The Misuse of Sun Tzu and the Cult of Maneuver

Before diving into this article, it is necessary to offer readers an important note. Due to the subject, it is unavoidable to use Mandarin in this article. We used Simplified Chinese [简体中文] (jianti zhongwen) format, with pinyin in parentheses. With the exception of Sun Tzu, we’ve replaced Wade-Giles romanization with pinyin. For those who are unaware, pinyin “the phonetic symbols for Chinese characters, is the system to transcribe Mandarin Chinese sounds into a Latin alphabet.”[i]

Introduction

The concept of “maneuver warfare” has returned to the forefront of debate with the Russo-Ukrainian war. As for the development of maneuver warfare, Liddell Hart and John Boyd played an important role, and they paved the way for the acceptance of maneuver warfare doctrine by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps[ii]. Meanwhile, they both misused Sun Tzu’s theories to serve their own.

However, all the theories are misused: Deutsches Heer misused Clausewitz[iii], and Imperial Japanese Navy misused Satō Tetsutarō[iv]. Considering the textual simplicity and ambiguity of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, it is undoubtedly more difficult to translate it to fully reflect its original meaning. What makes it necessary to explain the misuse of an ancient Chinese militarist?

First, the misuse of Sun Tzu is still widespread today. Second, it has played a role in the history of maneuver warfare. Third and most importantly, it represents a false methodology: serving one’s theory through the selective use of text and history. Texts and histories from other times, can serve as motivations, perspectives, and descriptions of the historical evolution, but they are evidence only after rigorous analysis and argumentation. Most references to Sun Tzu are divorced from their original meaning and context, as well as from the time period.

The Road to Maneuver Warfare

In the late 1970s, the U.S. Army emerged from the shadow of the Vietnam War, and tried to find a new bible for the defense of Central Europe. This led to the introduction of operation level[v], the emphasis on the mental dimension[vi], and the return of mechanized warfare[vii]. The Army’s use of maneuver warfare can be marked by the 1982 version of the FM 105-1 Operations, which introduced the operational doctrine of “AirLand Battle”. It has a complex background of thought, involving the Wehrmacht legacy[viii] and the mirror image of Soviet deep-operations doctrine[ix].

The learning about the Wehrmacht and Soviet Army during this period was not historical but ideological. Core concepts of AirLand Battle – initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, replaced history itself. For example, one article even claimed that Genghis Khan was also AirLand Battle because he also had these four concepts![x] Attributing Guderian to Liddell Hart is not surprising[xi]. These led to Liddell Hart’s doctrines being closer to the maneuver warfare used by the U.S. Army, especially the emphasis on the mental dimension.

Out of anxiety about the independence of their service, the Marines embraced the concept of maneuver warfare more fervently than the Army. The USMC primarily used the theorist John Boyd’s concept of the OODA cycle[xii]. William S. Lind further built on Boyd’s work and wrote his Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Officially, maneuver warfare was used as a core concept in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1: Warfighting in 1989.

Liddell Hart promoted Sun Tzu and used multiple concepts of Sun Tzu directly, such as the “Indirect Approach”. Sun Tzu is also considered to be Boyd’s conceptual father[xiii]. As Michael Gordon points out, Patterns of Conflict draws on the writings of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu[xiv]. Even in the article that claimed Genghis Khan used AirLand Battle, Genghis Khan was credited with learning Sun Tzu. This is not an isolated case. Sun Tzu became the Yoda Master of maneuver warfare.

“Indirect Approach” or Just Reverse

In his famous Strategy, Liddell Hart claimed, “Throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it… In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.”[xv] The direct approach is exhausting, while the indirect approach is dislocating. John Boyd also used this pair of concepts as “unorthodox” and “orthodox”, which is just another version of “indirect approach” and “direct approach”.

The Indirect Approach, which is Hart’s core concept, actually comes from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. In the introduction to the 1963 Griffith’s translation of The Art of War, Liddell Hart claimed that The Art of War “has never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding…Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness.”[xvi] And, we can see the specific origin of the word Indirect Approach in Griffith’s translation:

“In all battles, the direct approach can be used to join the battle, but the indirect approach will be needed to ensure victory.” [凡战者，以正合，以奇胜。]

Here “正(zheng)” corresponds to the “direct approach” and “奇(qi/ji)” corresponds to the “indirect approach”. In his notes, Griffith also provided an explanation of the corresponding translation of this term:

“The concept expressed by zheng (正), ‘normal’(or ‘direct’) and qi(奇), ‘extraordinary’(or ‘indirect’) is of basic importance, The normal (zheng) force fixes or distracts the enemy; the extraordinary (qi) forces act when and where their blows are not anticipated, Should the enemy perceive and respond to a qi manoeuvre in such a manner as to neutralize it, the manoeuvre would automatically become zheng.”

In modern military parlance, the closest term to “合(he)” is movement to contact, and “战(zhan)” is engagement or battle. These limit this paragraph to the tactical level. Thus, the term “正(zheng)” is not an “approach” but a noun, i.e., “body”; in contrast, “奇(ji)”[xvii] is used as a reserve. Here, “奇” is in fact pronounced ji. This concept is influenced by the ancient mathematical concept of “余奇(yuji)”, which refers to the remainder of the parity change. For example, Li Weigong answering the questions of Emperor Tang Taizong [李卫公问对] quoted from Cao Cao’s New Book[曹公新书]: “If we are two and the enemy is one, then one is zheng and one is ji.” [己二而敌一，则一术为正，一术为奇]

Therefore, there is neither an “indirect approach” from Sun Tzu’s text, nor an “indirect approach” as a strategy. Compared to Liddell Hart, Sun Tzu’s view is closer to Fuller’s view than to Liddell Hart’s. Body[正] is needed to “fix” the opponent[xviii], and the reserve(indirect approach) is not the only way to win.

Material Rather Than Mental

In a speech in 1932, Liddell Hart attacked Clausewitz, deriding him as “the Mahdi of mass”[xix]. In his preface to a new translation of Griffith’s Sun Tzu, he called Clausewitz “dated” and “antiquated” compared to Sun Tzu[xx]:

Among all the military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is comparable, and even he is more ‘dated’ than Sun Tzu, and in part antiquated, although he was writing more than two thousand years later. Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness.

Here, Liddell Hart used Sun Tzu to serve his theory. By portraying Sun Tzu as a master of the mental dimension, he put Clausewitz in opposition. But in fact, Sun Tzu gave almost stringent requirements for the strength of combat troops. For example, he had a doctrine that linked force ratios to specific missions:

“Thus, the doctrine of using the army is that, if you are ten times of your enemy in strength, encircle it; if you have five times of your enemy in strength, attack it; if you have twice of the enemy in strength, divide it; if you match the enemy in strength, you can engage it; if you have fewer than the enemy in strength, you can retreat from it; if you unmatch the enemy in strength, avoid it.”[故用兵之法，十则围之，五则攻之，倍则分之，敌则能战之，少则能逃之，不若则能避之。]

Although this force ratio was influenced by offense-defense balance due to the technical capability at the time[xxi], it is at least sufficient to show that Sun Tzu was also “the Mahdi of mass” that Liddell Hart ridiculed. A similar emphasis on the importance of concentrating superior forces is:

“If my strength is concentrated into one and the enemy’s strength is scattered into ten (detachments), then I am attacking at a ten-to-one force ratio, thus my strength is more and the enemy’s is less.” [我专为一，敌分为十，是以十攻一也，则我众敌寡。]

Does Sun Tzu have a preference for deception? Sun Tzu’s famous maxim – “All warfare is based on deception” [兵者诡道也], also mistranslated by Griffith. Here, gui[诡] does not mean deception or trickery, but variance or unconventionality[xxii]. Furthermore, in context, this sentence is explaining how to do “capitalizing on strengths and then creating opportunities”[因利而制权也]. So, this is not a general overview of the nature of war, nor is it a discussion of operations. It’s about how to “support foreign operations”[以佐其外] in the above context.

Maneuver Paradox

How does Sun Tzu view speed and maneuver? On the one hand, there are texts that emphasize speed, but the meaning of these texts needs to be analyzed specifically. For example, “So in the realm of war, I’ve heard of simple rapidity, but not skillful prolongation.” [故兵闻拙速，未睹巧之久也] actually emphasizes the unbearable negative impact of prolonged warfare on the state. On the other hand, Sun Tzu maintained a prudent approach to battle doctrine in general, such as “those who were good at war in the past first managed not to be defeated by the enemy in order to wait for the enemy to be able to be defeated.”[昔之善战者，先为不可胜，以待敌之可胜]

In the chapter on Maneuvering for contest[xxiii][军争], Sun Tzu expressed in detail his complex attitude toward maneuvering:

“Thus, Maneuvering for contesting can be profitable. Maneuvering for contesting can be dangerous. If the entire army is used to contest the favorable terrain, it will be too late. If (part of) the army is left behind to contest the favorable terrain, supply wagons will be left… So armies will perish without supplies, will perish without provisions, will perish without stockpiles.” [军争为利，军争为危。举军而争利则不及。委军而争利则辎重捐……是故军无辎重则亡，无粮食则亡，无委积则亡。]

Reaching a key location before the enemy is undoubtedly important, but excessive pursuit of speed can also bring losses, such as fatigue, troop losses, and lack of logistics. These are exactly the possible outcomes of maneuver warfare.

In Patterns of Conflict, Boyd claimed:

“Remember, as a matter of fact, Sun Tzu said it… Remember what he said, seize that which is the vulnerability, seize that which your adversary holds dear or values most highly. Then he will conform to your desires. That’s a vulnerability. He said that, Sun Tzu back [in] 400, 500 [BC]. Seize that which your adversary holds dear and values most highly. Then he will conform to your desires.”

This may come from the translation: “If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: ‘Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.’”[敢问敌众整而将来，待之若何？曰：先夺其所爱则听矣。] In this section, Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of dispersing and confusing enemy. In addition, Sun Tzu also suggested that:

“Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.” [兵之情主速，乘人所不及，由不虞之道，攻其所不戒也。]

However, once again, Sun Tzu showed a complex attitude towards maneuvering. In this chapter(Nine terrains[九地]), Sun Tzu mainly discussed the correspondence between terrain and suitable operations. Thus, not in all terrains and at all times is maneuver warfare justified.

Methodology of History

Even if Sun Tzu was misused, is maneuver warfare wrong? Were Liddell Hart and Boyd simply influenced by mistranslations? But there is a methodological problem behind this: how do we use the cases of history and historical theorists? As the struggle between the historical school and the technical school[xxiv], are there “eternal principles” of warfare?

Of course not. When Schlieffen used the Cannae analogy, he confused the characteristics of wars in different eras, as well as confusing tactics and operations. Only from World War I to the Cold War there is a continuous front, hence this period is also known as the period of “linear strategy”[xxv]. Sun Tzu’s text only makes sense when considered in the context of his time. At the technological level, Sun Tzu made extensive references to the weapons and siege weapons of the Classical period; at the tactical level, the cavalry revolution had not yet even taken place in Sun Tzu’s time; and at the logistical level, Sun Tzu was of course constrained by the pack animal logistics of the Classical period.

We give an example here. When Sun Tzu claimed that “the principle of wars into the enemy’s country: if we go deep into the enemy’s territory, the army will be united, and the enemy’s army will not be able to win against me” [凡为客之道：深入则专，主人不克], it was because we can “seize food and fodder in the rich districts, so that the whole army would be well fed” [掠于饶野，三军足食]. The logic of this sentence is based entirely on what Martin van Creveld described as “the tyranny of the plunder”[xxvi] – distinctive features of logistics in the pre-railroad era. Can we apply Sun Tzu’s maxim and ignore rear supply lines?

If we go back to the Chinese context, Six Secret Teachings [六韬] was written in the late Warring States period, and it already dealt with cavalry tactics. But in the Han Dynasty, with the advent of shock cavalry, Six Secret Teachings became obsolete. Some elements of Sun Tzu’s text at the strategic level do have enduring reference value, but this also makes it impractical. As Ming dynasty writer Wang Shizhen[王士祯] lamented: “Real soldiers can’t understand these books when they read them, and scribes can read them but can’t use them in actual combat.”[介胄之士见之而不能习，觚翰之士能习之而不能用]

Thus, the biggest problem with the maneuver warfare promoters is not that they misinterpreted and misused Sun Tzu, but that they lacked the prudence to use cases. When Marine Corps capstone publications used the American Civil War[xxvii], the Inchon landings and even the battle of Cannae[xxviii], where is the prudence? Can these cases serve as lessons for today? Can they represent a prevailing pattern at the time? If these appear in the essay merely to demonstrate an erudition, then this is rhetorical at best, and confuses the reader even more. As Clausewitz put, most of the references to history only add to the confusion of already confused concepts.

Ultimately, no classic should be reduced to a simple series of aphorisms that can be easily quoted. Authors such as Lawrence Friedman have even quoted “Sun Tzu’s maxims” that Sun Tzu did not say![xxix] The misuse of Sun Tzu is so severe because he has gained too much fame and the reader lacks knowledge of historical context and exegetical skill. If I need to give advice on using Sun Tzu’s text, first ask yourself: “Do I really need to quote it, just to enhance my persuasiveness?” If so, it is more helpful to know the context of what is being quoted.