Military Strategy Magazine  /  Volume 10, Issue 1  /  

How can Strategic Theory Provide Insights into the M23 and the Broader Instability in Eastern DRC?

How can Strategic Theory Provide Insights into the M23 and the Broader Instability in Eastern DRC? How can Strategic Theory Provide Insights into the M23 and the Broader Instability in Eastern DRC?
M23 troops. Image by Al Jazeera English, CC BY-SA 2.0 , via Wikimedia Commons
To cite this article: Beloff R., Jonathan, “How can Strategic Theory Provide insights into the M23 and the Broader Instability in Eastern DRC?”, Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 10, Issue 1, winter 2025, pages 49-58.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is engulfed in a never-ending conflict as its internal instability began after Joseph-Désiré Mobutu’s regime collapsed in 1997. Ever since irregular forces have fought either international peacekeepers, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), or one another. Properly defining Congo’s intrastate warfare actors is problematic as multiple groups claim the status of ‘rebels’ fighting for various strategic goals of political, social, and economic control. While some estimates claim over 120 rebel forces exist[i], many are localized armed groups with the strategic goal of protecting their villages, i.e., the Mai Mai, but there are larger ones with far broader goals. Since the initial rise of the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) in April 2012[ii], this primarily Banyarwanda rebel force has received special attention from researchers, human rights groups, and even investigations by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE). Despite the wealth of study, there is a lack of strategic theory to understand the M23, the Congolese government, and the multiple other internal actors.

M.L.R. Smith describes strategic theory as “concerned with the ways in which available means can be employed to reach desired ends.”[iii] Smith provides critical insights for this research into understanding conflict within the theoretical framework found within strategic theory. Specifically, this research relies on his description of strategic theory and irregular warfare within strategy. His explanations and those of others, such as Colin Gray, Thomas Schelling, James J. Wirtz, and others, provide the foundations to understand the key and often universal drivers of war that have frequently been overlooked in examining African conflicts. Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz provides perhaps the most common definition of war as the “continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”[iv] This is an important description as it allows for the often-missing factors when studying eastern Congo’s near-constant state of low-intensity warfare. While the UNGoE, central African scholars, and human rights organizations focus on the ways and means of the M23 and other rebel forces, they often either ignore or minimize the ends. Specifically, they will examine the battles in terms of captured cities or the ways and speculate on the means of their operational art, often accusing Rwanda or Uganda of assisting the rebels. However, the examination of the desired ends is frequently missing. Without this critical piece of information, we gain an incomplete understanding of the reasons for the rebel forces, and what they ideally wish to achieve. Additionally, it ignores the problematic aspects of an uncertain public policy, which is fundamental to understanding conflict.[v] Thus, assessing the Congolese government’s strategy becomes difficult without a sense of what public policy is being carried forth as tactics and operations. Simply put, the question is: How can a military understand its objectives when no clear ends are brought forth by policy?

Thus, this research utilizes the strategic theory described by Carl von Clausewitz and Smith to provide a fresh perspective on the instability in eastern Congo. Rather than applying past narratives that often blame foreign actors and ignore Congolese agency, this article will examine the ways, means, and ends of not only the M23 but the Congolese government and its military. This includes other irregular forces, such as the Mai Mai and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). By examining the strategic goals of these actors, it is possible to understand the complexity of the continued low-intensity warfare. The constant Congolese fighting illustrates how strategic theory provides better insights and analysis when examining African conflicts.

Recent History of the Never-Ending War:

On August 30, 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire (AFDL), under the political leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, began its military operations to remove President Mobutu. While officially described as a Congolese rebel force, as Philip G. Roessler and Harry Verhoeven write[vi], most of its military command and many fighters were Rwandans. Colonel (now Rtd General[vii]) James Kabarebe led the military campaign and even became a mentor for Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph.[viii] Within a matter of nine months, the AFDL overthrew the Congolese government, forcing a sick Mobutu into exile, and began governing a profoundly underdeveloped and fractured nation. The First Congo War (1996-1997) should be seen as two separate conflicts as they contained separate strategic ends despite similar ways and means.

The first two months witnessed Rwandan forces entering the neighboring refugee camps that had been terrorizing their nation. While there had been discussion within Rwanda and Uganda’s elite for the possible removal of Mobutu’s regime, there was no set strategic plan to use military forces, whether Rwandan, Ugandan or the AFDL for that goal.[ix] Only after completing the objective of removing the refugee camps did the realization begin that they could remove President Mobutu from power. By November, the ADFL and their foreign allies fought across the poorly traversable country to defeat the already weakened Congolese military. While the two conflicts are often under the ‘First Congo War’ umbrella, it is important to depict the differences as the conflict contained two strategies, one occurring after the other.[x] For both operations within the broader war, the previously poor relationship between the government’s ineffectiveness in conducting public policy or governance, the military’s weakened state, and the civilian population’s distrust of both military and government aided the AFDL’s quick victory by May 16, 1997. Despite Rwanda’s, and to a lesser extent, Uganda’s critical role in supporting the ADFL, relations between the nations deteriorated.

First Congo War
Don-kun and Uwe Dedering, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

By August 1998, tensions between President Kabila and his former allies of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi began to boil over. Rwandan military officers appointed in the new Congolese military were dismissed from their positions with all Rwandan military forces expelled.[xi] President Kabila claimed that his former supporters, particularly Rwanda, were trying to take advantage of Congolese instability for financial gains. Rwanda’s historical interpretation differs and instead suggests that they were expelled soon after they uncovered President Kabila’s developing ties with the FAR and transporting genocide perpetrators closer to its borders.[xii] Additionally, former Rwandan Hutus and those loyal to President Kabila aided in the lynching of Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda Tutsis.[xiii]

Debates continue on what initiated the Second Congo War (1998-2003). However, after Colonel Kabarebe’s failed Operation Kitona to capture western DRC[xiv], the bloody conflict witnessed the DRC transformed into spheres of influence between multiple irregular forces, which were all aided by different governments. In eastern DRC, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), domestically supported by the Congolese Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda populations, received foreign support from Uganda and Rwanda. However, conflicting strategic goals between Uganda and Rwanda led to the RCD split into two, as seen during the Battle of Kisangani in June 2000, with RCD-Kisangani and Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) supported by Uganda and RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda.[xv] The war quickly grew to encompass support from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan contributing military and political support. Within these regions, the Congolese became dependent on the local armed faction and established their own Mai Mai rebels to become the primary source of security, employment, and food.[xvi] For civilians, the humanitarian crisis from disease and malnutrition led to over 5 million deaths from these causes rather than actual warfare.[xvii]

Spheres of Control during the Second Congo War 2001
Don-kun and Uwe Dedering, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Internal divisions between various rebel forces and allies led to multiple international agreements but with little change to the conflict. The July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the introduction of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in February 2000, did not alter the ground conditions.[xviii] However, hope for the conflict’s end began after President Laurent Kabila’s assassination on January 16, 2001. Like so much of the war, debates continue about the circumstances around his death.[xix] Shortly after, his son Joseph Kabila, who had been previously close with Colonel Kabarebe during the First Congo War[xx], became President and successfully campaigned to end the war. Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Accord on July 30, 2002, with Uganda signing the Luanda Agreement on September 6, 2002.[xxi] By October 5, Rwanda had withdrawn its soldiers, leading to the war being ‘officially’ over by July of the following year.[xxii] While the Second Congo War was officially over, the carved-up regions of the DRC controlled by various rebel groups continued.

The M23 in Eastern Congo:

Akin to describing the Congo Wars, simplifying the M23’s complex history is rather challenging. The origins of the M23 stem from the end of the Second Congo War. While foreign militaries withdrew from the DRC, rebel force remnants, either created or aligned with foreign nations, remained. Many were offered political and military agreements through different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. They incorporated the political wings of the irregular forces into the new Congolese government, with the military actors integrating within the broader national military. Despite the initial hopes that these agreements would reduce rebel forces, they failed to incorporate a complete victory over the forces that submitted them into this transition. Fundamentally, there was no “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” as Clausewitz argues.[xxiii] Overall, rebel forces were not compelled by armed forces to engage in this new incorporation of the ‘conventional’ political and military actors through the UN’s DDR program. Rather, it was just advantageous to do so at the moment. As Smith suggests, this lack of compelling or defeating irregular forces allows for their later re-engagement.[xxiv]

The M23 origins came from the remains of Congrès National Pour la Défense du People (CNDP) rebel force created in December 2006, by Laurent Nkunda, who served for the RCD-Goma forces during the Second Congo War. CNDP’s leaders, such as Nkunda, Bosco Ntaganda, and the M23’s current military commander, Sultani Makenga, fought for the CNDP at one point.[xxv] After the end of the Second Congo War, in 2003 and until 2007, CNDP was relatively successful in pushing back the conventional Congolese forces until 2007, when the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) forced its leader, General Laurent Nkunda, to enter a round of negotiations with the Congolese Government.[xxvi]

The March 23, 2009, peace agreement between CNDP and the Congolese Government signaled the beginning of the measures for integrating the rebel fighters into the FARDC forces. The nearly 6,000 fighters of CNDP would be able to retain their military ranks and be stationed in the Kivu Region to protect the Congolese Banyarwanda populations. One of CNDP’s senior commanders, Bosco Ntaganda, received immunity from being extradited to the International Criminal Court for the charge of war crimes. This was intended to quell fear from the former CNDP fighters that President Joseph Kabila would not honor the agreement. The political side of the rebel group would transition into a political party and campaign for Parliamentary seats in the 2011 National Assembly election.[xxvii]

Accusations of corruption and the sidelining of former CNDP officers within the FARDC led to the April 4, 2012, creation of the M23 rebel movement under the leadership of General Makenga Sultani and Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero with 300 former CNDP fighters. They grew to a few thousand soldiers who defected from the FARDC.[xxviii] Despite some initial successive operations, such as on November 20 during the capture of North Kivu’s capital of Goma[xxix], the M23’s limited operational art and increased friction between resources, training, and tactics led to its inevitable fall. It ceased military operations in November 2013, after the introduction of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed primarily of Tanzanian soldiers who worked alongside the FARDC and the MONUSCO peacekeepers.[xxx] Unlike past negotiations with rebel forces, the Congolese government and its allies pushed for its dissolution through military might. This led to the surrender of Sultani Makenga and around 1,500 troops in Mgahinga National Park in Uganda.[xxxi] During much of its existence, international actors accused Rwanda and Uganda of supporting the rebel force based on the UNGoE 2014 report.[xxxii]

Despite the M23’s military wing being largely dismantled, Sultani Makenga and some of his forces departed Uganda to establish a new base at Mount Mikeno in 2017.[xxxiii] Its forces grew and eventually, by November 2021, began offensive operations, occupying a large section of North Kivu.[xxxiv] While it still has yet to attempt the capture of Goma, it threatens the region’s capital city and controls multiple smaller cities and towns.[xxxv] Despite little physical evidence proving Rwandan support for the M23, Rwanda still faces accusations based on historical precedent within the region. One African Great Lakes region specialist privately commented, “I have no evidence to suggest Rwanda is supporting the M23, but they probably are because they [Rwanda] have supported rebel forces in the past. There is no way for the M23 to do so well without Rwandan support.”[xxxvi] Their misperception stems from the misunderstanding of conventional versus irregular warfare, with rebel forces often seen as inferior to conventional militaries. However, Smith rightly notes how, in all types of warfare, there will always be a more robust and weaker actor.[xxxvii] Additionally, the comment ignores the reality of the situation in eastern DRC and a guiding principle of strategic theory, which is the researcher’s moral neutrality and the actors’ rationality.[xxxviii] With the renewal of fighting between the M23, the FARDC, and MONUSCO, the strategy of the rebel force has been relatively ignored.

M23 Offensive Map 2024
Own work Sources by MrBLOCKiron, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

There are few attempts to understand why they renewed the fighting years after seemingly being finished. Clausewitz’s statement that “the political object is the goal” in warfare[xxxix] allows one to examine the beliefs that led to policy. This is echoed by Smith, who writes that “strategy is concerned with the ways in which available means are employed in order to achieve desired ends.”[xl] Much of the M23’s coverage focuses on the military successes, i.e., tactics and operations, rather than the irregular force’s strategy.[xli] It ignores Smith’s warning that artificial divides between conventional and irregular warfare do not aid our understanding of strategy. Rather than focus on the military tactics and operations, there needs to be greater attention paid to the M23’s overall strategy with a particular focus on its desired ends.

Even attempts to examine the rationale for the M23’s revival often fall within historical tropes rather than utilizing the tools provided by strategic theory. This is most prevalent among researchers and fellows at the Congo Research Group, a predominant research group specializing in conflict, politics, and the political economy of the DRC. Jason Stearns, Senior Fellow at the Congo Research Group, examines the problems that drove the M23’s revival.[xlii] This includes the Congolese military’s ever-growing relationship with the FDLR, a Rwandan Hutu rebel movement that desires a return to Rwanda’s Genocide and the localized Mai Mai militias. These groups target the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda communities.[xliii] Genocide Watch goes so far as to describe the attacks against the Banyarwanda as genocidal.[xliv]

Additionally, many M23 officials still perceive the Congolese government as not honoring past ceasefire agreements. Despite describing some of the M23’s policy concerns, Jason Stearns and the Director of Programs at the Congo Research Group, Joshua Walker, ignore the M23’s rationale for the conflict and instead blame neighboring Rwanda.[xlv] This is perhaps a misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s comment that “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”[xlvi] by trying simply to explain the current crisis. While not alone in their assessments[xlvii], their simplification contradicts Netherlands Defence Academy Research Fellow and strategic theorist George Dimitriu’s comment that understanding warfare requires “Only a deeper understanding of the contemporary political condition and the implications for warfare can restore coherence – both conceptual and in practice.”[xlviii]

Strategic theory provides the necessary insights if the Congolese government and international, whether global or regional, such as SADC[xlix], actors desire peace within eastern DRC and the end of the M23. Ideally, the FARDC would be the primary actor to defeat the M23 by, to quote Clausewitz, “complete defeat of the enemy,” but its lackluster operations, as seen by the M23’s increased territory since 2022 and the utilization of FDLR and Mai Mai fighters, clearly indicate this is not a viable option. As warfare is the continuation of politics by other means[l], ending the M23’s military campaign will require a viable political solution that addresses the M23’s concerns for the Banyarwanda community. However, the complex policy issues that led to the instability seem too immense or undesirable for the Congolese government.

Congo’s Problem of Fighting Irregular Forces:

Unlike the First Congo War with the AFDL, the M23’s operations focus more on controlling North Kivu to promote its strategic goals rather than marching towards Kinshasa to overthrow the government. Congo’s current President, Felix Tshisekedi, and his government have two options. The first is to have a clear strategy to defeat the M23 through the FARDC’s use of overwhelming force to defeat its adversaries.[li] The FARDC’s ineffectiveness in defeating the M23 goes beyond issues of friction and leads to questions relating to Smith’s definition of strategic effectiveness.[lii] North Kivu’s rugged terrain and the Congolese lack of developed infrastructure create even greater friction between the FARDC’s theoretical possibilities and realities.

With the significant friction and ineffectiveness of the FARDC, the government relies greatly on arming Mai Mai forces, which often need to be swayed through financial means with little oversight by the Congolese military and the FDLR. Clausewitz warns that allies will have their own goals and should be seen as a type of last line of defense.[liii] The FARDC’s growing alliance with these two groups highlights its inefficiencies. The support of the anti-Rwandan rebel group is problematic as its strategic goal is not the integrity of Congolese territory from other rebel forces. The FDLR’s policy goals, objects of power, and interests[liv] focus on promoting Hutu ethnic supremacy and a return to an ethnic-based Rwandan society akin to that found during the Genocide.[lv]

Additionally, the relationship, in particular with the FDLR, spurs greater political issues as Rwanda considers the rebel force as a danger to its ontological security for its post-ethnic societal construction.[lvi] In September 2022, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) sent a military force into North Kivu to work alongside other military actors, including the MONUSCO peacekeepers. Its goals were to establish safe zones for internally displaced persons and push back the M23.[lvii] However, the forces departed more than a year after deployment based on receiving criticism from the Congolese government for their calls for a political rather than a military solution to the conflict.[lviii] With the FARDC’s inability to use its forces to achieve the military objective of defeating the M23, a policy solution is thus required.

A lack of a clear strategy in war is often a failure of public policy.[lix] During the early years of Felix Tshisekedi’s presidency, he was much less antagonistic towards Rwanda and even developed closer ties. This included rhetoric that claimed the necessity to demobilise the FDLR.[lx] Tshisekedi’s political objective was to increase Kinshasa’s control over eastern DRC by appeasing Rwandan security concerns. The policy rested on the false assumption that Rwanda held significant influence with various rebel forces in the region rather than addressing local grievances. Relations ultimately soured as it became more politically advantageous for Tshisekedi to securitize Rwanda and the Banyarwanda to deflect domestic criticism. During the 2023 Presidential election, President Tshisekedi labelled Rwandan President Paul Kagame as ‘Hitler’ while calling for action against the M23 and the Banyarwanda community.[lxi] Multiple government officials openly call for attacks on the Banyarwanda.[lxii] Thus, his policies became more hostile towards not only the M23 but also against their strategic goal of protecting the Banyarwanda. With the FARDC’s inability to enact the policy and strategy through tactics and operations, the Congolese government must reconsider its policies.

As Smith comments, the use of warfare in a domestic setting is a liability of the political system.[lxiii] It will inevitably falter at one point when the population grows to either distrust the effectiveness or become fearful of their military and government. Recall Smith’s warning: “The longer a campaign goes on the more immune to feelings of fear or psychological attrition a target audience may become as the violence becomes ever more predictable.”[lxiv] The DRC had already witnessed the result of the distrust of these actors during the First Congo War. The means-ends calculations are seemingly misguided as the M23 has yet to indicate any threat to the survival of President Tshisekedi’s government but remains firm in its strategic goals. Thus, there is an opportunity for a restriction on continued escalation through a shift in public policy. The shift could be to honor past agreements such as the initial UN-brokered agreement on February 24, 2013[lxv], the December 2013 ceasefire proposal[lxvi], the November 2022 ceasefire agreement[lxvii], or the most recent agreement signed in July 2024.[lxviii] However, an altered policy through renewed peace negotiations can address M23’s policy concerns. The inability of the FARDC to defeat the M23 requires the Congolese government to realize the situation, and as Clausewitz described, “…state is ready to accept the situation, it should sue for peace.”[lxix] This seems unlikely as domestic political drivers rather than military realities interfere with fostering a constructive new strategy to end the violence in eastern DRC. However, this will end when the war loses its current utility, which at present benefits President Tshisekedi’s tenure.[lxx]

Conclusion:

The Congo wars fostered far-reaching instability and insecurity that is still felt today. Within much of the DRC, especially the eastern province of North Kivu, multiple significant and minor rebel forces dominate the landscape. Uganda and Rwanda are often accused of meddling in DRC affairs, the most current being the M23. However, this attempt to simplify the conflict only ignores the reality of the multiple actors’ strategies. Fundamentally, the lack of a clear Congolese strategy to defeat the M23 has not indicated any progress. While multiple domestic issues are at fault for the current instability in eastern DRC, the continuous policy, tactical, and strategic failures have emboldened the M23. Unlike the Congolese government, the M23’s relatively straightforward strategic goals to protect the Banyarwanda community led to successful operations and effective tactics. Despite the DRC’s conflict being one of Africa’s most prolonged military conflicts, strategic theory is largely absent in its understanding. This research addresses this gap to provide critical insights into this mostly ignored conflict. It argues that strategic theory and Clausewitz can offer a different analysis than currently available to understand the instability within eastern DRC.

References

[i] "Democratic Republic of the Congo," Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 1, 2024, https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:~:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.
[ii] Koko, Sadiki. "The Mouvement du 23 Mars and the dynamics of a failed insurgency in the Democratic Republic of Congo." South African Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2014): 261-278.
[iii] Smith, M. L. R. "On Efficacy: A Beginner’s Guide to Strategic Theory." Military Strategy Magazine 8, no. 2 (2022): 10-17.
[iv] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87, 177.
[v] Neumann, Peter R. Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 6.
[vi] Roessler, Philip and Harry Verhoeven. Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa’s Deadliest Conflict. (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).
[vii] While he holds the rank of General, this article will use his Colonel rank as during the First Congo War.
[viii] Stearns, Jason. Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 51-65, 120-125.
[ix] Beloff, Jonathan R. Foreign policy in post-genocide Rwanda: Elite perceptions of Global Engagement. (Oxon, Routledge, 2020), 64.
[x] Smith, M. L. R. "Strategic Theory: What it is… and just as importantly, what it isn’t." E-International Relations 28 (2011): 1-6., 2-3.
[xi] Roessler, Verhoeven, Why Comrades Go to War, 293-296, 339-350.
[xii] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-Genocide, 65; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory, 183-185
[xiii] Clark, John. The African Stakes of the Congo War. (New York: Springer, 2002)., 128.
[xiv] Mills, Greg. "The Boot is now on the Other Foot: Rwanda's Lessons from Both Sides of Insurgency." The RUSI Journal 153, no. 3 (2008): 72-78.
[xv] Prunier, Gérard. Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, xxix-xxxviii, 227-234.
[xvi] Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. "The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States." In Rethinking the Nature of War, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, 65–87. (London: Routledge, 2005)., 79.
[xvii] Bavier, Joe. "Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a Month-Study." Reuters, January 22, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280201220080122/.
[xviii] Prunier, Africa's World War, 227-232, 243-248; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory, 271.
[xix] Prunier, Africa's World War, 249-254.
[xx] Interview with General James Kabarebe by the author, Kigali, 13 September 2014.
[xxi] Prunier, Africa's World War, 257-274; Waugh, 2004, 142-145.
[xxii] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-Genocie, 69; Stearns, Dancing in the Glory, 168, 307-330.
[xxiii] Clausewitz, On War, 75.
[xxiv] Smith, Michael LR. "Guerrillas in the mist: reassessing strategy and low intensity warfare." Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 19-37., 35-36.
[xxv] Beloff, Jonathan. "The Relationship between M23 Rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Rwandan Defence Force," Perspectives on Global Issues 8, no. 1 (2013): 1-20.
[xxvi] Prunier, Africa's World War, 297-298, 322-323.
[xxvii] Essa, Aza. "Q&A: Behind the M23 mutiny in DR Congo," Aljazeera, November 26, 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/20121126936588395.html.
[xxviii] Ibid; Gouby, Melanie. "Congo-Kinshasa: General Ntaganda and Loyalists Desert Armed Forces." allAfrica, April 4, 2012. https://allafrica.com/stories/201204040870.html, Moshiri, Nazanine. "Reporter's Notebook: The rise of M23," Aljazeera, December 20, 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/2012review/2012/12/2012122873527662715.html
[xxix] Gil, M. M. "M23 and eastern D.R. Congo: An intractable problem or an opportunity to engage?" European Parliament: Policy Department. 2012. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=78831.
[xxx] Beloff, Jonathan. "Friends forever, again? Rwanda and Tanzania mend bridges," African Arguments, June 15, 2016. https://africanarguments.org/2016/06/friends-forever-again-rwanda-and-tanzania-mend-bridges/
[xxxi] “DR Congo’s M23 Rebel Chief Sultani Makenga ‘Surrenders.’” BBC News, November 7, 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24849814.
[xxxii] Kok, Naomi. "From the international conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade: Dealing with the latest crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo." African Security Review 22, no. 3 (2013): 175-180.
[xxxiii] Kinshasa, Rédaction. “RDC : Recrutement, Réarmement et Réorganisation Du M23, l’ouganda et Le Rwanda Ont Servi de Base Arrière.” Politico.cd, June 22, 2022. https://www.politico.cd/actualite/la-rdc-a-la-une/2022/06/22/rdc-recrutement-rearmement-et-reorganisation-du-m23-louganda-et-le-rwanda-ont-servi-de-base-arriere.html/110975/; Schwikowski, Martina. “M23 Rebels Resurface in DR Congo.” Deutsche Welle (DW), August 4, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/m23-rebels-resurface-in-dr-congo/a-61383104.
[xxxiv] “DR Congo Army and M23 Rebels Clash near Densely Populated Eastern Towns.” Reuters, August 25, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/dr-congo-army-m23-rebels-clash-near-densely-populated-eastern-towns-2024-08-25/; Stearns, Jason. "Congo SIASA: Discrimination and the M23 Rebellion." Congo Research Group | Groupe d’étude sur le Congo, 2024. https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2023/01/24/congo-siasa-discrimination-and-the-m23-rebellion/?searched=Violent+Conflict.
[xxxv] Ndushabandi, Claver. "M23 Rebels Seize Strategic Town in Rapid Advance to Goma." ChimpReports, February 5, 2024. https://chimpreports.com/m23-rebels-seize-strategic-town-in-rapid-advance-to-goma/.
[xxxvi] Interview with an unnamed academic by the author, London, May 2023.
[xxxvii] Smith, M. L. R. "Escalation in irregular war: Using Strategic Theory to Examine from First Principles." Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 5 (2012): 613-637., 618.
[xxxviii] Smith, "On Efficacy," 10-17.
[xxxix] Clausewitz, On War, 87.
[xl] Smith, "Strategic Theory," 1-6.
[xli] Ntanyoma, Delphin R. "M23: Four Things You Should Know about the Rebel Group’s Campaign in Rwanda-DRC Conflict." The Conversation, November 23, 2022. https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020.
[xlii] Stearns, "Congo SIASA".
[xliii] Beloff, Jonathan. “How the International Community continues to fail in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,” May 9, 2024. https://jonathanrbeloff.com/2024/05/09/how-the-international-community-continues-to-fail-in-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-congo/.
[xliv] "Genocide Emergency: Democratic Republic of the Congo," Genocide Watch, August 3, 2022, https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-emergency-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1.
[xlv] Stearns, Jason, and Joshua Z Walker. "DRC-Rwanda Crisis: What’s Needed to Prevent a Regional War." The Conversation, February 29, 2024. https://theconversation.com/drc-rwanda-crisis-whats-needed-to-prevent-a-regional-war-224345.
[xlvi] Clausewitz, On War, 119.
[xlvii] See also: Reyntjens, Filip. "Path dependence and critical junctures: three decades of interstate conflict in the African great lakes region." Conflict, Security & Development 20, no. 6 (2020): 747-762; Shepherd, Ben. "Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Democratic Republic of Congo (M23) Case Study." Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Democratic Republic of Congo (M23) Case Study (2018); Turner, Thomas. "Will Rwanda end its meddling in Congo?." Current History 112, no. 754 (2013): 188-194.
[xlviii] Dimitriu, "Clausewitz and the politics," 672.
[xlix] Naledi, Ramontja, and Adeoye O Akinola. "SADC Peacekeeping Missions and the Quest for Regional Security: From Congo to Mozambique." Essay. In Development and Regional Stability in Africa: Unlocking Potential, edited by Adeoye o Akinola and Emmaculate Asige Liaga, 131–51. (Cham: Springer, 2024).
[l] Smith, M. L. R., and David Martin Jones. "What Carl might have said about terrorism: How Strategic Theory can enlighten an essentially contested debate." Infinity Journal 6, no. 2 (2018): 30-35., 32.
[li] Zilincik, Samuel. "Emotional and Rational Decision-Making in Strategic Studies." Journal of Strategic Security 15, no. 1 (2022): 1-13.
[lii] Smith, "On Efficacy," 10-17.
[liii] Smith, Hugh. "The womb of war: Clausewitz and international politics." Review of International Studies 16, no. 1 (1990): 39-58.
[liv] Dimitriu, "Clausewitz and the politics".
[lv] Beloff, Foreign Policy in Post-Genocide, 98-108.
[lvi] Beloff, Jonathan R. "Rwanda's securitisation of genocide denial: A political mechanism for power or to combat ontological insecurity?." African Security Review 30, no. 2 (2021): 184-203.
[lvii] "DRC President Presides over Signing of Agreement Giving Greenlight to the Deployment of the EAC Joint Regional Force." East African Community, September 9, 2022. https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2589-drc-president-presides-over-signing-of-agreement-giving-greenlight-to-the-deployment-of-the-eac-joint-regional-force.
[lviii] Wambui, Mary. "EACRF Completes Withdrawal from Eastern DR Congo." The East African, December 21, 2023. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-completes-exit-from-eastern-drc-4471016.
[lix] Smith, "Guerrillas in the Mist," 19-37.
[lx] "DR Congo Launches Offensive against FDLR Rebels," Al Jazeera, February 26, 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/26/dr-congo-launches-offensive-against-fdlr-rebels.
[lxi] "DR Congo President Tshisekedi Compares Rwanda Counterpart Kagame to Hitler," BBC News, December 9, 2023. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67669187.
[lxii] Beloff, Jonathan. "30 Years after Genocide: Rwanda’s Older Generations Fear a Return of Ethnic Tensions, but Youth Feel More United." The Conversation, April 3, 2024. https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-genocide-rwandas-older-generations-fear-a-return-of-ethnic-tensions-but-youth-feel-more-united-225726.
[lxiii] Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1995)., 3
[lxiv] Smith, "Escalation in irregular war," 622.
[lxv] "African Leaders Sign Deal Aimed at Peace in Eastern Congo," Reuters, February 25, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-un-idUSKBN19W2DY.
[lxvi] "Joint ICGLR-SADC Final Communique on Kampala Dialogue.," Scribd, December 12, 2013. https://www.scribd.com/document/191157617/Joint-ICGLR-SADC-Final-Communique-on-Kampala-Dialogue.
[lxvii] "M23 Accept Conditional Ceasefire, Want Talks with DRC Government," Al Jazeera, November 26, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/26/m23-accept-conditional-ceasefire-want-talks-with-drc-government.
[lxviii] Nebe, Cai. "DR Congo Conflict: Why Is the Cease-Fire Not Holding?" Deutsche Welle (DW), August 27, 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-conflict-why-is-the-cease-fire-not-holding/a-70051223.
[lxix] Clausewitz, On War, 82.
[lxx] Dimitriu, "Clausewitz and the politics," 675.