Introduction
The effectual truth of Machiavelli is that he not only understood the modern world but created it.[i]
This paper aims to provide a Machiavellian analysis of the strategies employed in the 2023 War in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. By exploring the conflict through the lens of virtù, the paper demonstrates how Machiavelli’s principles, particularly his emphasis on adaptability, deception, and the effective use of force, remain relevant in contemporary warfare. So, How do Machiavellian principles shape the strategies of both Israel and Hamas in the 2023 War in Gaza?
The core objective of this analysis is to offer readers a practical framework for understanding the strategic dynamics at play in Israel versus Hamas and other modern military conflicts. By drawing connections between Machiavellian thought and current military strategies, the paper seeks to illuminate the underlying logic that drives both sides’ military actions.
By the end of this paper, readers will have a clearer understanding of how Machiavelli’s concepts can be used to analyze the outcomes of modern conflicts and how classical strategic ideas are applied in real-world scenarios. This approach is not only intellectually stimulating but also practically useful for those involved in strategic planning and military studies, offering a timeless perspective on the complexities of warfare.
Framing Virtù and Strategy
Machiavelli’s concept of virtù is crucial to understanding the 2023 War in Gaza. Virtù is not a moral virtue, but the qualities required to maintain power, including boldness, prudence, and adaptability.[ii] However, even if Machiavelli emphasizes the need to adapt to changing circumstances he abhors of shortsighted politics.[iii] Furthermore, as Regent (2011) highlights, Machiavelli admires the ability to adapt and use deception but warns about lasting enmity.[iv]
Unsurprisingly, Machiavelli is often misinterpreted in Western culture as a proponent of ruthless power politics. However, his ideas on virtù emphasize the necessity of adaptability and strategic thinking to create order and reduce bloodshed in the long term.[v] This approach also mirrors Ron Tira’s (2010) analysis of the necessity for continuous strategy in conflict.[vi] Thus, Machiavellian strategies may involve harsh actions, but their aim is ultimately pragmatic: to secure stability and prevent prolonged conflict.[vii]
Other strategic thinkers like Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Sun Bin as well as influential philosophers such as Laozi provide contrasting philosophies with Machiavellianism that also could be used to understand the 2023 War in Gaza.[viii] However, Machiavelli offers a timeless quality that you will hardly find anywhere else. It is not a sort of Middle East exception but also can be seen in very different ongoing postmodern scenarios such as the tactics seen in 2020s Russian hybrid warfare.[ix] Therefore, we will make the most of Machiavellian philosophy to understand the prima facie calculated havoc of Israeli Dahiya doctrine and the irrational yet effective Hamas’ Muqawama.
Dahiya Doctrine and the Israeli Rational Strategy
Rational strategies, as described by Kobi Michael (2011), emphasize the need for Israel to enhance its strategic learning processes to cope with complex environments.[x] Thus, Israel’s strategy is characterized by ongoing but calculated planning, which aligns with Machiavellian thought on continuous adaptation and learning. In contrast, I consider Hamas’s strategy as irrational because, just like an uncanny cunning ads campaign, it is grounded on straightforward emotions such as identity, honor and faith first and grinding complexity after. In other words, Hamas employs a strategy focused on keeping superior war support and Gaza as a tinderbox over calculated outcomes.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) employ the Dahiya doctrine, a strategy named after the heavily damaged Dahieh neighborhood in Beirut during the 2006 Lebanon War. This strategy, pioneered by former IDF Chief of General Staff Gadi Eizenkot, involves using disproportionate force to deter enemies by causing significant destruction to civilian infrastructure. The goal is to prevent prolonged guerrilla warfare by causing such immense damage to the enemy’s support base that they reconsider further aggression. This doctrine targets infrastructure to weaken the enemy’s capabilities and willpower, aligning with Machiavellian principles of strategic deterrence and control.
Machiavelli would likely judge the Dahiya doctrine as better than the Gazan Muqawama since it aligns with two Machiavellian core tenets that it is better to be feared than loved (if you cannot be both) and that never you should inflict an enemy a small injury.[xi] Machiavelli would appreciate the IDF’s focus on strategic deterrence and the use of overwhelming force to ensure a decisive outcome, as it reflects the pragmatic and sometimes ruthless approach he advocated for maintaining power and achieving strategic goals.[xii]
The Dahiya Doctrine, with its focus on disproportionate force to deter future attacks, exemplifies how Israel strategically applies Machiavelli’s principle of virtù—favoring pragmatic, decisive actions to maintain power, aligning with the broader Machiavellian framework of adapting to and controlling unpredictable circumstances. However, Machiavelli would also caution Israel against the potential for creating lasting enmity and resistance. Drawing from the Roman conquest of Carthage versus Greece, he would warn that leaving a conquered population with its own laws and customs (in this context, the Shariah) can lead to persistent resistance and the need for repeated military interventions.[xiii] The Dahiya doctrine’s emphasis on disproportionate force can foster victimization and anti-Semitism, particularly in the most anti-Semitic world region, which in turn hampers the Israeli military strategy.
Muqawama Doctrine and Hamas Irrational Strategy
The Muqawama doctrine, much like the Israeli strategy, directly aligns with the Machiavellian framing of virtù outlined earlier. However, it reflects a different manifestation of Machiavellian virtù, emphasizing adaptability and resourcefulness in the face of overwhelming military power, much like Machiavelli’s guidance to navigate fortuna while aiming to disrupt Israel despite its superior strength.
In 2012, eleven years before the 2023 War in Gaza started, Gur Laish stated that Hamas’ resistance can succeed as long as it does not provoke overwhelming Israeli retaliation, which finally happened.[xiv] Has Hamas done a wrong movement with its atrocities? In 2012, there were no Abraham Accords, to begin with, so there were no incentives for breaking this stalemate by Hamas since demographic projections, in the long run, were favorable for antisemitic interests. Furthermore, Israel gave up the Sinai in 1967 and Gaza in 2005 so it seemed a question of time that Arab territorial pretensions got mostly if not completely fulfilled as long as conflict could be sustained. Even if it never happened due to strong Israeli red lines, it would create a dynamic of low-intensity conflict, where both sides maintain a balance without achieving long-term goals, mirroring Machiavelli’s insights into the pragmatic use of power and the complexities of control in a hostile environment.[xv] But the Abraham Accords happened, and Israel normalized its relations with formerly hostile Arab countries that didn’t recognize it and even the US appointed the whole of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. The demographic swarming and economic disruption of Israel by Iran, Arab countries and disputed territories seemed at this point too distant. Before the 2023 War in Gaza started, the ultimate declared goal of wiping out Israel was kicked forward to an unforeseeable date. Consequently, Gur’s 2012 view became outdated as soon as Hamas’ strategy, which once seemed viable within a low-intensity conflict framework, was upended.[xvi] I can’t highlight it enough: irrational strategies are not inherently reckless or inferior to rational ones. In fact, they can be just as effective if they align with the context of the conflict and secure the support of key agents while evoking fear, respect, or loyalty from the general populace. Following the 2023 War in Gaza hostilities, Hamas was able to reverse its popularity crisis within six months.[xvii] This was achieved by aligning the cultural and religious makeup of Gazans with their experience in insurgent warfare, strengthening their overall military strategy.
Even if it’s not a paper on religion nor politics, in most Middle East Muslim countries you need to delve a bit into religious beliefs to understand their military strategies better because such is the weight of religion in every aspect of life. As a result, Gazan military strategy cannot be conventional by Israeli and Western standards, and we need to double down to grasp how much Islamic beliefs infuse every aspect of its operations and objectives. To begin with, the Hamas Charter establishes that Gaza, Cisjordania and Israel are an Islamic endowment (Waqf, الوقف), making its reclamation a religious duty for every Muslim. This mandate frames the conflict as a continuous Jihad (struggle, جِهَاد) against Israeli occupation. Central to this strategy is the concept of martyrdom, influenced by the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This belief is operationalized through tactics like suicide bombings and other martyrdom operations, which are portrayed as religiously sanctioned acts of self-sacrifice. This glorification of dying while killing the most Jews possible is disseminated through educational programs, media, and ‘pay for slay’ programs.[xviii] Specifically, the doctrine of Muqawama (resistance, مقاومة) further integrates military actions into daily life. This approach mobilizes the entire community, blending civilian and military roles to sustain resistance efforts. To ensure this communal effort doesn’t lose momentum, Hamas leaders and affiliated clerics issue fatwas that emphasize the religious imperative of Jihad and martyrdom.
The caliphate / political Islam, unlike the modern nation-state, operates without territorial limits or reliance on legal sovereignty, blending religious and political authority into one framework. Political obedience within the caliphate is seen as a religious duty, enforced by leaders with divine authority and supported by institutions like the Sunni ulema and Shia marjaʿiyya. This model shapes military strategy in ways that diverge from Western norms, where the separation of religion and state is central. Furthermore, Machiavelli’s advice that a wise ruler ought never to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interests goes not with Hamas because of an extremist view of taqiyya (تقیة, prudence) an Islamic tenet that allows behaving against Quran in order to foster it.[xix] As a result, from the most nimious tactical decision to the game changing military strategy dilemmas, everything in Gaza is presented as a religious duty and is soaked in pious rhetoric because doing so, rather than limiting strategic options, frees strategy from any moral constraints (e.g. human shields, attacking from hospitals, etc.).
Comparative Analysis of Rational vs. Irrational Strategies
In the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, rational and irrational strategies can be clearly delineated so they can be clearly compared as well. An evaluation of these approaches needs to assess their inherent strengths and weaknesses, which leads us back to our Machiavellian virtù frame. Namely, the IDF mindset is closer to Clausewitz than Hamas in the light of its emphasis on using decisive military strength to achieve political objectives. On the other hand, the Muqawama doctrine aligns most closely with Sun Tzu’s focus on strategic deception and adaptability, using unconventional tactics to weaken a stronger opponent over time. To avoid the comparing of apples and pears kind of error, we’ll position Dahiya and Muqawama into a Machiavellian military strategy space to highlight how both strategies reflect different aspects of Machiavellian thought.
Figure 1
Seemingly, Israel’s decisive military actions are more Machiavellian since they follow his principles more closely. However, there are two major disruptors that have made the IDF in practice badly underperform, especially, at the beginning of the 2023 War in Gaza. The first falls under Machiavellian theory and is none but the lack of military strategic leadership due to the shortage of moral authority from politicians and its subsequent meager political obedience after years of misguided politics.[xx] The second one has been barely sketched and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is the way how politically shaped Islam has helped Hamas in turning an antisemitic creed into blind militancy and relentless pursuit of the Jewish state and Jewish people’s destruction. Machiavelli was not ignorant about the utility of religion when it comes to manipulating the populace, but he never properly assessed its true political size, so there is a portion of the Hamas decision to trigger this war that will remain hidden from the philosophical coordinates the Florentine provides us.
Once again, no matter how irrational a strategy is, it doesn’t rule out adapting its military strategies in response to internal and external pressures, including interactions with other radical groups and pragmatic political participation to further its objectives. And the other way around, regardless of how rational a military strategy might be, it is not exempt from generating significant international backlash and humanitarian crises, which Machiavelli’s writings barely address but Hamas radically expects. So, we must not allow shortsighted stereotypes to blind us (oh, irony!) from Machiavellianism hidden in religious power and its weight in grand strategy. Machiavelli’s downplaying of religious institutions, after the fall of the Florentine Republic and the return of the Medici family in 1512, sent him behind bars. Further even, in 1559, long after his death, Machiavelli’s works were placed on the Catholic Church’s Index of Prohibited Books due to his anti-clerical stance.
Conclusion
The 2023 War in Gaza contains Machiavellian principles in present 2024 strategy. The Israeli application of the Dahiya doctrine, characterized by the use of overwhelming force to deter future aggression, exemplifies Machiavelli’s philosophy. By inflicting significant damage on civilian infrastructure, Israel aims to weaken the enemy’s capabilities and morale, ensuring a decisive and intimidating presence. This strategic use of force reflects the pragmatic and often ruthless approach necessary to maintain power and achieve long-term security objectives.
On the other hand, Hamas’ strategy, driven by ideological and religious motivations, highlights a different aspect of Machiavellian virtù: adaptability and resilience in the face of superior military power. By exploiting religious beliefs to sustain its resistance, Hamas embodies a resourceful and cunning approach that aligns with Machiavelli’s emphasis on the importance of obedience. Despite the apparent irrationality from a conventional standpoint, Hamas’ strategies are effective within their own framework, demonstrating a profound understanding of their unique war dynamics.
In the present bellic context, Machiavelli’s insights into power dynamics and the use of force offer timeless guidance. He warned that initiating a new order after the war is fraught with danger and uncertainty and demands an effectual mindset and strategic calculus, for example, anticipating both Israel’s presence in Gaza and antisemitic stakeholders’ weaknesses.
True power lies not in the illusion of stability but in the relentless pursuit of strategic dominance and adaptability. It’s a Machiavellian lesson that remains ever pertinent in 21st century war theaters.
[i] Morrisey, W. (2024). Machiavelli's Virtù and the Modern World. History of Political Thought, 45(1), 89-105.
[ii] Skinner, Q. (2000). Machiavelli: A very short introduction. OUP Oxford.
[iii] Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. University of Chicago Press. Ch. 3, 14.
Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. Clarendon Press, 192-193
[iv] Regent, N. (2011). Machiavelli: Empire, Virtù and the Final Downfall. History of Political Thought, 32(5), 751-772.
[v] Skinner, Q. (2000). Machiavelli: A very short introduction. OUP Oxford.
[vi] Tira, R. (2010). Israel’s Strategy (or Lack of) Towards Iran’s Forward Rocket Deployments in Lebanon and Gaza. Infinity Journal, 1, 14-17.
[vii] Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. Clarendon Press, Ch. 8.
[viii] von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On War, eds., Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press.
Laozi. (1996). Tao Te Ching. Wordsworth Editions.
Tzu, S. (2002). The Art of War. Courier Corporation.
[ix] Yaman, F. (2022). Applying Machiavellian Discourses to Russian Hybrid Warfare. Middle East Technical University. https://open.metu.edu.tr/handle/11511/96266
[x] Michael, K. (2011). Limitations of Strategic Maneuver: The Israeli Case. Infinity Journal (4), 12-16.
[xi] Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. Clarendon Press, 199-200, Ch. 5.
[xii] Skinner, Q. (2000). Machiavelli: A very short introduction. OUP Oxford.
Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. University of Chicago Press.
[xiii] Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. University of Chicago Press, 28-30.
[xiv] Laish, G. (2019). Why Israel and Hamas Fail to Achieve a Strategic Change. Military Strategy Magazine 6(4).
[xv] Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. University of Chicago Press, 28-30, 239-241.
[xvi] Laish, G. (2019). Why Israel and Hamas Fail to Achieve a Strategic Change. Military Strategy Magazine 6(4).
[xvii] Cleveland, C., & Pollock, D. (10 October 2023). Polls Show Majority of Gazans Were Against Breaking Ceasefire; Hamas and Hezbollah Unpopular Among Key Arab Publics. The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/polls-show-majority-gazans-were-against-breaking-ceasefire-hamas-and-hezbollah
Shikaki, K., & Ladadweh, W. (2024). Public Opinion Poll (91). Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH. https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2091%20English%20press%20release%2020%20March%202024.pdf
[xviii] Kessler, G. (14 March 2018). Does the Palestinian Authority pays $350 million a year to ‘terrorists and their families’?. Washington Post.
[xix] Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. Clarendon Press, 70.
[xx] Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. University of Chicago Press, 274-290.
Machiavelli, N. (1891). Il Principe. Clarendon Press, Ch. 16, 17, 19.