The Problem with Strategy as Problem-Solving

In the modern strategic landscape, particularly in Western military and political contexts, complex challenges are often approached as problems with concrete solutions. This perspective, a hallmark of the ‘problem-solving’ mindset, seeks to break down complex issues into solvable parts. This approach, however, has often led to suboptimal results in foreign policy, as demonstrated by interventionist failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others. When strategy is viewed through the problem-solving lens, complex geopolitical issues are frequently simplified and unique dynamics are often ignored.

A deeper, more effective foundational approach that has been dormant in Western strategic thinking is re-emerging: the idea of ‘problem framing’.[i] Rather than attempting to ‘solve’ challenges with predetermined solutions, problem framing encourages strategists to explore the broader context, recognising that some issues defy bounded solutions. Problem framing allows strategists to adapt their responses to changing environments and complex cultural contexts, fostering a mindset that emphasises exploration, understanding and flexibility. This paper articulates the need to shift from an exclusive, or primary, focus on problem-solving in strategy, to one where problem-framing is accentuated, arguing that the latter approach is better suited to address the complexities that are always ever-present in international affairs.

The Rise of Problem-Solving in Strategic Thought

The problem-solving approach to strategy has, of course, been both an explicit and implicit characteristic of strategic formulation throughout history.[ii] In its more modern, Western, incarnation, its roots lie in the Cold War, when influential thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling began applying scientific methods to strategic analysis.[iii] These key architects of modern strategic theory popularised systematic approaches, such as game theory and systems analysis, which treated military and political challenges as technical puzzles that could be solved through rational planning.[iv] For example, Brodie’s work on nuclear deterrence focused on the idea of maintaining a balance of power through calculated moves, treating the Cold War as a strategic puzzle that could be solved by making the ‘correct’ decisions. This approach helped shape the way military and civilian strategic analysts were trained, reinforcing a view that rational analysis, calculation and systematic planning could offer solutions to challenges in the strategic realm.[v]

An emphasis on analytical rigour and formulaic solutions—problem-solving—became entrenched in professional military education, particularly in the West, where strategic thinking was often guided by models and calculations intended to predict and control outcomes.[vi] In 2004, for example, J. Boon Bartholomees would open his survey of strategic thought in the U.S. Army’s War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy by stating in his own view that ‘strategy is simply a problem solving process’.[vii] He would close that chapter by comparing strategy to carpentry, as ‘[b]oth skills are intended for solving problems’.[viii] Even so, while problem-solving can clarify certain technical aspects, it may impose rigid constraints on broader, context-sensitive thinking or situations. This approach has often overlooked the unpredictable human and cultural dimensions of conflicts, reducing diverse and complex issues into manageable parts that might not maintain meaningful fidelity to the situation.[ix] By prioritising reducibility and predictability, the problem-solving mindset has sometimes missed the larger picture, focusing narrowly on immediate objectives rather than on the evolving nature of strategic challenges.

Levels of War and the Role of Operational Art

When understood through a problem-solving paradigm, the ‘levels of war’—ranging from the technical and tactical to the operational, strategic and policy levels—are not only stripped of their individual substance but also left hollow. These levels, particularly the operational level, were developed to help military forces align short-term tactical actions with long-term strategic goals.[x] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, with a marked increase in fighting mass and the acceleration of technological change, victory required much greater efforts at organisation and coordination. By organising strategy into levels, military institutions aimed to achieve coherence across different stages of a mission, a campaign, or any programme of action. Operational art, in particular, serves as a bridge between tactics and strategy, ensuring that battlefield actions contribute to overarching objectives. This structuring has, of course, proven invaluable in the practice of war past and present, where alignment across levels is crucial to mission success.[xi]

However, a problem-solving operational level-of-war mindset can become a rigid, highly linear framework, potentially hindering the ability to respond to strategic challenges. Rather than adopting a holistic approach that rationalises complexity, the operational problem-solver attempts to reduce it by decomposing the problem into discrete, smaller problems that can be solved. In socially and culturally complex environments—such as those that often characterise counter-insurgency and peacekeeping missions—this approach not only falls short, but in seeking to solve problems often creates new ones.[xii] Operational art, while essential for coherence in complex operations, understood through a reductionist problem-solving paradigm, is likely to reinforce a technical and formulaic approach, focusing on the efficient execution of missions rather than broader contextual understanding.

A linear mechanistic approach to the levels of war can thus struggle to account for the non-linear, often chaotic nature of human-driven conflicts, where deeply rooted social and political factors play significant roles. In these cases, a problem-solving style risks treating symptoms rather than addressing core issues, in a way that, to quote Steven Metz, ‘favors atomist and reductionist techniques that stress dichotomies and differences rather than linkages and relationships’.[xiii] It is a perspective that can end up reinforcing strategies that lack the flexibility needed for effective, long-term engagement, as examples of Western intervention from Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Libya attest.

The Philosophical Critique: The Shortcomings of Problem-Solving

The problem-solving model assumes that with the right strategy and resources, any issue can be resolved. In engineering and scientific fields, problems are indeed often solvable by following systematic approaches. In political contexts, however, challenges often involve human behaviour, competing values and intricate social dynamics that cannot be easily reduced to soluble problems. Many strategic issues are what social scientists call ‘wicked problems’—complex, interwoven issues with no clear solution.[xiv] These problems are marked by contradictions, evolving variables, and interconnected elements, making them difficult to address with straightforward, formulaic solutions.

A key limitation of the problem-solving approach is its emphasis on finding specific, predetermined answers. This perspective can lead to rigidity, as it often overlooks the adaptability required to navigate unpredictable circumstances. Moreover, by prioritising efficient, and sometimes short-term responses, problem-solving can encourage a narrow focus that neglects long-term considerations. For example, in the complex realm of international politics, with all its multiple, and invariably multi-layered, inter-, and intra-state tensions, struggles and conflicts, problem-solving approaches frequently emphasise short-term gains, such as military victories or political concessions, over sustainable outcomes that address the underlying motivations and values that may give rise to conflict. Recognising the difference between solvable, technical problems and wicked problems is crucial for developing strategic frameworks that can respond to evolving, context-specific challenges.

Historical Cases Illustrating the Limits of Problem-Solving

Historical cases highlight the limitations of applying a problem-solving approach to complex strategic challenges. One of the most illustrative examples is that of the U.S. containment strategy during the Cold War. The strategy was grounded in George Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram. Kennan’s framework presented Soviet expansionism as a problem to be ‘contained’.[xv] This framed the USSR as an adversary – a problem – that could be countered through strategic influence. Kennan’s notion of containment has often been held up as an example of an effective problem-solving strategy.[xvi] It undoubtedly helped shape the Cold War and deter Soviet expansion.[xvii] Yet, it also created long-term consequences that the U.S. struggled to manage. For example, containment led to U.S. involvement in conflicts like the Vietnam War, where the rigid application of Cold War policy failed to address the cultural and political complexities of the region.

Similarly, the U.S. Office of Net Assessment, led by Andrew Marshall, is also extolled as an instructive example of a problem-solving approach to strategy. Marshall’s answer to the Soviet ‘problem’ was to impose economic and technological ‘challenges’ in order to incite the USSR to over-reach itself economically and socially. Marshall’s strategy aimed to create costly arms races that would strain Soviet resources, a tactic that arguably contributed to the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse.[xviii]

At one level, of course, it can be said that the strategy worked. Yet, at another, this approach also set the stage for new challenges in U.S.-Russia relations, as Russia continued to be seen as an adversarial ‘problem’ to be managed and dealt with rather than a potential partner who might be engaged constructively.[xix] This adversarial ‘challenge-problem-response’ paradigm influenced Western policy, leading to persistent tensions and a lack of cooperation in the post-Soviet landscape.[xx]

Such cases illustrate that problem-solving strategies, while effective in the short and medium term, often generate unforeseen issues that compromise long-term stability. Neither do such examples of success consider seriously the notion of counterfactuals: the idea that a different approach from the one taken might have been better. Collectively, they demonstrate not simply that strategies are only successful in specific, context-dependent, situations but that the persistence of a rigid problem-solving outlook can be the harbinger of further, and arguably entirely unnecessary, security challenges further down the road. For evidence, we can look no further than to the devastating, and as of writing still ongoing, war between Russia and Ukraine that broke out following Russia’s invasion of February 2022. The war was at least in part provoked by a belief on the part of Western powers that Russia was a problem that needed to be solved after the end of the Cold War, via containment, expanding NATO further eastward, despite well-advertised Russian geopolitical sensitivities that such moves would be regarded as hostile.[xxi]

Embracing Intractability in Strategic Thinking

Recognising that some challenges are inherently unsolvable is not, though, a counsel of despair, because the recognition of intractability can offer valuable insights that can enhance strategic thinking. In mathematics and computing, concepts like Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and Alan Turing’s halting problem illustrate fundamental limitations in solving certain kinds of puzzles. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem demonstrated that any sufficiently powerful formal system, such as arithmetic, is incomplete: there exist true statements within such systems that cannot be proven using the system’s own rules.[xxii] Similarly, Turing’s halting problem showed that it is impossible to devise a universal algorithm to determine whether any given computer programme will eventually halt or run indefinitely.[xxiii] The obduracy of these types of conundrums in logic and computation provide a valuable insight for strategy: they delineate the boundaries of those fields, marking the frontiers of our understanding and problem-solving within them.

In the realm of strategy, accepting that some problems are intractable and do not lend themselves to practical solubility, however, can foster a mindset of openness and adaptability. Rather than striving to impose specific or complete solutions, strategic analysts and policymakers who recognise the limits of problem-solving may be more willing to consider different courses of action, cultivate broader understanding, and remain flexible. Alternatively, this approach might render policymakers amenable to piecemeal moves that may be the ‘best’ that can be achievable under the circumstances, but which at least advance some of the way towards a possible longer-term resolution. This perspective can help avoid overly rigid approaches and instead develop policies that are adaptable and responsive to change. When problem-solving is tempered by an awareness of intractability, strategic thinking can move beyond quick fixes, disproportionate responses, and a tendency to always seek bounded solutions, instead addressing deeper, systemic challenges that require sustained engagement.

From Problem-Solving to Problem-Framing in Strategy

Transitioning from problem-solving to problem-framing requires a shift in how challenges are defined and approached. Rather than viewing issues as discrete problems that demand solutions, problem-framing encourages the asking of broader, context-driven questions. For example, instead of asking how to prevent an adversary’s immediate actions, a problem-framing approach might explore why the adversary is acting in a certain way, examining the broader cultural, historical, and ideological factors that shape behaviour. This approach prioritises flexibility, tractability and understanding, allowing strategic analysts to respond more effectively to the complexity of real-world situations.

Problem-framing also promotes continuous learning, as it involves re-evaluating assumptions and remaining open to alternative viewpoints. Unlike problem-solving, which seeks solvability, problem-framing keeps the issue open to exploration. This approach is especially valuable in rapidly changing environments, where evolving conditions require strategies that are flexible and responsive to the changing demands of a situation. By focusing on understanding rather than solving, problem-framing allows for a more creative, even subtle, approaches that can reveal opportunities for influence, compromise and negotiation that might be overlooked under a rigid problem-solving model.[xxiv]

The Failure to Problem-Frame in Practice

While the theoretical appeal of this approach is evident, critics may argue that the limitations of problem-solving have not been convincingly demonstrated in practice. Similarly, they might contend that the benefits of problem-framing have been asserted rather than thoroughly substantiated. With respect to the repeated failures of Western foreign policy, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, where objectives were either not achieved or led to outcomes worse than the situations that preceded them, the case can be articulated relatively easily. These failures can be attributed, at least in part, to the lack of adequate ‘problem-framing’ adopted in strategic formulation and execution. The conceptualisation of complex international crises as discrete problems to be ‘solved’ has resulted in flawed implementation and a cascade of unintended consequences.

After 9/11 ‘the problem’ of Afghanistan was ‘to be solved’ by dismantling al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban regime. Most members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, however, were not captured and instead escaped to neighbouring Pakistan or dissolved into remote rural regions and mountains. This, of course, created new problems which in turn required new solutions. Eventually, the problem of Afghanistan morphed into a process of democratisation with insufficient consideration of the nation’s tribal dynamics, historical resistance to centralised authority and regional geopolitical entanglements involving actors like Pakistan and Iran.[xxv]

In Iraq, the 2003 invasion was conceived under the banner of solving the problem of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ through ‘regime change’, neglecting the profound sectarian divides and institutional voids left by the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Such reductive approaches during the ‘global war on terror’ ignored deeper socio-political undercurrents, inadvertently fuelling insurgencies, corruption and instability—creating newer more vexing problems.[xxvi]

The overemphasis on military solutions to non-military problems exemplifies the absence of Western problem-framing. In Afghanistan and Iraq, prolonged counter-insurgency campaigns achieved tactical victories but failed to secure lasting stability.[xxvii] This militarised approach to inherently political and social problems further highlights the disconnect between strategic goals and on-the-ground realities. The lack of stability was not just a consequence of accentuating military solutions but a result of an inattentiveness to exit strategies. In Iraq, the reliance on sectarian Shia leaders marginalised Sunni communities, paving the way for the rise of ISIS and a US return in 2014 after an injudicious withdrawal in 2011.[xxviii] In Afghanistan, the U.S.’s abrupt withdrawal in 2021, shaped more by domestic political considerations than by the situation on the ground, left the Afghan government and security forces incapable of resisting a Taliban resurgence.[xxix] The strategic neglect of local agency and cultural contexts frequently alienates local populations or inadvertently empowers unintended actors.

The ‘solutions’ in Afghanistan and Iraq have had far-reaching consequences. Strategies built on this problem-solving and inadequate problem-framing often prioritise optics—such as staging elections—over substantive progress, fail to anticipate secondary effects like the rise of ISIS or refugee crises, and lack the long-term commitments needed to address the evolving nature of these conflicts. Arguably the most damning, yet predictable, secondary effect was the return of the Taliban government. The reliance in Afghanistan on corrupt and unpopular central governments drove rural communities toward the Taliban, who were often seen as a more reliable source of justice and security.[xxx]

Ultimately, Western problem-solving treats conflicts as problems to be solved rather than as complex systems full of interlocking dynamics that require sustained attention and continuous adjustment. The problem-solving approach to both Afghanistan and Iraq is, in part, a failure to frame the issue and identify alternative pathways. Questions framed as problems—such as ‘how should one respond to the rise of sectarian militias?’ or ‘how should one respond to record levels of opium poppy cultivation?’—tend to yield discrete, closed solutions, often emphasising escalation, increased military aid, or greater financial commitment. In contrast, more open-ended questions, such as ‘Why are local socio-political dynamics, such as sectarian divides or tribal structures, often overlooked in Western policy formulation’? or ‘Why do interventions fail to adapt to the cascading nature of problems they create or exacerbate?’ might explore options like diplomatic off-ramps or alternative approaches, without necessarily excluding strategies based on escalation.[xxxi]

Until this cognitive and strategic rigidity is reformed, similar failures are likely to recur. The framing, therefore, plays a critical role in shaping both the discourse and the range of actionable strategies. Problem-solving, in other words, reduces the scope of strategy, whereas problem framing leads to the expansion of strategic options.

Clausewitz’s Legacy and the Value of Framing

At the outset this article maintained that the idea of problem-framing in strategy is not inherently new. In fact, the insights of Carl von Clausewitz offer a foundational perspective on problem-framing in strategy. Clausewitz’s assertion that ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other means’ underscores the importance of viewing military engagements within their larger political and social context.[xxxii] Unlike a purely operational perspective, which focuses on tactical victories, Clausewitz’s approach emphasises how military actions contribute to long-term political objectives. His often-overlooked dictum that ‘in war the result is never final’ equally reflects an understanding of war as an evolving, continuous process rather than a series of isolated events with fixed outcomes.[xxxiii]

Clausewitz’s approach aligns with problem-framing by highlighting the interdependence of means and ends. His work suggests that strategy should not be reduced to strict formulas or prescribed solutions but should instead foster adaptability, reflection, and critical judgement. His concept of ‘friction’—the unpredictable, often chaotic factors that arise in conflict—further illustrates the limitations of a strictly problem-solving cast of mind. Friction requires strategists to remain flexible, responding to unexpected developments rather than adhering strictly to predetermined plans.[xxxiv] By embracing the inherent uncertainty of conflict, Clausewitz’s philosophy underscores the value of framing as a method that promotes understanding and adaptability.

Conclusion: Embracing Problem-Framing in Strategy

Strategy as problem-solving has been around since the dawn of humanity. The concept has been integral to human development as it has been to success in waging wars. Nothing is likely to displace it as a primary lens for viewing situations and challenges and nor should it. Even so, believing that ‘problem-solving’ is the only or necessarily the best way of approaching strategic dilemmas is inherently self-limiting and potentially self-harming. Viewing strategy as problem-framing provides a pathway toward more flexible and context-sensitive approaches in modern strategic thought.[xxxv] Unlike problem-solving, which seeks definitive answers, problem-framing fosters critical thinking and exploration, encouraging analysts to remain open to new insights and adaptive solutions. In a complex world, shaped by different cultures, interests, values-systems and historical contexts, problem-framing offers a more resilient framework for understanding and addressing challenges that defy simple solutions.

By emphasising understanding over solutions, problem-framing equips strategic thinkers to engage with challenges in ways that move beyond conventional methods. While problem-framing does not eliminate the inherent complexities in conflicted situations, it provides a more flexible foundation for strategic decision-making, enabling responses that are likely to be more thoughtful, adaptive, and better suited to the dynamic nature of the modern world and the multiple challenges to war and peace they present.