Theory to Reality: Defensive Operations Confirm Clausewitz’s Theory

Since its publication in 1832, Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege (On War) has been an academic pillar for Western military strategists, influencing military doctrine and shaping the debate on power relationships. Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer, fought against the French during the Napoleonic Wars and participated in the Waterloo campaign, which culminated in the surrender of Napoleon Bonaparte. His firsthand experience in these battles provided him with valuable insights into the nature and character of war. In addition to his combat experience, Clausewitz spent considerable time in staff roles within the Prussian Army, affording him the intellectual space to examine the complexities of conflict.[i] This unique blend of theoretical investigation and battlefield experience lends authenticity to “On War,” solidifying its high status in the intellectual study of military theory and making it a seminal text that continues to be studied and debated.

Central to Clausewitz’s theory is the argument that defensive operations hold an inherent advantage over offensive operations[ii]— a proclamation this article argues resonates in contemporary armed conflicts. The aim is to confirm the credibility of Clausewitz’s assertion by examining its relevance through four core tenets of warfare that undergird his philosophy: resource supply, psychological influence, public support, and fortifications. This article first discusses Clausewitzian theory in relation to defensive operations, a brief history of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and then considers the strategic implications of the culminating point of the attack. The bulk of this article’s analysis defines each tenet according to Clausewitz’s writings, then describes how these four tenets provide defensive advantages to both Ukrainians and Russians amid the ongoing conflict. [iii] The aim of this article is to affirm Clausewitz’s assertion that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.”[iv]

Clausewitz’s Theory

To initiate the analysis, this section will expound upon Clausewitz’s theory of defensive operations. Clausewitz highlights the critical role of resource supply in enhancing defensive capabilities. He notes that defenders typically have better access to local resources and shorter supply lines, which are vital for maintaining the endurance and effectiveness of forces.[v] Further, Clausewitz emphasizes the nuances of defensive warfare, highlighting its distinct advantages in terms of the psychological aspects of combat. He underscores the importance of courage, determination, and presence of mind, especially in defensive operations where the stakes of protecting one’s homeland magnify these factors.[vi] Additionally, Clausewitz underscores the significance of public support. He posits that the morale and backing of the local population, coupled with superior local intelligence, are pivotal in shaping the effectiveness of defensive strategies.[vii] Moreover, Clausewitz discusses the strategic utilization of physical terrain and fortifications, pointing out how a defender can reshape the local landscape prior to an offender’s forward movements.[viii] These insights from Clausewitz’s “On War” offer a foundational understanding of the strengths inherent in defensive operations.

Recent Conflict in Ukraine

The subsequent analysis covers recent developments leading to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. In 2014, Russia heightened its aggressive stance toward Ukraine through the annexation of Crimea, a territory that had been under Ukrainian sovereignty for 60 years, 23 of which were as an independent nation. This geopolitical maneuver occurred immediately after the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who had earned widespread criticism from Ukrainians for prioritizing Russian interests. The catalyst for this public sentiment was Yanukovych’s refusal to engage in an economic partnership with the European Union.[ix] The 2014 invasion is attributable to Ukraine’s multifaceted significance to Russia, affecting various dimensions of Russian national power. Ukraine holds strategic importance for Russia, serving as a buffer zone to Western-aligned countries and offering access to critical resources like the Black Sea. Vladimir Putin’s aim to annex Crimea was to reestablish a Russian empire and prevent a democratic encirclement around Russia.[x]

Putin, exploiting divisions among the predominantly Russian-speaking population, asserted a “moral obligation to address security concerns in the region” and blamed the West for escalating tensions.[xi] From Putin’s view, this rationale justified Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. During this invasion, Putin’s war aims were to seize these Eastern blocs where dissension existed and overthrow the Ukrainian government to install a system more amenable to Russia.

Clausewitz’s Culminating Point

Before analyzing each tenet in relation to both Ukrainian and Russian defensive operations, it is worth mentioning Clausewitz’s concept of the culminating point of the attack. This concept reveals a critical dimension in understanding the Russia-Ukraine conflict and each belligerent’s war aim. Clausewitz asserts that an attacker reaches the culminating point when they extend their operations to where only enough drive remains to maintain a defensive posture and wait for the subsequent peace. Pushing beyond this point to achieve political objectives risks military overreach, which inevitably shifts the advantage to the defender.[xii] Russia’s initial war aims to overthrow the Ukrainian government and capture significant territories arguably surpassed this culminating point. The reliance on unconventional reinforcements, such as North Korean force support and conscripted prisoners, further signifies a desperate attempt to regain momentum and compensate for the strategic miscalculations and resource depletion.[xiii] This lens underscores how Ukraine’s persistent and adaptive defensive tactics have effectively exploited Russia’s strategic overextension, significantly hindering its ability to achieve its war aims. Given this context, this article explores how Russia subsequently entrenched themselves to shift to the defensive against Ukrainian counteroffensives and maintain their territorial gains.

Examination of the Four Tenets

With the stage now set to study the current Ukrainian-Russian war, each of the four tenets that underpin the Clausewitzian theory will be examined to demonstrate that defensive operations are superior to that of offensive operations. The four tenets – resource supply, psychological influence, public support, and fortifications – will be analyzed through real examples occurring in Ukraine from February 2022 to the present day.

Tenet One – Resource Supply

First, resource supply holds a critical advantage in conducting defensive operations, particularly when the conflict is on one’s home soil. Resource supply can encompass a range of assets, from military equipment and human reinforcements to strategic war reserves. Operating on one’s terrain allows for shorter lines of communication and well-established processes for material manufacturing and the acquisition of resources. Clausewitz asserts as an offender advances, the distance from their supply sources increases, leading to delays in replenishing their forces, while a defender, closer to their own sources, does not face the same delays.[xiv] Further, Clausewitz first observed logistical challenges during Napoleon’s failed Moscow campaign. Disruptions in Napoleon’s extended lines of communication deprived him of resupply options. This logistical failure compelled Napoleon to retreat toward France and ultimately contributed to his defeat.

In its defensive posture, Ukraine has expertly used its resource supply in military operations. By adjusting in-country manufacturing, the Ukrainians have met the urgent need for vital military supplies like anti-tank and anti-helicopter missiles.[xv] The military has also moved away from the reliance on other countries for critical parts for drone manufacturing and repair, allowing for faster acquisition of assets and increased sortie rates.[xvi] Furthermore, fighting on home soil makes it easier to mobilize and deploy reserve forces and provides quick access to medical support, getting soldiers back into action faster. This capability also serves as a deterrent, making Russia think twice about advancing further due to the risks involved with a Ukrainian defense constantly resupplied with critical resources.

The relative ease of resupplying resources on home soil for defensive operations sharply contrasts with the logistical difficulties when launching an offensive attack on foreign territory. In one instance, near Chornobyl, supply lines were cut, which drove Russian troops to such desperation that they unknowingly shot and ate deer contaminated by nuclear radiation, effectively removing them from combat.[xvii] This is an example of the offender having little knowledge of the resource environment in hostile territory and the increased risk of resource shortages. The Ukrainian defense can resupply resources more effectively than the Russian offense, helping them successfully hold off Russian advances in critical battles.

To be sure, Russian forces have effectively leveraged resource supply as a fundamental aspect of their entrenchment defensive strategy. By establishing robust supply lines and stockpiling necessary resources within occupied territories, Russia has ensured that its defensive positions are well-equipped for prolonged engagements. Their placement of resources includes setting up forward depots that are supplied with ammunition, fuel, and essential military equipment.[xviii] This sustains their defensive capabilities and exemplifies Clausewitz’s tenet of resource supply, highlighting the crucial role that provisioning plays in the strength of a defense posture. This approach is evidenced by the success of entrenched Russian forces staving off Ukrainian counteroffensives during the summer of 2023.[xix]

Tenet Two – Psychological Influence

Second, the psychological influence of protecting one’s homeland emboldens ferocity in the combatants fighting in defensive operations. Clausewitz does not explicitly use the term psychological influence but instead uses moral forces when describing these phenomena.[xx] He argues that these moral forces, in the heart of combatants, are a force multiplier that can outweigh asymmetric military advantages.[xxi] This force multiplier gives defensive operations an edge, as combatants are motivated to defend their sovereignty and view continued fighting as heroic. Clausewitz’s focus on psychological advantages that amass for the defender further validates his assertion of the inherent superiority of defensive over offensive military operations.

Spearheaded by President Zelensky’s passionate leadership, the Ukrainian military united around the imperative of safeguarding their homeland.[xxii] Zelensky said he couldn’t help thinking Russian missiles were flying “over my children, over all of our children.”[xxiii] These thoughts had an intense psychological influence on his calculation to stay in the capital of Kyiv and motivate his military to stand with him in the defense of Ukraine. Concurrently, this deepened psychological influence stimulated a surge in volunteer recruitment, facilitating rapid troop integration and formation of territorial battalions, further augmenting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Moderately trained civilian personnel comprise these territorial battalions, which resemble city militias or guerrilla-style combatants. Local armaments equip them to defend their specific areas of responsibility.[xxiv] The increased vigor of armed locals enabled the Ukrainian military to halt the offensive near Kyiv, preventing the enemy from entrenching, and reclaimed Ukrainian land held by Russian troops.[xxv] The psychological influence has significantly bolstered the military effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive force, creating an asymmetrical advantage that transcends mere firepower.

To be sure, Russian defensive strategies have effectively utilized psychological tactics to bolster their positions. By entrenching within view of Ukrainian cities and towns, Russian forces create a palpable sense of presence, impacting the morale and decision-making of opposing forces. This psychological advantage is compounded by disinformation about these fortifications and potential future disruptions to basic Ukrainian needs through media and intelligence channels, demoralizing Ukrainian troops.[xxvi] These tactics showcase how psychological operations are integral to maintaining a robust defense and exemplify Clausewitz’s insights into the moral forces at play in warfare.

Tenet Three – Public Support

Third, public support is a critical element in Clausewitz’s defensive superiority framework. The collective will of the populace can significantly strengthen a military’s effectiveness. The passion intensifies when the conflict unfolds on home soil, directly impacting the population. Throughout a conflict, sustained public support for the endeavor can shape governmental perspectives, aligning them more closely with military objectives. Clausewitz emphasizes that public will is not merely a secondary consideration but a central component that can determine the war’s outcome.[xxvii] This is expanded upon when he states, “The moment an invader enters enemy territory, the nature of the operational theater changes. It becomes hostile.”[xxviii] An offender must also contend with international public support often granted to the defender. Clausewitz asserts, “The danger threatening the defender will bring allies to his aid.”[xxix] Leveraging this public support in defensive operations can be a force multiplier, backing the military’s capabilities and resilience.

Public support has been pivotal in strengthening Ukraine’s defensive operations and hindering the Russian offensive. Civilians have actively engaged in information networks, providing the Ukrainian military with real-time intelligence on Russian troop movements, tactics, and future plans. These civilian networks have also coordinated efforts to deplete resources and disrupt Russian military activities, making the invaders increasingly dependent on their lines of communication.[xxx] Accordingly, the Ukrainian military has managed to outmaneuver the Russians, slowing their invasion. Additionally, public support in the form of international backing has significantly augmented Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. As of September 2023, forty-seven countries have extended various forms of aid to Ukraine, including financial, military, and humanitarian support. The United States has been the most substantial contributor, providing a cumulative total of $76 billion in aid.[xxxi] This international support has further solidified Ukraine’s position and added another layer to its defensive operations. In contrast, the international community has leveraged unprecedented sanctions on the Russian aggressor. These sanctions cover all instruments of national power and have impeded Russia’s ability to wage an efficient offensive war.[xxxii] The ability to ignite the will of the civilian population and unite the international community reinforces the inherent advantage of defensive operations, validating Clausewitz’s assertion.

To be sure, Russia’s defensive operations also leverage public support to fortify their military stance. Russian state-controlled media extensively cover the deployment and perceived effectiveness of their fortifications, portraying them as a shield against aggression, which bolsters domestic support and legitimizes their military actions to the Russian public.[xxxiii] This manipulation of public perception not only strengthens internal morale but also serves to justify their defensive posture internationally. Recent reports indicate that North Korea has supplied manpower to bolster Russian forces, significantly impacting the conflict’s dynamics.[xxxiv] Additionally, China’s role as a crucial supplier of dual-use assets, which include critical technologies that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, has been crucial.[xxxv] This aid affects public perception and support within Russia by portraying a narrative of substantial external backing.

Tenet Four – Fortifications

Fourth, fortifications on home soil offer a distinct asymmetrical advantage in defensive operations. Fortifications in defensive operations encompass more than traditional military bases; they include natural terrain features that provide barricaded support. Clausewitz emphasizes the tactical utility of fortifications in the form of natural terrain features such as rivers, mountains, and forests in obstructing enemy movements.[xxxvi] He states, “The invader has to besiege, assault or observe the enemy’s fortresses,” which slows the offensive, allowing the defender more time to reinforce strongholds.[xxxvii] Additionally, a combatant’s knowledge of the home-field terrain can safeguard critical infrastructure and essential lines of communication. Defenders can also entrench themselves in man-made or natural fortifications to attack an advancing enemy. This intimate knowledge of the landscape makes defensive operations less reliant on resources than the offensive. Consequently, the offenders find themselves compelled to expend significantly more energy, time, and supplies to breach the fortified strongholds established by the defender.

The Ukrainians have leveraged their intimate knowledge of local terrain and constructed fortifications that are challenging barriers to Russian advancement. In anticipation of the invasion, Ukrainian forces moved resources from military installations to hidden locations within urban and forested areas, effectively concealing equipment and personnel. This preemptive action safeguarded critical assets as military installations became the initial targets in the Russian campaign toward Kyiv.[xxxviii] Additionally, leveraging an acute understanding of natural features like rivers and forests and infrastructure such as bridges and tunnels, Ukrainian forces have created strongholds that hinder enemy advancement. Ukrainian engineers even manipulated a dam to increase the water level of the Irpin River, thereby expanding its footprint and creating a natural barrier to Kyiv’s western flank. These natural fortifications have not only protected the capital but also compelled the Russian military to retreat.[xxxix]

Moreover, the fortifications have psychologically affected Russian forces, contributing to low morale and complications in their logistical planning.[xl] The Russians have encountered guerrilla-style attacks from what appeared harmless infrastructure but were instead Ukrainian fortifications. When forced to re-route because of these fortifications blocking thoroughfares, the Russian’s reliance on outdated maps and unfamiliarity with the environment hampered offensive efforts. As a result, estimates indicate that Russian casualties are approximately double those of the Ukrainians, a testament to the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defensive campaign.[xli]

To be sure, Russian forces have constructed extensive fortification systems across occupied territories in Ukraine, utilizing trenches, anti-vehicle ditches, and defensive barriers that impede Ukrainian advances.[xlii] These structures, strategically placed to maximize natural terrain advantages and control key access points, enhance the defensive endurance and complicate Ukrainian counteroffensive plans. By integrating these physical barriers with tactical defense operations, Russia manages to maintain a formidable defensive posture with a relatively economical allocation of resources. This adept use of the fourth tenet, fortifications, in defensive operations perfectly aligns with Clausewitz’s theories, emphasizing the inherent advantages of the defender in war.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has shown the relevance of Clausewitz’s perspective that defensive operations hold an advantage over offensive operations. Clausewitz declares, “I am convinced that the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.”[xliii] By revisiting the concept of the culminating point of the attack, this analysis illuminates the strategic pitfalls of overextension in offensive campaigns. By juxtaposing Clausewitzian theory with the Ukrainian-Russian war, this article examined four core tenets: resource supply, psychological influence, public support, and fortifications. Each tenet has proven pivotal in shaping the conflict’s trajectory, highlighting how both Ukrainian and Russian forces have effectively utilized their materiel, informational, societal, and geographical advantages to fortify their positions.

Resource supply has underscored the critical role of logistical superiority in sustaining prolonged engagements. Psychological influence has revealed the power of morale and resolve in shaping battlefield outcomes. Public support has emerged as a decisive factor, with both domestic backing and international alliances influencing decisions and tactical capabilities. The strategic use of fortifications has emphasized the tactical benefits of well-prepared defensive positions. Through these explorations, the analysis reaffirms Clausewitz’s assertion that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack,” reflecting its significant strategic value in contemporary warfare.[xliv] The insights gained from this examination not only validate Clausewitz’s principles but also contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play in modern conflicts, offering valuable lessons for both military strategists and policymakers.