into account the possibility of a pro-insurgent majority – a situation which likely existed in Algeria (whose insurgency served as his main case study) according to modern scholarship[viii]. The presumption that the population actually can be won over – even by a highly unpopular occupying force – would subsequently inspire much fruitless effort on the part of Western COIN planners.

The second key principle is nation-building. While “Hearts and Minds” seeks simply to convince civilians to oppose insurgency, nation-building goes further by attempting to address insurgency’s root causes – often identified as underdevelopment and lack of institutions. American-led efforts to invest in infrastructure, education, and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, together with the creation of national institutions such as an army and police force,[ix] are an excellent example. Modern Western COIN, as practiced in Iraq and Afghanistan, tends to prioritize nation-building over military defeat of insurgents, stemming from a belief that physical insecurity will reduce on its own once a government gains legitimacy.

These two principles significantly influence the third: minimal use of force. British theorists have stressed the importance of a light touch in Britain’s historical COIN successes, although their claims are debatable.[x] Notably, Frank Kitson emphasized the importance of proper intelligence in identifying insurgents to avoid alienating the population.[xi] This emphasis is also reflected in contemporary COIN documents such as the US’s COIN manual FM 3-24.[xii]

Contrastingly, Non-Western approaches to COIN are often but not always enemy-centric, typically employ much greater use of force, and usually prioritize military security over political approaches such as nation-building. Sri Lanka’s 2008-2009 Northern Offensive, which permanently crushed the last of the Tamil Tigers, is one example of the enemy-centric approach,[xiii] prioritizing the insurgent’s destruction rather than “Hearts and Minds”. Russia’s lengthy history of COIN illustrates broader patterns of force maximalism, characterized by reliance on indiscriminate firepower, collective punishment, and forcible resettlement.[xiv] Few COIN operations by non-Western governments involved the developmentalist or nation-building approach – Ethiopia in Eritrea, Algeria against its Islamist insurgency, or Syria’s government during its civil war – have followed this approach. The most noteworthy exception – Plan Colombia – was a product of cooperation between the US and Colombia’s government.[xv]

Successful Examples of Western COIN

Examples of Western success using contemporary COIN principles are relatively few, mostly involving small, outnumbered groups of insurgents with no cross-border support.

Before discussing these edge cases, we must first discuss the example of Malaya, and why it makes a poor case study for successful Western COIN. While British victory is often cited as a product of “Hearts and Minds”, modern scholarship has demonstrated that British forces in fact relied heavily on violence.[xvi] Moreover, separation of the population from the insurgents was achieved using what were effectively concentration camps[xvii] – a tactic which, though successful in the Boer War[xviii] and elsewhere, can hardly be deployed by modern democracies without significant backlash. It also does not work in every case, as evidenced by Vietnam’s “Strategic Hamlet” program. Lastly, the Malayan rebels were outnumbered, their support was confined to a single minority (Han Chinese), and they were surrounded with no means of cross border support.[xix] Suggestions that Malaya could provide a successful COIN template for a dramatically different country such as Afghanistan – whose Taliban possessed all the aforementioned advantages lacked by Malayan rebels – were the height of folly.

Tellingly, few general readers are familiar with most successful examples of Western COIN. Oman’s Dhofar insurgency is one such example, in which Marxist rebels were defeated in a campaign overseen by British military advisers.[xx] Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado insurgency is a more recent example, in which Rwandan troops achieved major success against Islamic State affiliated rebels while following Western COIN principles of battlefield restraint and outreach to the civilian population.[xxi]

The methods of these victories are difficult to apply elsewhere, as they both involve small insurgencies without cross-border support. Additionally, the “Hearts and Minds” strategy employed in Oman involved rallying the population around Islam to combat Marxism[xxii] – a considerably easier task than that faced against Islamist insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. Cabo Delgado is also a problematic example, as insurgent attacks appear to have increased following the withdrawal of Rwandan forces.[xxiii]

British COIN in Northern Ireland, despite achieving success against insurgents operating cross-border, is also an unrealistic template for most COIN operations, as it required the presence of British troops for several decades – a commitment most states are unable or unwilling to make.

Unsuccessful Western COIN: Afghanistan

Why is Western COIN broadly unsuccessful? The case study of Afghanistan is an illuminating example. Like many examples of Western expeditionary COIN, the Afghanistan intervention failed due to a combination of geographic and institutional factors.

Geographic factors mostly include difficult terrain and cross-border support – a deadly combination in insurgencies from Vietnam to the contemporary Sahel. Lack of roads funnelled troops into narrow valleys where they were ambushed and threatened with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Taliban’s cross-border activity from Pakistan further aggravated the situation. Even the most well-planned COIN operations can be hard pressed to overcome these disadvantages.

Institutional factors in the intervention’s failure are legion, but most revolve around the apparent belief of American forces that deep-seated structural problems – such as lack of trust in the state – could be solved within a few years. For example, nation-building efforts at building a strong military were undermined by the corruption of the Afghan government, which was distrusted by many citizens for its tribal favoritism. Attempts to solve the problem of drugs (a major source of Taliban funding) were stymied by the fact that significant portions of the population depended on poppy cultivation, and destroying their livelihood would run contrary to the principles of “Hearts and Minds”; when British forces tried to compensate farmers for destroyed poppies, the funds were stolen by corrupt local officials.[xxiv]

A pattern emerged – seen in other examples of Western COIN such as France’s Operation Barkhane – of tactical success and strategic failure. The Taliban could not win militarily but could simply wait until American forces became exhausted and left. The U.S. resources were vastly overstretched, in large part due to its task of singlehandedly attempting to create institutions from scratch in a country that had none. Technological superiority also did not guarantee victory: while coalition forces spent millions on high end military technology, the Taliban was able to maximize the effectiveness of easily made, low-cost weapons such as IEDs.[xxv]

Each of Western COIN’s three core principles failed to work in the Afghan context. “Hearts and Minds” is more difficult to implement on a grand scale than it is in a smaller environment such as Dhofar. Moreover, U.S. efforts to shift traditional Afghan cultural attitudes towards gender roles or instil democracy in a country with no liberal tradition, were a Sisyphean task impossible to accomplish within the span of even two decades. Likewise, the nation-building approach to Afghan institutions was doomed to fail. Policymakers in Washington incorrectly assumed that the mere creation of institutions would solve problems created by their absence, without recognizing that this was akin to placing a flimsy bandage over a deep-seated wound. The Afghan military’s dysfunction due to patronage and tribal divisions is an excellent example. Resources that could have been diverted towards the military were instead spent in a fruitless quest to modernize a society lacking any of the traditional ingredients for modernization – such as industrialization, a strong middle class, or even a coherent sense of national identity. Vague commitments to “protect the population” resulted in a dramatic overextension of responsibilities for US forces.[xxvi] Lastly, the principle of minimal use of force arguably allowed the Taliban to retreat and regroup to fight another day.

The cultural and geographic challenges faced by the US and its allies illustrate the difficulty of applying Western COIN principles under varying conditions and point towards the necessity of developing a more flexible approach towards political victory – one not necessarily hampered by geographic and cultural constraints.

Other factors influencing the failure of Western COIN include high casualty sensitivity coupled with a lack of political will at home (since Western COIN is typically expeditionary in nature). This combination, which may serve to deter effective military action, contrasts with non-Western COIN actors, which are often more willing to make greater sacrifices – in part because their insurgencies are frequently domestic and thus more existential.

Lack of will on the part of Western COIN actors is particularly problematic since their smaller adversaries typically have much greater will, as observed by Andrew Mack in his classic essay “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”. Katzenbach notes that the US’s vast military superiority in the Vietnam War ultimately failed to bring it victory; Vietnamese Communist insurgents could simply outlast the US because they had a greater political will to continue the fight, whereas the American will to continue was gradually sapped through protracted warfare. Katzenbach observes that in the case of expeditionary COIN – the type of COIN most often practiced by Western nations – the stronger political will of the insurgents is often derived from their ability to draw on strong wells of nationalist sentiment against foreign occupiers. [xxvii]

These issues are further compounded by the fact that due in part to its nation-building component, Western COIN is a process easily spanning many years. As Colonel Gian Gentile observed, “Sun Tzu said that ‘speed is the essence of war’. Population Centric COIN is the antithesis of speed”.[xxviii]

Non-Western COIN: Unsuccessful Examples

It is tempting to suppose that insurgencies may more easily be beaten if the counterinsurgent simply abandons the niceties of respecting human rights – an approach followed by many non-Western nations, most notably Russia. However, this is not necessarily true.

The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is an excellent example. Despite adapting harsher methods than the Americans (including frequent massacres of civilians),[xxix] and pursuing a more enemy-centric approach, the Soviets met with no better success. Facing the same insurmountable problems of difficult terrain and cross-border support from Pakistan, the Soviets similarly struggled to impose rule on a population that fundamentally did not accept the legitimacy of its government.

Sudan’s failed attempt to prevent South Sudan’s secession – characterized by severe repression of the civilian population by Sudanese dictator Omar Al-Bashir – similarly indicates that a harsher approach is not a panacea. Bashir’s complete alienation of the southern Christian population strengthened resistance to his northern Arab regime, as indicated by the fact that 99% of South Sudanese voted for independence.[xxx]

The pitfalls of harsh reprisals against civilian populations are also demonstrated by contemporary counterinsurgency in the Sahel. State sponsored militias such as Burkina Faso’s Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland[xxxi] and Nigeria’s Yan Sakai[xxxii] have conducted indiscriminate attacks on Fulani pastoralists regardless of their affiliation with insurgents – driving pastoralists to take up arms against the state.

Such examples create something of a paradox. So far, our survey has indicated that the Western model, involving a population-centric strategy of “Hearts and Minds”, is rarely successful. Yet the examples of Sudan and the Sahel seem to indicate that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency if the counterinsurgent lacks the population’s support. This seems contradictory.

Successful Non-Western COIN: Chechnya

This contradiction can be resolved through a study of the successful Russian COIN campaign during the Second Chechen War.

Russia’s strategy in Chechnya was double-faceted. The first element involved an enemy-centric, security first approach, aimed at physically destroying the Chechen rebels and securing their bases (such as the capital of Grozny, which was essentially destroyed by Russian firepower).[xxxiii] By avoiding the West’s overly expansive defensive of security as used in Afghanistan – in which topics as diverse as law enforcement, healthcare, and urban planning were grouped under the banner of security – Russian forces avoided overstretching their capacity, allowing themselves to concentrate on the conflict’s real center of gravity – the enemy’s forces. While highly effective at achieving a military solution, however, this was not the secret to Russia’s long-term success at permanently restoring order.

The second half of Russia’s strategy consisted of cultivating Chechen elites frightened by the rebellion’s Wahhabi-influenced Islamist turn – specifically, the former rebel Akhmat Kadyrov and his son Ramzan. Russia bargained with the Kadyrovs, allowing them to wield regional autonomy over Chechnya in exchange for suppressing terrorist activity.[xxxiv] This strategy of “divide and rule” allowed Russia to attain a political, and not merely a military, solution to the Chechen conflict.

It also represents a significantly different approach to the problem of population than that employed by the West. While the Western “Hearts and Minds” approach might be termed a “bottom-up” strategy, Russia employed a “top-down” strategy – building a transactional relationship with influential actors in the population. Unlike Western forces in Vietnam or Iraq, Russia never labored under the illusion that it could influence the views of the population directly. Rather than fruitlessly expending resources on schools and development programs to influence civilians in the long term, Russia outsourced its COIN efforts to local actors more capable of influencing and controlling the population. Essentially, Russia engaged in military and diplomatic subcontracting – a move arguably influenced by traditional Russian strategic principles, which emphasize making maximum gains for minimum effort. Other precedents for this approach are seen in COIN’s roots in 19th century imperialism, which often involved European empires using local client elites to indirectly administer troublesome areas.[xxxv]

It is possible to argue that this approach is not always effectual: both Russia and the US had local allies in Afghanistan, and neither succeeded. However, this objection ignores historical context. Russia indeed had allies – Afghanistan’s communist government – but this was wildly unpopular and lacked the same influence or legitimacy as traditional tribal elites. The U.S. worked with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the 2001 invasion but failed to utilize its potential by folding most of its members into the Afghan military – transferring their loyalty from tribal leaders with long-standing influence to a new institution which failed to inspire the same loyalty.

Is it possible to bypass the dual political-military approach and win insurgencies by force alone? While possible, this is a considerably less sure approach than the dual-political military approach seen in Chechnya. The two most prominent examples are Syria and Sri Lanka, neither of which is easily generalizable. Bashar Al-Assad’s victory is arguably more due to his massive support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah – and the disorganization of his opponents – than it is to his own military acumen.[xxxvi] The Sri Lankan military’s final victory over the Tamil Tigers in 2009 was largely achieved without outside aid, but the reasons for victory arguably depend on errors by the insurgents themselves – failure to integrate the Tigers’ political and military wings, failure to coordinate strategies of regular and irregular warfare, and alienation of India. [xxxvii]

Conclusion

COIN is currently politically possible, but not under the contemporary approach practiced by Western nations. The most effective approach to COIN involves a combination of enemy-centric military strategy and a political strategy aimed at cultivating local elites. One typically does not work without the other. Relying entirely on local allies is often unrealistic as they may lack the military capacity to achieve battlefield victory on their own; reliance entirely on a military approach may result in temporary victory but a resurgence of rebellion once the army withdraws (as Russia discovered during the first Chechen war). Even with both factors present, the counterinsurgent is not guaranteed to succeed; issues such as difficult geography, ethnic fractionalization, and cross-border insurgent support can significantly mar the efforts of even the best COIN operator.

Western COIN’s weakness stems from its misunderstanding of the role of the population. The mantra of “clear, hold, build” encourages armies to see populations as the insurgency’s center of gravity, effectively committing the army to a political rather than a military role. While the population is undeniably key in insurgency, its role is best addressed by diplomats working with elite actors, rather than soldiers working with remote villagers.

Is there a future for Western COIN? While contemporary militaries have shifted towards a focus on conventional warfare, the rise of jihadist movements in Africa, the spread of domestic extremism in the West, and the likelihood that great power competition will generate irregular proxy conflicts (similar to the Cold War) all suggest that COIN will not lose relevance. To prepare itself for coming conflicts, the West must engage in a fundamental re-evaluation of its counterinsurgency doctrine.

Beyond following the dual approach of an enemy-centric military strategy and an elite-centric political strategy, what specific policies must the West adopt to win?

In the field of political strategy, Western counterinsurgents must first recognize that they cannot and should not attempt to transform local cultures, including political culture. Attempts to change local customs or impose Western liberal democratic norms on societies without preexisting liberal traditions are not only likely to be futile; they are likely to incite backlash. Western actors must accept the necessity of sometimes working with non-democratic or liberal regimes based on local circumstances. Moreover, Western forces must learn that when conducting expeditionary COIN, the state is often not the only actor to be dealt with – forging relationships with powerful non-state groups, such as traditional rulers, can often allow counterinsurgent forces to exert influence where the state is weak. (An excellent example is the successful US alliance with tribal chiefs in Iraq’s Anbar province in 2007, as discussed by David Kilcullen)[xxxviii]. Willingness to work with and delegate responsibility to varieties of actors and regimes allows Western counterinsurgents greater political and strategic flexibility.

On the military front, utilizing new domains of warfare can put the counterinsurgent at a great advantage. While Western forces should not fall prey to the fallacy that superior technology will inevitably lead to victory, it is still true that improved capabilities in technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles can result in greatly improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – a key asset in counterinsurgency. Exploration of the cyberspace domain is also a promising outlet for improved intelligence collection, especially through the introduction of artificial intelligence systems. While such technologies may act as powerful force multipliers, however, counterinsurgency remains a form of warfare predominantly waged by infantry, whose ability to physically deny insurgents territory by occupying it remains the simplest, and powerful, tool of the counterinsurgent. Policymakers should not delude themselves that a war can be won simply through drone strikes, special forces raids, and strategic bombing.

Adapting a new approach to COIN, and unlearning the habits of the past several decades, will be a difficult task for Western strategic culture. However, it is by no means an impossible one. Western military traditions have shifted before and will likely continue to do so to match the changing nature of insurgency in an increasingly globalized world.